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Abstract 
This thesis uses cyber security, an important topic in today's world, as a vector for analysis 
in order to contribute to a better understanding of the European Union (EU)’s policy-
making processes.  Although EU policy has received extensive scholarly attention, cyber 
security policy is under-researched, a gap in current literature this thesis addresses.  The 
goal of the thesis is to understand why the Union adopted and maintained a socio-
economic approach to cyber security when other actors added military and defence 
considerations.  The thesis employs an historical institutionalist (HI) framework to 
examine the long-term institutional and ideational influences underpinning policy 
development in this area between 1985 and 2013.  This was achieved using a longitudinal 
narrative inquiry employing an original, conceptual content analysis technique developed 
to gather data from both relevant EU acquis communautaire and over 30 interviews.   
There were three main findings resulting from this analysis, two empirical and one 
theoretical.  The first empirical finding was that the EU’s competences established an 
institutional framework – a set of rules and procedures – for policy development in this 
sector.  By restricting the EU’s capacity to engage in military or national security-oriented 
issues, its competences required it to respond to emerging security matters from a socio-
economic perspective.  The second empirical finding was that there exists a specific 
discourse underpinning EU cyber security policy.  That discourse is predicated upon a set 
of five ideational elements which influenced policy continuously between 1985 and 2013.  
These five elements are: maximising the economic benefits of cyberspace; protecting 
fundamental rights; tackling cyber-crime; promoting trust in digital systems and achieving 
these goals through facilitating actor co-operation.  Throughout the thesis the argument is 
made that the EU adopted and maintained its socio-economic policy as a result of an 
interaction between this ideational discourse and the institutional framework provided by 
competences.  This interaction created a linear, but not deterministic path of policy 
development from which the EU did not deviate.  The third, theoretical, finding relates to 
the HI mechanisms of path dependency and punctuated equilibrium.  The EU’s policy 
discourse was exposed to major stresses after 2007 which, according to punctuated 
equilibrium, should have caused policy change.  Instead, those stresses entrenched the 
Union’s discourse.  This demonstrates an explanatory flexibility not normally associated 
with punctuated equilibrium.  The findings of the thesis have implications for policy 
practitioners by providing a way to identify underlying ideational dynamics in policy 
development.  Due to a combination of empirical and conceptual findings, the thesis 
provides a potential basis for future research in EU policy development and HI analyses. 
 
3 
 
Contents 
Contents ................................................................................................................................ 3 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ 7 
List of Diagrams ................................................................................................................... 8 
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................ 9 
Author’s declaration .......................................................................................................... 11 
Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 12 
Dedication ........................................................................................................................... 14 
Chapter 1 | Introduction .................................................................................................... 15 
1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 15 
1.2. Focus of thesis, rationale and placement in the literature ............................................................. 19 
1.3. Rationale for Applying Historical Institutionalism to EU Cyber Security Policy ........................ 21 
1.3.1. Applying the mechanisms of HI .......................................................................................... 22 
1.4. Analytical Approach and Methodology: Data Sources and Analytical Techniques ..................... 24 
1.5. Definitions Employed in the Thesis ............................................................................................. 26 
1.5.1. Defining Cyber Security ...................................................................................................... 27 
1.5.2. “European Union” or “European Community”? .................................................................. 27 
1.5.2.1. Retroactive Continuity:  Applying modern terms to historic concepts ........................... 28 
1.5.3. “Timescape” versus “timeframe" ........................................................................................ 29 
1.6. Thesis outline and main findings .................................................................................................. 30 
Chapter 2 | Literature Review: The EU and Cyber Security – Debates and Theory .. 35 
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 35 
2.2. Academic debates ......................................................................................................................... 37 
2.2.1. Fragmentation of the EU’s approach ................................................................................... 37 
2.2.2. Co-operation as a policy goal .............................................................................................. 42 
2.2.3. Contribution of this thesis to EU academic literature .......................................................... 45 
2.3. Theory .......................................................................................................................................... 46 
2.3.1. Neofunctionalism................................................................................................................. 48 
2.3.1.1. Neofunctionalism, Cyber Security and Limited EU competences in defence policy ..... 49 
2.3.1.2. Neofunctionalism, Cyber Security and a Lack of Integration ......................................... 51 
2.3.2. Intergovernmentalism .......................................................................................................... 51 
2.3.3. Constructivism ..................................................................................................................... 54 
2.3.4. Institutionalism .................................................................................................................... 56 
2.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 3 | Research Design, Methodology and Ethics .................................................. 62 
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 62 
3.2. Identifying Data Sources .............................................................................................................. 63 
3.2.1. Identifying, collecting, collating and cataloguing primary literature ................................... 64 
3.2.2. Elite interviews .................................................................................................................... 67 
3.2.2.1. Selection/identification of Participants ........................................................................... 68 
3.2.2.2. Conducting the elite interviews – ensuring consistency, fidelity and reliability ............. 71 
3.3. Data collection and Analysis ........................................................................................................ 75 
4 
 
3.3.1. Generating Data: Coding the acquis and interview transcripts ............................................ 76 
3.4. Narrative Inquiry: Employing HI techniques ............................................................................... 80 
3.5. Reflections on methodological strengths and limitations ............................................................. 81 
3.5.1. Methodological Strengths .................................................................................................... 81 
3.5.2. Limitations ........................................................................................................................... 82 
3.6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 86 
Chapter 4 | Theoretical Framework: Applying Historical Institutionalist Elements 
and Functions ..................................................................................................................... 88 
4.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 88 
4.2. The institutions relevant to this thesis .......................................................................................... 90 
4.2.1. Classifying Union Competences as an Institution ............................................................... 91 
4.3. Actors for this study – clarifying “actorness” ............................................................................... 94 
4.3.1. Defining “Actorness” .......................................................................................................... 96 
4.3.1.1. The Role of the Formal Institutions in EU Policy-making ............................................. 97 
4.4. Path Dependence and Punctuation Points ..................................................................................... 98 
4.4.1. Path dependence .................................................................................................................. 99 
4.4.2. Punctuated equilibrium ...................................................................................................... 100 
4.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 101 
Chapter 5 | The EU’s Cyber Security Discourse ........................................................... 103 
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 103 
5.2. The EU’s cyber security discourse: An Historic Framework Based on Five Ideational Elements
 104 
5.2.1. Maximising the Economic Potential of Cyberspace .......................................................... 107 
5.2.2. Promoting Trust in Digital Systems................................................................................... 111 
5.2.3. Protecting Fundamental Rights .......................................................................................... 112 
5.2.4. Tackling Cyber-Crime ....................................................................................................... 115 
5.2.5. Co-operation as a modus operandi .................................................................................... 118 
5.3. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 120 
Chapter 6 | Creating Path Dependence 1985-2001........................................................ 122 
6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 122 
6.2. Establishing Union “cyber” policy ............................................................................................. 124 
6.2.1. The Initiation of the Single Market and the Focus on ICT ................................................ 124 
6.2.2. The 1994 Bangemann Report ............................................................................................ 128 
6.3. The Influence of Competence on Establishing Cyber Security Principles ................................. 132 
6.3.1. The 1987 Single European Act .......................................................................................... 132 
6.3.2. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the creation of policy pillars .......................................... 134 
6.4. Responding to Increasing Security Concerns ............................................................................. 137 
6.5. Creating a Recognisable “cyber security” policy: The 2001 Proposal for a Network and 
Information Security Strategy .................................................................................................................... 143 
6.5.1. Defining a Threat Typology .............................................................................................. 143 
6.5.2. Specifying Technical Measures for Network and Information Security............................ 144 
6.5.3. Defining Network and Information Security ..................................................................... 145 
6.5.4. Promoting Actor Co-operation .......................................................................................... 145 
6.6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 146 
Chapter 7 | Policy Consolidation 2002-2006 .................................................................. 149 
7.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 149 
5 
 
7.2. Operationalising Cyber Security Policy ..................................................................................... 151 
7.2.1. Europol and the Fight against Cybercrime ........................................................................ 151 
7.2.2. The European Network and Information Security Agency ............................................... 153 
7.3. A Shift in Approach but not Discourse: The 2006 Strategy for a Secure Information Society .. 156 
7.3.1. Ideational Continuity in the Strategy for a Secure Information Society ............................ 157 
7.3.2. A New Dynamic for Cyber Security .................................................................................. 161 
7.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 163 
Chapter 8 | Punctuated Equilibrium Part 1:  The Influence of Exogenous Institutional 
Stresses on EU Cyber Security Policy ............................................................................ 166 
8.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 166 
8.2. Crisis 1 – The 2007 Cyber Attacks on Estonia ........................................................................... 167 
8.2.1. Policy Choice 1: Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) ............................. 171 
8.2.2. Policy Choice 2: Resilience ............................................................................................... 173 
8.2.3. Interpreting “Estonia 2007” ............................................................................................... 175 
8.3. Crisis 2 – The 2008 Financial Crisis .......................................................................................... 177 
8.3.1. The Influence of External Crises: Policy Continuation vs Policy Change ........................ 182 
8.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 184 
Chapter 9 | Punctuated Equilibrium Part 2: The Effect of the Treaty of Lisbon on 
Cyber Security Policy ...................................................................................................... 186 
9.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 186 
9.2. The Effects of the Treaty of Lisbon: Restructuring the EU’s policy-making architecture ......... 187 
9.3. Removing the Maastricht Pillars ................................................................................................ 189 
9.3.1. Promoting Co-operation .................................................................................................... 190 
9.3.2. Combining Pillars in the EUCSS ....................................................................................... 193 
9.4. The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on EU Cyber Security ........................................................ 198 
9.4.1. The Lack of Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the EU’s Cyber Security Discourse ........ 199 
9.4.2. The Nature and Influence of Competence Post-Lisbon ..................................................... 207 
9.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 210 
Chapter 10 | Conclusions ................................................................................................. 212 
10.1.  Introduction and summary of main findings .............................................................................. 212 
10.2.  Finding 1: Socio-economic competence as the institutional driver of greatest influence on EU 
cyber security ............................................................................................................................................ 215 
10.3. Finding 2: Clarifying the EU’s Cyber Security Discourse ......................................................... 216 
10.3.1. Empirical Implications: The influence of competences and ideas on EU cyber security 
policy development............................................................................................................................... 217 
10.4. Finding 3: The resilience of EU cyber security policy to institutional stresses .......................... 220 
10.4.1. Implications for Historical Institutionalism ....................................................................... 221 
10.5. Implications of this research for policy practitioners and avenues for further research ............. 222 
10.6. Contribution of the thesis and concluding comments ................................................................. 224 
Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 228 
Appendix 1 – European policy and legislative documents relevant for cyber security ............................. 228 
Appendix 2 – EU Acquis relevant to Cyber Security ................................................................................ 230 
Appendix 3 – Acquis categorised by Actor and Publication Date ............................................................. 237 
Appendix 4 – EU acquis relating to Critical Information Infrastructure Protection .................................. 244 
6 
 
Appendix 5 – EU acquis relating to the 2008 financial crisis ................................................................... 245 
Appendix 6 – European Commission DG HOME Organisation Chart ..................................................... 246 
Appendix 7 – Sample Interview Questions ............................................................................................... 247 
Appendix 8 – Participant Information and Plain Language Statement ...................................................... 248 
Appendix 9 – Sample Participant Consent Form....................................................................................... 250 
Appendix 10 – List of Referable Interview Participants ........................................................................... 251 
Appendix 11 – Control Codes (NVivo nodes) derived from EU Cyber Security Strategy ....................... 253 
Appendix 12 – Codes (NVivo nodes) not derived from EUCSS ............................................................... 255 
Appendix 13 – Article 222 TFEU: “Solidarity Clause” ............................................................................ 257 
References ......................................................................................................................... 258 
 
  
7 
 
List of Tables 
Table 5-1 Ideational Elements in EU cyber security policy………………………..…..p.105 
Table 5-2 Linear continuity of “economics” as an ideational element……………...…p.106 
Table 5-3 Linear continuity of “trust” as an ideational element…………………….…p.108 
Table 5-4 Linear continuity of “protection of fundamental rights” as an ideational 
element…………………………………………………………………………………p.112 
Table 5-5 Linear continuity of “tackling cyber-crime” as an ideational element……...p.114 
Table 5-6 Linear continuity of “co-operation” as an ideational element………………p.116 
Table 6-1 Comparison of the Bangemann Report and the EUCSS………………….…p.126 
Table 6-2 Comparison of the EUCSS and COM (1996) 487…………………………..p.136 
Table 7-1 Continuity in Cyber Policies 1996-2013…………………………………….p.156 
Table 8-1 Comments from Interview Participants on 2007 Estonian DDoS attacks…..p.165 
Table 9-1 Content Analysis of Occurrence of Ideational Elements 2007-2013………..p.200 
  
8 
 
List of Diagrams 
Diagram 3-1 Acquis collection Process…………………………………………………p.65 
Diagram 3-2 Participant Acquisition Process…………………………………………...p.69 
Diagram 3-3 Data generation process (coding)…………………………………………p.77 
Diagram 6-1 The Pillars of the EU post Maastricht…………………………………....p.133 
 
  
9 
 
Acknowledgments 
As anyone who has ever undertaken a PhD knows, there is a huge phalanx of people who 
deserve thanks and acknowledgement when the thing is finally completed.  I am grateful to 
all those with whom I have discussed the thesis, its content and concepts and who have 
provided invaluable insights.  I am indebted and grateful to my supervisors, Drs Eamonn 
Butler and Brandon Valeriano, who supported me and guided me through not only this 
project but all the logistical challenges that came with it. 
I must also thank the various members of the Politics Department at the University of 
Glasgow who have helped out over the last four years with advice, ideas and sources of 
invaluable information, and especially Maggie Nicol and Eileen Douglas who frequently 
provided sympathetic ears and welcome laughs.  I must also thank Bethia Pearson for her 
counsel and for keeping me grounded, and Haley Cross for putting up with me as an 
office-mate. 
I am very grateful to all those professionals and practitioners who agreed to meet with me 
during the fieldwork phase of the thesis and who shared their time, ideas and experiences 
as interviewees for this research.  I am also grateful to the University of Glasgow’s Centre 
for, Russian, Central and East European Studies (CRCEES) and the Universities’ 
Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) for fieldwork travel awards.  
Particular thanks have to go to Terry Dorrity and Lydia Laura who very kindly let me stay 
in their home in Brussels twice during fieldwork, and who secured a number of high-level 
interviews on my behalf. 
I would also like to thank my new colleagues at ETH Zürich – Prof. Andreas Wenger, Dr 
Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Dr Tim Prior, Richard Fueglister and Marie Baezner – who gave 
me a fantastic career opportunity but still allowed me the time and space to complete the 
thesis.  I must particularly thank Myriam, Dr Matteo Bonfanti and Dr Matthias Leese who 
helped immensely by reading drafts of the thesis and sharing their thoughts. 
Finally, many, many thanks have to go to my family.  Huge thanks to my parents Betty and 
Peter, who helped and supported me in so many ways throughout this endeavour, in 
particular helping with funding, proofreading so many successive drafts and occasional 
washing and ironing.  Thanks also to my parents-in-law Hamish and Anne, who so very 
kindly let me turn their home into a writing retreat for several weeks and to my Aunt Isabel 
10 
 
and Uncle Sandy who helped kick-start the whole process by supporting me through my 
MSc.     
My most heartfelt thanks have to go to my wife Shona, who not only gave me 100% 
support over the last four years, but sacrificed a great deal of time and effort, gave me 
some great insights, helped produced the diagrams used in this thesis and never stopped 
believing that I could accomplish this feat.  She put up with the ups and downs and kept 
the coffee flowing, never stopping believing for a moment.  Thank you also to our 
beautiful daughter, Ӓdeline, who joined us for the final furlong and whose smiles, giggles 
and gurgles always cheered and inspired.  Thank you to you both. 
  
11 
 
Author’s declaration 
 
 
 
I declare that except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this 
dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree 
at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.  
  
 
  
 
Signature:   
  
 
 
Printed Name: ROBERT SCOTT DEWAR 
 
  
12 
 
Abbreviations 
AEI University of Pittsburgh's Archive of European Integration 
BEPA Bureau of European Policy Analysis* 
CAQDAS Computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
CCDCOE Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
CERT Computer emergency response team 
CERT-EU EU computer emergency response team 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIP Critical infrastructure protection 
CIIP Critical information infrastructure protection 
COM Commission Communication 
CNO Computer network operations 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team 
DDoS Distributed denial of service 
DG Directorate General 
DG Connect 
Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content 
and Technology 
DG GROWTH 
Directorate General for the Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs 
DG HOME Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs 
DG MARKT Directorate General for the Internal Market and Services* 
DNS Domain name system 
EAEC European Atomic Energy Community 
EC3 European Cyber-Crime Centre 
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community 
EDA European Defence Agency 
EDC European Defence Community (proposed) 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EEC European Economic Community 
ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency 
EPC European political co-operation 
EU European Union 
EUCSS Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union 
eu-LISA 
European Agency for the operational management of large-
scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice 
Eurojust European Union Judicial Co-operation Unit 
EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law database 
13 
 
Europol European Police Office 
FoP Friends of the Presidency 
HI Historical institutionalism 
HR 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy 
HTCC High-tech Crime Centre 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
ICDS International Centre for Defence and Security 
ICT Information and communications technology 
IGC Intergovernmental conference 
IR International relations 
ISP Internet service provider 
IT Information Technology 
JHA Justice and Home Affairs 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NIS Network and information security 
PD Path Dependency 
QMV Qualified Majority Voting 
RCI Rational choice institutionalism 
Retcon Retroactive continuity 
SDA Security and Defence Agenda 
SEA Single European Act 
SI Sociological institutionalism 
SME Small and medium sized enterprises 
SMP Single Market Programme 
SSIS Strategy for a Secure Information Society 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
The Council The Council of the European Union 
UACES Universities Association for Contemporary European Studies 
UK United Kingdom 
USA United States 
W3C World Wide Web Consortium 
 
 
* No longer active 
 
14 
 
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my wife, Shona 
And our daughter, Ӓdeline 
and 
For my mother and father, Betty and Peter 
 
 
  
15 
 
“Institutions persist through time, organising politics into something more than a seamless 
flow of activities and events.” 
(Orren and Skowronek, 1996, p. 111) 
 
“Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate 
operators in every nation…A graphic representation of data from the banks of every 
computer in the human system.  Unthinkable complexity.” 
 
(Gibson, 1984, p. 67) 
Chapter 1 | Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
On the 17th May 2016, the Council of the European Union formally adopted new rules to 
enhance cyber security across the EU.  Directive (EU) 2016/1148 Concerning Measures 
for a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information Systems across the 
Union (European Parliament & Council of The European Union, 2016) is intended to 
“support and facilitate strategic co-operation between Member States” (European 
Commission, 2016a).  The Directive lays down security obligations for operators in critical 
sectors (such as energy, transport, health and finance) and for digital service providers 
(online marketplaces, search engines and cloud services).  In addition, each EU Member 
State will for the first time be required to ensure that they are properly equipped to tackle 
cyber security incidents.  The obligations placed on them include designating one or more 
national authorities, establishing a strategy for dealing with cyber threats and setting up a 
Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) (European Commission, 2016a). 
How the EU reached this position is a long and fascinating process.  EU cyber security 
policy evolved during a time when the world became more digitally connected and in turn 
more digitally vulnerable.  The need for the EU to become more involved in cyber security 
is not difficult to comprehend when it is placed in the context of the major cyber security 
incidents which have occurred in recent years.  The cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007, the 
discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011, p. 23) and the release of 
classified data by National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden 
(Greenwald and MacAskill, 2013) increased political and academic interest in cyber 
security as a policy sector.  The response of the EU has not been to deepen the integration 
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of the Union, but to oversee better co-ordination between its members and to focus on 
particular forms and types of security threat.   
The Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union (EUCSS) is the exemplar of this 
policy and approach.  Published in 2013, it promotes a pragmatic, socio-economic 
approach to cyber security challenges.  The EU’s policy is to ensure the economic viability 
of the internal market and associated digital infrastructures and networks.  This is to be 
achieved by prioritising the functionality of systems reliant on those digital networks 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 5).  This resilience-based approach is to be achieved by 
promoting co-operation between interested entities rather than by concentrating on national 
security or defence provisions and military capabilities (European Commission, 2016b). 
The EU’s socio-economic approach is a contrast to the strategies of other international 
actors.  States such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Estonia and 
Georgia have prioritised the protection of digital networks and assets in a similar, socio-
economic manner to the EU.  However, in response to important international cyber 
incidents, they have also included military, defence, or national security-focused solutions 
in their strategies, often with offensive capabilities.  The UK categorises cyber security as a 
Tier 1 national security risk alongside terrorism, major natural disasters and international 
military crises (United Kingdom, 2010, p. 27).  The US cites a secure cyberspace as being 
one of its top national security priorities (USA, 2010, p. 4).  The US also retains the right 
to respond to a cyber incident with all the diplomatic, informational, economic and military 
tools at its disposal, implying the use of kinetic weapons (USA, 2011a, p. 14). 
The EU’s approach stands apart from these defence-oriented strategies by focussing solely 
on socio-economic, criminal justice aspects of cyber security.  It acts as a counter to the 
hype, exaggeration and threat inflation common to much academic and policy analysis of 
cyber threats (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 1164).  Understanding why the EU has 
developed and continued to concentrate on this socio-economic approach to cyber security 
has not been explored in any great depth in existing literature.  This poses an interesting 
puzzle which this thesis seeks to address: why, when faced with the same challenges as 
other international actors and states, has the EU developed and continued to follow a socio-
economic path of engagement?   
To address this puzzle, the thesis will focus on internal EU processes, rather than conduct 
an examination of external influences such as the actions of NATO and the EU’s relations 
with that alliance.  There are three reasons for this internal focus.  First, as introduced in 
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Section 1.6 of this chapter, and as explored in detail in Chapter 4, the EU can be 
considered an international actor in its own right.  It has an international presence as well 
as the capabilities and opportunities to engage with cyber security issues (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006, pp. 24–35)  It is therefore of benefit to academic and political commentators 
to examine the response of that actor to an important security challenge.  Second, the thesis 
seeks to examine and understand EU policy-making processes.  Such processes are an 
integral, internal part of the way the EU functions.  This gives any examination of policy-
making an internal focus.  Finally, as stated in the previous paragraph, the EU was exposed 
to the same external forces and events in cyber security (the 2007 Estonian attacks, the 
discovery of Stuxnet inter alia).  However, the EU chose a different path to other actors.  If 
the external forces were the same for all actors, then it must have been something internal 
that made the difference. 
There are caveats to such an internal focus, however.  Concentrating an analysis on internal 
policy-making processes may at first appear to exclude external dynamics, or to infer that 
such dynamics played no role in EU policy-making.  However, as will be shown in 
Chapters 8 and 9, the role of external events is taken into consideration in this thesis 
through a detailed examination of the EU’s response to those events and why the EU chose 
that response. 
Throughout the thesis, the argument will be made that EU policy and its continuation 
stems from an interplay of institutional and ideational influences.  Specifically, the thesis 
will argue that Union competences interact with a policy discourse predicated upon five 
key ideational elements – trust in digital systems, the protection of rights, ensuring 
economic viability, tackling cyber-crime and achieving these through facilitating co-
operation.  These ideational elements both inform a socio-economic policy discourse and 
facilitate its continuity.  A result of this interaction is that the direction of EU policy was 
able to continue unchanged between 1985 and 2013.  This continuity was maintained even 
in the face of major events and crises.  From a theoretical perspective, this has implications 
for certain aspects of historical institutionalism, in particular Krasner’s (1984, p. 240) 
models of punctuated equilibrium.  Instead of generating policy change, major events and 
crises led to policy continuity. 
This opening chapter will explore these puzzles in more depth and lay out the approach 
that the thesis takes as a whole.  The chapter is divided into five sections.  Section 2, which 
immediately follows this introduction, will set out the focus of the thesis, the research 
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question the thesis will answer as well as the rationale for engaging in this research topic.  
The section will also position the thesis in current academic literature pertinent to this 
topic.  Section 3 explores the theoretical framework in which the thesis will be positioned: 
historical institutionalism (HI).  It examines how the selection of HI informed the 
development of the specific research question this thesis will answer.   
The analytical and methodological framework employed in answering the research 
question is examined in Section 4.  The section sets out the research and data collection 
methods used to gather information for examination in the empirical chapters.  Section 5 
clarifies important definitions and terminology which will be used throughout the thesis 
while Section 6 outlines the thesis’s structure and summarises the main findings. 
In addition to explaining the argument and methodology, this chapter also sets out the 
original contributions to scholarship made in this thesis.  There are a number of such 
contributions.  The thesis examines an under-researched area of EU policy, namely cyber 
security.  In addition, it seeks to explain why the EU adopted a particular policy approach, 
and not just what that approach is.  The goal of the thesis is more than simply providing an 
historical narrative showing how the EU got to its policy choice in 2013.  By examining 
and understanding the processes, influences and dynamics involved in the development of 
the EU’s cyber security policy, why the EU adopted the approach it did can be discerned, a 
contribution of greater value to academic and political discussions of EU policy.   
The thesis also examines the role of ‘abstract’ institutions in EU policy-making, rather than 
focussing on the actions of existent, ‘bricks-and-mortar’ organisations.  To facilitate this 
analysis, two methodological contributions are made: the development of a conceptual 
content analysis technique and a new model for determining the “actorness” of composite 
entities.  From a theoretical perspective, applying historical institutionalism to cyber 
security is itself an original endeavour.  Although cyber security has been examined as a 
research topic it has not previously been subjected to an HI analysis.  Finally, as will be 
shown in the empirical chapters of this thesis, EU cyber security policy does not conform 
to models of punctuated equilibrium.  These models stipulate that policy paths continue 
until a major event, crisis or other critical juncture causes policy change.  In the case of EU 
cyber security policy, these critical junctures served to maintain continuity.  This means 
that punctuated equilibrium is more flexible than it can at first appear, and can be used to 
explain policy continuity as well as policy change. 
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1.2. Focus of thesis, rationale and placement in the 
literature 
Cyber security has received less academic attention than other areas of EU policy.  Those 
analyses which have been carried out are either internal reports (Klimburg and Tiirmaa-
Klaar, 2011), research commissioned by the EU’s institutions (Cornish, 2009) or 
publications intended to “explain the evolution of the EU governance system for cyber 
security” with a focus on resilience (Christou, 2016, p. 3).  Current studies therefore focus 
on how the EU seeks to achieve cyber security (Christou, 2016; Sliwinski, 2014).  They 
have not explained why the Union adopted its socio-economic, resilience-based approach, 
or why this approach has been so unchanging.  By examining this phenomenon, this 
research will make a contribution to the body of literature relating to EU policy and policy-
making.  Specifically, the thesis will investigate whether or not certain institutional 
arrangements have led to the development and continuity of the EU’s approach to cyber 
security.  This focus raises the specific research question the thesis will seek to answer: 
have institutions and institutional arrangements led the EU to develop and continue with a 
socio-economic approach to cyber security?  
The first key finding of this research is that the EU has a specific policy discourse in cyber 
security.  As will be examined in detail in Chapter 5 this policy discourse is derived from a 
socio-economic standpoint.  It concentrates on ensuring the availability of the commercial 
and social opportunities provided by networked communications.  The internet, and 
information and communications technology (ICT) in general, are treated as tools for 
economic growth, free speech and the exercise of fundamental rights (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 2).  Cyberspace is considered a vital component of the EU’s Single 
Market and the economic wellbeing of the Union and its citizens.  The EU’s priorities are 
therefore to ensure that European society can use the online domain to its full potential but 
in a safe and secure manner, and that no-one is denied access to the opportunities 
cyberspace can provide.  To achieve these goals, the EU seeks to position itself as a 
facilitator of co-operation and information exchange. 
This discourse is exemplified in the EUCSS of 2013.  However, the discourse is not an ad 
hoc construct.  This thesis will demonstrate that the discourse developed over a period of 
28 years, specifically between 1985 and 2013.  Most importantly, it is shown in this thesis 
that this discourse did not alter during those 28 years, despite significant institutional 
change within the EU and the occurrence of major cyber security events around the world.  
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In response to these events, other actors changed their approach and added national 
security and defence concepts to their own strategies.  The EU continued on its socio-
economic path.  This combination of the development of a socio-economic discourse, and 
the continuity of that discourse despite the occurrence of major events, is the subject of this 
thesis. 
In addition to examining why the EU adopted and maintained its approach, this research is 
important because it focusses on the influence of more abstract institutional dynamics.  
Institutional analyses undertaken to date have concentrated on the role played by existent 
organisational bodies such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and the NATO Co-operative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) (Choucri et al., 2014).  These existent 
institutions are also different types of bodies to the EU.  They serve very specific, technical 
purposes.  ICANN and the W3C focus on promoting and maintaining standardisation in the 
use and development of the Internet.  The CCDCOE is a think tank which focusses on 
researching cyber conflict.  None of these bodies, however, have as broad a remit as the 
EU.  Yet despite its unique organisational structure, legislative mandate, international 
economic position and promotion of the digital single market, the EU has, surprisingly, 
been overlooked in analyses of cyber security. 
Taking this significant institutional context into account, this thesis will examine the 
influence of abstract institutions on the process of cyber security policy development.  
Institutions are understood in this thesis as the rules, norms, standard operating procedures 
and common practices in which policy is made.  As such, the EU’s system of competences 
is the institution on which this thesis will focus.  The effect of abstract institutional 
constructs such as policy norms, principles and the rules governing actor interaction is also 
comparatively under-researched in cyber security.  This is a second gap which this thesis 
will help to fill and in so doing aim to contribute to a better understanding of EU policy-
making processes. 
It is important to establish at this point that the thesis will examine the influence of 
institutions and institutional arrangements, rather than their impact.  This is because the 
term “impact” means that there has been a noticeable change as a result of a phenomenon.  
If something has an “influence” it can effect either a specific change or reinforce 
continuity.  “Influence” is therefore a more accurate, nuanced word to use in the context of 
the relationship between Union competences and cyber security. 
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1.3. Rationale for Applying Historical Institutionalism to 
EU Cyber Security Policy 
The question for this thesis indicates that institutionalist approaches to social research 
would be the most apposite.  The choice of theoretical framework for this thesis required 
greater consideration, however.  As will be examined in Chapter 2, there is a rich heritage 
of theoretical approaches to the study of the European Union.  Although these range from 
gender studies to critical approaches (Wiener and Diez, 2009), analyses of the EU tend to 
favour either neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism or constructivism.  However, 
an issue arises with the application of these theories to cyber security in the EU. 
The commonly applied theories of neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and 
constructivism tend to theorise on the processes of integration.  This is problematic 
because the EUCSS states explicitly that ensuring the security of systems, networks and 
digital data rests with the Member States.  While not an explicit rejection of integration per 
se, acknowledging the primacy of the Member States in a specific policy field is not 
conducive to promoting ever closer union.  This means that theoretical frameworks and 
approaches which concentrate on deeper integration become less suited to an analysis of 
EU cyber security policy.  Historical institutionalism (HI) was found to be the most 
apposite theoretical framework for this thesis because it is not predicated upon analyses of 
Union integration.  The other theories are not rejected outright, but instead inform the 
wider HI framework of the thesis. 
That framework is based around three mechanisms which characterise HI approaches to 
the study of social phenomena in political science.  These were postulated by Pierson and 
Skocpol (2002, p. 3).  They argue that HI analyses address substantive questions of 
inherent interest, take time seriously by studying sequences or tracing processes and 
hypothesize about the interaction of institutions and non-institutional elements.  Pierson, 
Skocpol and Steinmo (2008, p. 118) stress that this is not a specific HI methodology per 
se, but an approach to the study of social phenomena.  The three general, systemic 
mechanisms are present throughout HI scholarship although the precise application of 
those mechanisms may vary (Bulmer and Burch, 2001; Pierson, 1996; Skocpol, 1979).  
What follows here is a brief exposition of the application of those three mechanisms to this 
thesis. 
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1.3.1. Applying the mechanisms of HI 
The first mechanism is that HI addresses “big, substantive questions of inherent interest” 
(Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 3).  The substantive question for this research study is to 
understand why the EU has adopted its particular socio-economic approach to cyber 
security and continued to apply this while other actors opted to add national security 
considerations to their strategies.  To address this problem this thesis will conduct what 
Pierson and Skocpol call a study of real-world “empirical patterns [that] run counter to 
received academic or popular wisdom” (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 4).  The patterns to 
be examined are the institutions and institutional arrangements pertinent to policy 
development.  This raises a supplementary question for this thesis: which institutions are 
the most relevant to cyber security?  Answering this will help to answer the research 
question by establishing which “empirical patterns”, i.e. which institutional arrangements, 
influenced the development of the EU’s socio-economic policy discourse.  Data will be 
gathered from Union acquis communautaire and elite interviews to answer this.   
The second of Pierson and Skocpol’s mechanisms is that HI “takes time seriously” 
(Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 3).  By studying phenomena over time HI allows scholars 
to identify and examine hitherto unseen slow-moving processes.  Combining a focus on 
large, substantive questions with a longitudinal approach to time enables the explanation of 
outcomes of interest – the social phenomena under examination – well after the emergence 
of key causal factors.  This avoids the trap of lapsing into deterministic historical causality.   
This is of particular importance to this thesis.  The exercise of identifying, gathering and 
cataloguing relevant Union acquis preceding the EUCSS showed that EU cyber security 
has an historical component that has not been acknowledged.  Political interest in this 
sector originated in the mid-1980s.  It was founded upon the desire of the then-European 
Community to use all possible avenues, means, methods and instruments available to 
stimulate economic growth in order to exit a financial crisis.  The European Community 
chose to promote and support the burgeoning ICT industry as one of these methods 
(European Commission, 1985, 1993).  This concentration on utilising ICT for economic 
growth would over time lead to the development of a socio-economic cyber security 
policy.  While there is an identifiable linearity to the development of policy in this sector, it 
is not deterministic.  Employing an approach which allows for the identification and 
analysis of processes, rather than simple causality, avoids implying that the EU’s policy 
was an inevitable, teleological result of its original interest in ICT. 
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In addition to identifying the effect of institutions on this policy area, conducting this 
analysis will also identify the influence of non-institutional drivers.  This leads to a second 
supplementary question for this thesis: were there other forces at work – particularly 
ideational or catalytic elements – which inform policy choices?  Particular ideas or 
important external events can act as drivers which push policy outcomes in particular 
directions.  Examining such drivers will facilitate the identification of specific causal 
mechanisms not normally accounted for in analyses of EU policy-making (Checkel and 
Moravcsik, 2001, p. 221).   
The application of Pierson and Skocpol’s (2002, p. 3) third characteristic of HI – that it 
“analyses macro contexts and hypothesises about the combined effects of institutions and 
processes” – leads to a third supplementary question this thesis will seek to answer: did an 
interplay between institutional and non-institutional policy drivers also have an influence 
on the reasons why the EU developed and continued with its socio-economic cyber 
security discourse?  The thesis will study whether institutions and non-institutional 
elements operated independently of one another or in conjunction in influencing policy 
choice. 
This establishes two tasks which must be undertaken in this thesis in order to answer the 
primary research question.  First, the institutional and non-institutional dynamics pertinent 
to cyber security must be identified.  Second, the interaction of these two elements must be 
analysed.  Completing these tasks fulfils a core function of historical institutionalism itself.  
As Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 13) state, the purpose of institutionalism “is to 
demonstrate the relationships and interactions among a variety of [elements] in a way that 
reflects the complexity of real political interactions”.  To fully understand a particular 
social phenomenon, such as the development of a particular cyber security policy, the 
interactions of the relevant elements must be examined.   
There are precedents for such an approach to the study of social phenomena.  Hall (1992, 
p. 109) argued that the adoption of a monetarist economic policy by the UK government in 
the 1970s was not the only possible policy option available in response to the recession of 
the time.  A continuation of Keynesian economic principles – the prevailing economic 
system of the period – was a viable option.  This led to the question: why did the UK 
government change to monetarism?  For Hall, the answer was to be found in competing 
social interests combining and interacting with changes in the operating procedures of 
financial markets.  This interaction put pressure on British policy-makers to seek out 
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alternative economic models.  A similar analytical process can be undertaken when 
examining EU cyber security policy.   
Such an analysis presents another opportunity for this thesis to contribute to current 
scholarship.  Examining the nature of the relationship between institutional and non-
institutional drivers enables a model for explaining actor behaviour to be developed.  That 
model is predicated upon particular configurations of those drivers and can be applied to 
any research scenario where actor behaviour diverges from the prevailing narrative.  There 
are three possible theories to explain why the EU opted to develop and continue policy X 
while others opted to add policy Y.  One is that the institutional architecture of the EU 
influenced the Union’s approach to cyber security.  A second is that the EU’s response was 
not the result of institutional drivers at all, but non-institutional elements such as socio-
economic policy ideas.  A third potential model is that the EU’s policy choice was not the 
result of institutional or non-institutional drivers alone, but a combination of the two.  This 
thesis can help to identify not only which of the three explanatory theories was in effect, 
but also the specific policy choices which account for the divergences.  By providing and 
exploring such models this thesis can make a substantive contribution to the study of 
international organisations such as the EU as well as the field of international relations. 
1.4. Analytical Approach and Methodology: Data 
Sources and Analytical Techniques 
Data analysed in this thesis was drawn from two source types.  These were primary 
literature in the form of EU acquis communautaire and elite interviews carried out with 
Union functionaries, academics and industry specialists in the field of cyber security
1
.  
While the methodology will be set out in detail in Chapter 3, it is beneficial to set out a 
number of points here.  The first is the clarification of what will be considered acquis 
communautaire in this thesis.  According to the EU, the acquis is  
the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU Member 
States. It is constantly evolving and comprises: 
 the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; 
 legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the Court of 
Justice; 
 declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; 
 instruments under the Common Foreign and Security Policy; 
                                            
1
 See Appendix 10 for a complete list of referable interview participants 
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 international agreements concluded by the Union and those entered into by the 
Member States among themselves within the sphere of the Union's activities. 
(European Union, n.d.) 
 
This thesis adopts the position that Commission Communications – the majority of the 
EU’s policy pronouncements and publications – also form an integral part of the acquis.  
This is because these Communications comprise not only proposals for legislation but also 
“declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union” as defined by the EU itself (European 
Union, n.d.).  Strategy documents such as the EUCSS, a Commission Communication, are 
required to be considered by the Parliament and approved by either the Council of the 
European Union or the European Council.  A set of Conclusions approved by the Council 
of the European Union on 25 June 2013 formally approved the EUCSS as representative of 
the European Union’s position on cyber security (Council of The European Union, 2013a).  
Once this approval and adoption was confirmed, the EUCSS, a Commission 
Communication, became a part of Union acquis communautaire. 
In addition to using primary literature it was necessary to gather data from elite interviews 
and combine the information gathered.  A study of policy-making in any sector of the EU’s 
purview cannot rely on either the acquis or interviews alone.  Research into any EU policy 
sector must analyse primary documentation setting out that policy, i.e. the EU’s acquis.  
That acquis, however, is the end point of a developmental process, a final product which 
offers little to no insights into its formation.  To study that process, data must be sought 
elsewhere.  The functionaries and bureaucrats personally involved in the development of 
policy are invaluable sources of information for this aspect.  Union acquis and elite 
interviews are therefore mutually complementary in a study of this nature.  One source 
provides details of the policy itself, while the other provides insights on the policy’s 
development. 
A methodological problem was encountered when combining data from two different 
source types.  Separate research methodologies and techniques are applied to interviews 
and primary literature (Bryman, 2008; Berg, 2004; Hycner, 1985).  Content analyses are 
more often applied to literature sources, while discourse analysis techniques are applied to 
interviews.  Because both source types needed to be used in this study, a modified form of 
content analysis was developed specifically for this thesis.  The modification blended both 
qualitative and quantitative elements from two current research approaches.  A toolkit for 
the analysis of interviews was derived from Hycner (1985, pp. 280–294), while Berg 
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(2004, pp. 241–242) posited counting units of meaning rather than numbers of words, as 
would be the case in a standard, quantitative content analysis.   
As will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 3, core elements of both of these 
methodologies were blended to form a “Hycner-Berg” model of conceptual content 
analysis.  Because it drew on techniques for analysing both interviews and literature, the 
modified toolkit meant that the same methodological technique for data extraction could be 
effectively applied to both source types.  This greatly facilitated ensuring data validity, 
replicability and reliability.  Finally, the modified analysis was conducted using NVivo 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) to help maintain data 
validity and reliability. 
While there were certain limitations to using both literature and interview data which 
needed to be mitigated using the methods outlined above, there were two distinct 
advantages for using these source types.  One important advantage was that this method 
provided opportunities for triangulating findings.  Data provided by academics and sector 
specialists were used to corroborate or challenge findings derived from both acquis and EU 
functionary interviews.  Interviews with academic specialists are important because they 
are not a part of the EU’s structure.  They are able to provide more objective viewpoints 
and analyses of Union action. 
The second advantage was that the exercise of collecting and analysing Union acquis 
relevant to this thesis provided a period of time on which to focus.  The end point of the 
analysis is the publication of the EU’s Cyber Security Strategy in February of 2013.  This 
is because that Strategy is the culmination of a policy-making process.  However, defining 
a starting point for the analysis was more problematic.  Gathering the relevant acquis 
established that the earliest mentioning of ICT as a sector occurred in 1985 with the 
initiation of the internal market.  This means that the period of time this thesis will 
examine is the 28 years between 1985 and 2013. 
1.5. Definitions Employed in the Thesis 
There are a number of terms which will be frequently used in this thesis and which merit 
clarification.  As set out in the overview of the methodology, one such term is the acquis 
communautaire.  When referring to Union acquis, this thesis uses the term to include 
Commission Communications as well as Treaties, legislation, Council Conclusions and 
international agreements.   
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There are three further terms which require elaboration of the manner in which they will be 
used in this thesis: “cyber security”, “European Union” and “timescape.” 
1.5.1. Defining Cyber Security 
International policy, legislation and regulation in cyber security suffers from a lack of 
consistently applied terminology (Kruger, 2012).  EU policy and acquis is no different.  
“Cyber security” is used interchangeably and synonymously with other terms such as 
“network and information security” (NIS) or online safety.  This is despite the fact that 
much EU acquis uses “NIS” in specific contexts.   
Despite this, the EU offers a definition of “cyber security” in the EUCSS:   
The safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the 
civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may 
harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cyber-security 
strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure 
and the confidentiality of the information contained therein.  (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 3) 
For efficiency and consistency, this thesis will employ the EU’s definition but expand it to 
refer to the full range of issues relating to online safety, software and hardware integrity 
and criminal and state-sponsored malicious activity.  The term will therefore be used as a 
generic, umbrella definition to cover the broad spectrum of cyber security concerns 
ranging from credit card fraud, identity theft and protection of privacy, to corporate 
espionage and state-sponsored hacks.   
1.5.2. “European Union” or “European Community”? 
As set out in Section 4 above, this thesis will examine cyber security policy development 
between 1985 and 2013.  During this time, the EU underwent three separate 
transformations and was known by different names.  In 1985 it was still operating under 
the terms of the Treaty of Brussels of 1967 which created a single Commission and single 
Council to serve three “communities”.  These were the European Economic Community 
(EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) and the European Coal and 
Steel Community ECSC) (Europa, n.d.).  There was at the time no single political body, 
but rather a composite entity comprising three separate organisations managed by a single 
Council. 
This system continued through the 1980s and early 1990s.  This is significant because it 
means that interest in ICT began before the creation of the European Union.  That creation 
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occurred in 1993 with the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht.  As will be 
examined in Chapter 6, that Treaty had an important influence on EU policy-making in 
general and on cyber security in particular, due to the creation of a single political entity 
made up of three separate pillars.  This system continued until the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 which abolished the three pillars and created a single political 
entity with a unified legal personality. 
As a result of these changes, since 2009 it has become academic convention to refer to all 
the historic iterations and guises prior to 2009 as the “European Union”, irrespective of the 
time period under examination.  This thesis will adopt this academic convention in order to 
reduce the potential for confusion and to aid clarity.  This exercise of applying modern 
terms to historic issues is known as “retroactive continuity”. 
1.5.2.1. Retroactive Continuity:  Applying modern terms to historic 
concepts 
Retroactive continuity, or “retconning”, refers to the process of amending past narratives to 
avoid inconsistencies with modern ones (Blundell et al., 2010, p. 4; Martin, 2014, p. 5).  
Although a device common in fiction writing, it is appropriate for use in an historical 
institutionalist analysis due to modern terms being used to describe long-standing issues.   
Retroactive continuity is particularly relevant to this study because the issues which come 
under the umbrella term “cyber security” are not modern.  Unauthorised access and 
intrusions into networked systems or the theft and manipulation of digital data have been 
security concerns since the earliest use of networked ICT (Healey, 2013).  The issue here is 
that none of these early security concerns were labelled “cyber security”.  Instead they are 
being retroactively included in a modern interpretation of the concept.  This has occurred 
in both data sources used for this research: acquis and interviews.  In the EU context the 
term “cyber security” did not appear in Union acquis until 2002.  This is 18 years after the 
commencement of EU interest in the sector.  The preferred term in the earliest periods of 
Union interest in this sector was “online safety” from illegal and harmful content 
(European Commission, 1996a).  By 2001 policy-makers had adopted “network and 
information security” as a term broad enough to cover issues relating to online safety2.  
These included fraud, child exploitation and copyright infringement. 
                                            
2
 This will be examined in Chapter 5 on the EU’s cyber security discourse 
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The potential limitations of retroactive continuity can be mitigated by acknowledging the 
existence of this device and accepting that, in certain circumstances, it is unavoidable in HI 
research.  This thesis aims to understand and explain a long-term policy-making process in 
a sector which was only recently defined.  In order to examine and understand the 
development of any policy discourse it is necessary to identify concepts or ideas and trace 
them to their origin.  Where there is an historic component, achieving this inevitably 
involves applying modern terms to historic concepts.  It is necessary to use a form of 
mitigated or controlled retconning in order to carry out an analysis.  Applying the EU’s 
definition to all instances of online safety or NIS between 1985 and 2013
3
 necessarily 
involves retconning.  Acknowledging this device mitigates its effect on the validity and 
reliability of the analysis. 
1.5.3. “Timescape” versus “timeframe" 
The final clarification relates to the terminology used to describe the 28-year period under 
examination.  Instead of using terms such as “timeframes” or “chronologies” this thesis 
will adopt the term “timescape”.  Bulmer (2009, p. 307) describes a timescape as “the 
manner in which time is institutionalised in a political system along the polity, political and 
policy dimensions”.  This conceptualisation facilitates HI analyses such as this thesis 
because it looks at political and social processes in time rather than over time.   
This is an important distinction.  A timescape differs from concepts such as a “timeframe”, 
“timescale” or “chronology” because it is not concerned with purely historical analyses 
which focus on the influence of the past on the present (Meyer-Sahling and Goetz, 2009, p. 
181).  A timescape infers that a greater importance has been placed on the timing of social 
phenomena – when they occurred in a sequence of events – rather than simply placing 
them in an historical chronology.   
The notion of a timescape is therefore invaluable to conducting a study of EU policy-
making.  This is because this topic is a developmental process and not an ad hoc creation 
or a deterministic product.  This is particularly valuable for this thesis given that it seeks to 
explain a particular social phenomenon – the EU’s cyber security discourse – but 
endeavours to do so without lapsing into historical causality
4
.  As will be examined in 
greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6, the institution of greatest influence in EU cyber security 
was formalised after the initiation of the policy discourse itself.  The timing of these two 
                                            
3
 As was examined in Section 1.5.1. of this chapter. 
4
 As described in Section 1.3. 
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elements is significant, but that significance would have been lost had a simple historical 
analysis been carried out. 
1.6. Thesis outline and main findings 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters including this introduction.  Chapter 2 provides a 
critical review of current academic literature in two areas of scholarship.  The first relates 
specifically to the literature on the EU and cyber security.  Compared with other policy 
areas in the EU there is a relatively small body of scholarship to draw upon.  This is 
because Union cyber security policy remains a developing area of academic study.  The 
main debates surround measures undertaken to combat policy fragmentation prior to 2013, 
such as fostering co-operation between entities involved in cyber security.   
The second area of scholarship reviewed in Chapter 2 examines the various theoretical 
frameworks most prominent in analyses of EU policy-making in general. 
Neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism and institutionalism are 
evaluated as possible frameworks for this thesis.  The reasons for selecting HI are then set 
out. 
Chapter 3 explains the research methodology employed to identify and gather data sources, 
extract and analyse data.  As set out in Section 1.4 above, a mixed-methods approach 
combining quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques was employed to gather data 
on how institutional processes informed or influenced policy choices.   
Chapter 4 follows on from the methodology by setting out the HI mechanisms which form 
the theoretical framework to be employed in the analysis.  The chapter will also clarify two 
important aspects of an HI analysis: which institutions and which actors will be examined.  
The thesis adopts Hall’s (1992, p. 96) definition of institutions as formal rules, standard 
operating procedures and customary practices which influence actor behaviour and policy 
choice.  Given this position, the standard operating procedures and rules which most affect 
EU policy-making are the Union’s competences.  This is because the competences specify 
in which policy sectors, and to what degree, the EU can become involved.  The 
clarification of Union competence and the institution of greatest influence is the first of the 
thesis’s three main findings.  The influence of competence on the EU’s cyber security 
policy-making process will be examined in the empirical analysis.   
The actors for the study are the seven formal entities of the EU which operate within the 
setting of Union competences.  These are the European Council, the Commission, the 
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Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the Central Bank, the Court of 
Justice and the Court of Auditors.  This position is justified by developing a model of 
“actorness” predicated upon a combination of Scharpf’s (1997, p. 52) definition of 
“composite actors” with Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006, pp. 24–29) conceptualisation of 
“actorness”.  This Scharpf-Bretherton-Vogler conceptualisation enables these seven 
principle bodies to be classified as actors.  The development of this new model is one of 
the main contributions to scholarship this thesis makes.  Finally, Chapter 4 will outline 
why four of these actors, namely the Council of the European Union, European Council, 
Parliament and Commission, are more important for this thesis than others such as the 
Central Bank or Court of Auditors. 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 comprise the empirical section of the thesis.  Chapter 5 sets out 
the EU’s cyber security discourse.  The clarification of the existence of a specific policy 
discourse is the second of the thesis’s three main findings.  After adopting Gasper and 
Apthorpe’s (1996, p. 2) definition of the term “discourse” as the manner in which 
particular issues are framed, the EU’s cyber security discourse is identified in its acquis 
communautaire.  Setting out and clarifying the EU’s discourse in cyber security is 
important for a number of reasons.  That framing differs from the prevailing narrative of 
international cyber security policy because it is purely socio-economic in nature.  Other 
approaches have included national security considerations.  Clearly setting out the 
discourse also facilitates the analysis of this approach.  This exercise also demonstrates that 
the discourse was not an ad hoc policy, created solely for the EUCSS of 2013.  Instead, as 
will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, it was developed and constructed between 1985 and 
2013, clearly providing a timescape for analysis. 
Finally, the chapter demonstrates that that discourse construction was predicated upon five 
core ideational elements which endured throughout the policy-making timescape and 
underpinned the EUCSS itself.  These five elements are economic maximisation, ensuring 
trust in digital technologies, tackling cyber-crime, protecting fundamental rights and 
fostering co-operation.  The elements are so pronounced that they constitute core themes to 
be examined throughout the empirical chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter 6 examines the years between 1985 and 2001 and focusses on the initiation of core 
path dependencies.  Path dependency is an important aspect of historical institutionalism 
because it explains how decisions made early in a process continue to have an influence in 
subsequent periods.  The chapter explores how the five ideational elements of the EU’s 
32 
 
cyber security discourse, elements which would endure throughout the 28 year timescape, 
were established and became path dependencies.  Crucially, the chapter explores how these 
policy paths were laid down before Union competences were formalised.   
The stabilisation of those early policy paths is explored in Chapter 7.  This occurred in the 
years between 2001 and 2006.  The mechanisms of path dependency mean that once a 
policy choice has been made it enters a period of stasis and consolidation.  The chapter will 
demonstrate that, in the case of EU cyber security, that consolidation is manifested by the 
initiation of specific agencies which were tasked with operationalising core aspects of 
policy.  The consolidation process culminated in 2006 with the publication of a 
Commission Communication promoting the development of a secure information society.   
Chapters 8 and 9 examine the policy-making process’s exposure to institutional stresses 
between 2007 and 2013, the final period of time in the analysis.  The purpose of this 
exercise is to demonstrate the resilience of policy paths and the EU’s underlying discourse 
to major exogenous and endogenous events or punctuation points.  This resilience is 
examined in three case studies, representing three different types of punctuation.   
Chapter 8 examines two case studies exogenous to the EU in order to study the effect of 
external events on Union cyber security policy.  The first case study is the cyber-attack on 
Estonia in 2007.  The chapter examines how the Union responded to that incident.  Due to 
restricted competence in foreign and security affairs the EU required a creative 
interpretation of the attack in order to be able to respond effectively.  The precise nature of 
that interpretation and response is explored in the first section of the chapter.  
The second case study is the influence of a major event in which the Union had much 
greater competence.  In 2008 the EU was caught up in the global financial crisis which 
began in the US sub-prime mortgage market.  In order to boost economic growth the ICT 
industry was once again targeted for specific attention, a move reminiscent of the late 
1980s.  The main difference was that by 2008 the digital domain had become critical to the 
ongoing functionality of other physical infrastructures.  It needed to be secure and resilient 
against future downturns and crises in order to ensure that economic opportunities could be 
exploited and trust in digital commerce maintained.  Both of these events served to 
entrench established policy paths, rather than effect any change in the EU’s approach to 
cyber security. 
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Chapter 9 examines the final case study: the influence of the Treaty of Lisbon on cyber 
security policy development.  In reshaping the architecture of the Union itself, most 
notably by abolishing the Pillar structure established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the 
Treaty of Lisbon streamlined the EU’s policy-making processes.  This enabled formal co-
operation between functionaries previously separated by the Pillars and led to the 
development of a holistic EU cyber security policy.  In short, without the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the EUCSS would not have come about.  
Throughout the examination of these case studies, the argument will be made that EU 
competences were the institutional framework of greatest influence in cyber security 
policy.  While the EU’s original, initial interest and discourse in ICT was socio-economic, 
Union competences created a framework in which that discourse could not deviate from 
this initial position.  The empirical chapters will also present the argument that these 
institutional stresses entrenched the EU’s cyber security discourse, rather than led to 
change.  This means that the incidents did not influence cyber security policy in a manner 
to be expected by HI approaches, notably punctuated equilibrium and path dependency.  
Punctuated equilibrium is an HI mechanism for explaining policy change whereby choices 
remain in place until a major event shifts that policy onto a new path.  The opposite effect 
occurred here.  Rather than cause change, the three punctuation points served to entrench 
established policy paths and encourage their continuity.  The paradoxical resilience of EU 
cyber security policy to those three critical junctures will be explored in these chapters.  
EU cyber security’s paradoxical lack of conformity to punctuated equilibrium is the third 
main finding of this thesis. 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis.  It summarises the main findings of the research and 
highlights a number of implications for academics and EU practitioners.  The chapter also 
sets out the contributions the thesis makes to scholarship on the EU and HI as well as 
identifying potential avenues for further research.   
Applying HI mechanisms to EU cyber security is itself an original endeavour.  This 
research will therefore make a substantive contribution to the study of EU policy-making 
by applying HI methods and tools to an under-research policy area.  In addition, the model 
of institution and idea interaction developed in this thesis can be applied not just to the 
EU’s approach to cyber security, but to other policy areas where there is a divergence from 
prevailing policy and academic narratives.  As a result, this research will make a 
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substantive contribution not just to academic studies of the European Union but also to 
historical institutionalist scholarship.  
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Chapter 2 | Literature Review: The EU and Cyber 
Security – Debates and Theory 
2.1. Introduction 
Academic studies of EU cyber security are limited.  Nevertheless, available scholarship 
demonstrates a small but dynamic research agenda, covering topics as diverse as 
cyberbullying, online criminal activity and the use of ICT in industry.  Current literature 
has not, however, examined the development and evolution of the field within the context 
of the EU’s policy-making process.  This is important because EU policy diverges from 
academic and political cyber security narratives.  It advocates a purely socio-economic, 
criminal justice approach to cyber threats without any military or defence capacity.  Other 
actors include national security-oriented solutions.  To date, why this is the case is a 
question which has not been asked in current academic studies.  This is an important 
omission which this thesis addresses.  To fully understand a system – such as a policy-
making process – it is not enough to understand how that system operates and produces 
results.  One must understand why the system functions the way it does.  This thesis seeks 
to address this gap, a goal which positions the thesis as an examination of EU policy-
making, with cyber security as the vector or lens for this analysis. 
In reviewing academic literature relevant to this thesis, the chapter will first examine the 
small corpus of literature on EU cyber security policy.  There are two themes within that 
body of research.  The first is the recognition of a fragmented EU policy in this field.  
Because of the range of policy sectors in which cyber security plays a part, prior to 2013 
there was no overarching, holistic strategy for dealing with cyber security in all its guises.  
There has consequently been no overarching, holistic academic study of cyber security in 
the EU context.  This is an important gap in academic literature because an environment 
where there exists a fragmented policy approach and a range of policy instruments is not 
one conducive to policy continuity.  This makes a long-term, continuous socio-economic 
approach to cyber security, such as that of the EU, even more surprising. 
The second theme in current scholarship is the acknowledgment of co-operation as a 
crucial component of EU policy in this sector.  Despite the fragmentation of policies and 
approaches, the overall tenor of EU policy is geared towards facilitating and promoting co-
operation between actors.   
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The recognition of co-operation as a crucial element of EU cyber security is important for 
this thesis’s research question because, unlike fragmentation, co-operation is conducive to 
policy continuity.  This is especially the case in the EU context.  As will be shown in 
Chapter 5, co-operation is one of five core ideational elements which are present 
throughout the 28 year timescape of cyber security policy development.  Christou (2016) 
goes so far as to say that facilitating co-operation is the EU’s purpose as an actor in 
international cyber security.  However, as will be shown in this literature review, he does 
not say why this should be the case.  This is a common issue with analyses of EU cyber 
policy.  There is a heavy focus on what the EU is doing in this sector and how it goes about 
this, but very little analysis of why this policy approach was chosen.  This is the second gap 
in the literature which this thesis addresses. 
The chapter will also present the theoretical framework used in this research.  To date there 
have been limited attempts to conduct theoretically grounded analyses of EU cyber 
security policy.  This is a third gap in the literature which this research will address.  The 
section will conduct a comparison of four of the most prominent theoretical approaches to 
EU studies: neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, constructivism and institutionalism.  
This comparison will show that the first three traditions are less suitable for a study of 
cyber security than institutionalism.  While these traditions can inform a study of cyber 
security policy development, neofunctionalist, intergovernmentalist and constructivist 
approaches tend to focus analyses on the processes of integration.  This makes them less 
suitable for this thesis due to the EU’s position that cyber security is largely the 
responsibility of the Member States.  The chapter will close by demonstrating that for this 
reason institutionalism, particularly the historical variant, is the most apposite framework 
for this study due to its comparatively reduced concentration on integration.  HI is also 
apposite because policy-making in the EU is not a speedy process.  It takes years for 
proposals to be developed, debated and agreed upon.  As shown by this literature review, 
cyber security also has a long pedigree.  HI lends itself to such a study by taking into 
account processes being carried out over time.  This research will therefore make a second 
substantive contribution to the wider literature on the EU; it will conduct an HI analysis of 
a policy sector not previously subjected to such an examination. 
The chapter is divided into four sections, in which the three specific gaps in scholarship are 
addressed.  The second section of this chapter reviews the small corpus of literature on EU 
cyber security policy.  The third section of the chapter will examine four key theoretical 
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approaches to the study of the EU, before explaining why historical institutionalism was 
selected as the framework for this thesis.  A fourth section concludes the chapter. 
2.2. Academic debates 
2.2.1. Fragmentation of the EU’s approach 
Relative to other areas of EU policy, the body of literature examining Union cyber security 
policy is small.  This is reflected in a tendency within that scholarship towards specificity.  
Academic analyses address highly focused subjects, such as the relationship between EU 
and US intelligence agencies (Segell, 2010), the adoption of broadband Internet and its 
impact on regulation (Briglauer, 2014), or a balancing of security with privacy (Liberatore, 
2007).  A recent analysis published by the European Organisation for Security (ESO) 
provides a detailed breakdown of the risks and threats to critical infrastructure from cyber-
crime and cyber-terrorism, and the role of public-private partnerships in addressing these 
(Olesen, 2016).  Despite the specificity of their subject matter, what these analyses show is 
the wide variety of policy areas in which cyber security has an impact, a fact recognised by 
the EU.  As one Union official stated, cyber security is like “an octopus”, it is an important 
consideration in a huge range of policy areas (Interview, Senior Official, DG Connect, 
European Commission, 2014).  It also highlights what is missing from that scholarship: a 
whole-of-sector approach to EU cyber security that takes account of the range of policy 
areas on which cyber security has an effect.  This is an important omission.   
One of the earliest works to examine EU cyber security – and one of the widest in its scope 
– was Crago’s (1996) analysis of the relationship between fundamental rights and the 
developing Internet.  It provides an examination not just of Union interest in this domain, 
but also of the capacity of the EU to temper Member States’ drives to censor legitimate use 
of the Internet through heavy-handed regulation of “indecent material” (Crago, 1996, p. 
479).  Because of an uncertain capacity for the EU to exert judicial jurisdiction (Crago, 
1996, p. 480) there was a tendency to employ national laws to prosecute individual users.  
This became problematic when those users were not nationals of the prosecuting state.  
The result was an issue which would become systemic in EU cyber security: a fragmented 
and fractured approach due to the absence of overarching, harmonising EU instruments.  
This fragmentation was present in other policy areas affected by online communications.  
Antezana (2003) and De Werra (2002) argue that co-operation and measures to prevent 
copyright infringement were relatively successful by 2003.  De Werra’s point centres on 
the agreement in 1996 that the technological measures designed to circumvent copyright 
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should be subject to legal ramifications (De Werra, 2002, p. 3).  This was particularly 
important given that, as Antezana (2003, p. 415) argues, “technology and the Internet have 
created substantial global markets in electronic commerce”.  The crux of the matter was 
that, as the technological capacity to disseminate information increased, so too did the 
capacity to illegally distribute content or engage in digital piracy.  Broadhurst et al (2014, 
p. 3) argue that cyber-crime evolved in parallel with the “opportunities afforded by the 
rapid increase in the use of the Internet for e-commerce”.  Just as the technology to spread 
information and ideas, as well as the tools to protect those ideas, was being developed, so 
too were the means to breach that protection for criminal gain.  In other words, “what one 
technology can do, another can generally undo” (Samuelson, 1996, p. 4).     
Antezana (2003, p. 435) further argues that there was an obstacle preventing a truly 
harmonised approach being developed.  By 2003 there was a disconnect between 
legitimate copyright protection, the potential revenues from increased e-commerce 
(forecast to $300 billion by 2003) and European Union legislation trying not to pre-empt 
national law-making.  The need to address these three distinct aspects invariably led to 
conflicts of interest which fractured Union attempts to develop holistic policies.  The goal 
was a harmonised approach to exploiting the internet for commercial purposes (Crago, 
1996) with the EU as a facilitator, but this harmonisation was still a work in progress by 
2003 (Antezana, 2003, p. 136).   
What these analyses omit was the action taken by the EU to attempt to resolve this issue.  
The fragmentation of policy instruments was a recognised problem by 2002 (Council of 
The European Union, 2002a, p. 4).  However, steps had been taken as early as 2001 to 
remedy this, steps not addressed in the literature.  The 2001 Proposal for a European 
Approach to Network and Information Security (European Commission, 2001a) was a first 
attempt to draw together the disparate elements of network and information security (NIS) 
policy, the name by which cyber security was then known.  It should be acknowledged that 
Antezana’s focus was purely on the EU’s Internet Copyright Directive, but given that 
digital piracy was a threat identified by the Union in 1996 (European Commission, 1996a, 
p. 3), the analytical net could easily have been cast more widely.  It is a central argument 
of Chapter 6 of this thesis that the EU’s acknowledgement of illegal and harmful content in 
the mid-1990s was a milestone in the development of a holistic cyber security policy, one 
which addressed the issues of fragmentation but which was not examined in the studies of 
the time. 
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Fragmentation affected not just specific policy sectors affected by cyber security.  Dunn 
Cavelty (2013, p. 4) argues that it affected cyber security policy itself.  According to 
Mendez (2005, p. 511), this was in part due to a divided bureaucratic foundation for cyber 
security as a policy sector, and the further division of decision-making at the centre of that 
bureaucracy.  As Robinson (2013, p. 96) points out “understanding who talks to whom and 
how co-ordination and co-operation is achieved is very complex”.  As demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, decision-making in this policy area is divided between the Commission, the 
European Council and the Council of the European Union.  Which actor is in the 
ascendancy depends on the nature of the issue as well as the type of decision being made.   
Fragmentation clearly problematizes issues at the micro-level, such as which tools for data 
protection notification are most suitable (Robinson, 2013, p. 93).   Fragmentation also 
causes problems at the macro level.  If it is not clear which bodies, agencies or policy 
instruments do what jobs, the social goals identified by Crago – exploiting the economic 
opportunities of cyberspace and the Internet – become that much harder to achieve. 
Specific security goals are also difficult to achieve.  Bossong (2014, p. 8) argues, for 
example, that information-sharing networks deemed critical for industrial resilience and 
counterterrorism would not “serve an important function over the medium term” due to the 
EU’s fragmented and weak institutional basis for critical infrastructure protection.  This 
view is supported by Boin et al (2014, p. 426).  The ability of the EU to react to crises is 
adversely affected by this fragmentation.  While not going so far as to say crisis 
management is compromised, they make the point that a lack of cohesion, harmonisation, 
“inter-institutional strife and cross pillar divisions tend to get worse during crises” (Boin et 
al., 2014, p. 426). 
Fragmentation of policy and goals was a serious issue for EU cyber security policy 
regardless of whether it stemmed from a lack of centralised co-ordination at the EU level 
(Mendez, 2005, p. 511) or from individual Member States seeking to “develop a coherent 
national response to the effect of the Internet on national laws and social values” (Crago, 
1996, p. 468).  The problem was so acute that two internal reports commissioned by the 
European Parliament specifically cited policy fragmentation as an obstacle for coherent 
cyber security policy.  Although Cornish (2009, p. 3) labelled the EU’s interest in cyber 
security “fragmented yet developing”, he argued that that interest was so fractured that  
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It is difficult to identify an EU body or agency which does not have some interest 
or involvement in cyber-security concepts and policy on the one hand, and/or in 
delivery and operations on the other. (Cornish, 2009, p. 27) 
By 2011 the situation had not improved.  Klimburg and Tiirmaa-Klaar (2011, p. 29) argued 
that the EU’s whole approach to the issue of cyber security was “highly fragmented”. 
According to the literature, systemic fragmentation has not yet been resolved, particularly 
in the areas of cyber-crime and the development of a market for cyber security products.  
From an economic perspective, Olesen (2016, p. 261) argues that the market for cyber 
security products and solutions also remains fragmented.  This has led to a reliance on non-
European cyber security products and a lack of standardisation.  While Olesen does not 
argue that there is an inherent insecurity in such third-party products and solutions, she 
makes the point that there is the possibility for vulnerabilities, such as digital or software 
backdoors, to go unnoticed given the lack of end-to-end scrutiny of the ICT industry.   
From a criminal justice perspective, Christou (2016, p. 2) argues that, while the whole EU 
policy towards cyber threats in general “has often been quite fragmented”, the Union’s 
approach to cyber-crime in particular still suffers from a lack of an overarching framework 
(Christou, 2016, p. 102).  The Council of the European Union and the European 
Commission considered a comprehensive approach to the problem in 2001 (European 
Commission, 2001a).  They went as far as encouraging Member States to ratify the 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (European Commission, 2010a, p. 2).  
Despite these initiatives, the EU still employs “a series of legal and regulatory instruments 
that overlap” (Christou, 2016, p. 136).  There are moves to reduce fragmentation, such as a 
common breach notification process, but the lack of an overarching framework means 
division persists.   
Carrapiço and Trauner (2013, p. 17) provide a counter to this pessimistic view of EU 
policy in cyber-crime by arguing that Europol has positioned itself as a central point of 
reference, and therefore as a force of influence on EU policy as a whole.  Due to its 
mandate as a focal point for cyber-crime intelligence and its resources in tackling this form 
of activity, Europol has “been  able  to  exert  an  influence beyond   its   narrowly   defined   
mandate” (Carrapiço and Trauner, 2013, p. 1) and into the policy arena.  However, 
Carrapiço and Trauner acknowledge that this role and influence is contingent on the 
amount and quality of data provided to Europol by the Member States.  This brings into 
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focus a larger problem for the EU in tackling policy fragmentation: the different priorities 
placed on cyber-crime and cyber security by the Member States themselves. 
The EUCSS makes it clear that it is the task of the Member States to deal with security 
risks from cyberspace (European Commission, 2013a, p. 4), meaning that responsibility for 
ensuring cyber security rests with them.  The EUCSS also seeks to ensure a common 
minimum standard for security (European Commission, 2013a, p. 5).  Purser (2014, p. 
98,103) provides insights into how different national priorities for standardisation can be 
overcome by stimulating the development and implementation of industry-led standards as 
well as ensuring conformity.  Establishing a common system of standards can help to 
promote information exchange and are beneficial in cross-border environments such as the 
Internet and cyberspace.  However, establishing a common minimum standard is not the 
same policy goal as ensuring a common prioritisation across the 28 national governments 
of the Member States.  This is an important facet of fragmentation, but one only rarely 
addressed in the literature.  Kabanov (2013, p. 9) alludes to it in his comparative analysis 
of Russian and EU policy discourses but only in the sense that not all Member States 
perform the same actions with the same significance.  Sarma (2016, p. 4) also infers this 
diverse prioritisation in her breakdown of individual UK, French and Estonian actions in 
cyber security within the context of EU policy.  These analyses miss an opportunity, 
however, to examine the important question as to why the Member States place different 
levels of priority on cyber security in their national frameworks and what effect the 
differing national priorities have on EU cyber security as a whole.  Although current 
studies acknowledge the problem of prioritisation and its effect on fragmenting EU-level 
approaches to cyber security, there is no indication provided as to the reasons why some 
Member States feel some policy areas are more worthy of political attention or resources 
than others.  This highlights a wider problem in academic studies of EU cyber security 
policy: very often the question why something is the case is not asked.  This is a gap not 
only in the specific sense of why Member States prioritise cyber security at a lower level 
than other areas.  Why the EU has adopted a socio-economic approach to cyber security, or 
why that policy has continued unaltered between 1985 and 2013, are wider questions 
which have also not been asked.  
To date, no academic studies have been conducted which address these wider questions, or 
which counter the specific position that EU cyber security policy is fragmented.  
Interviews and primary literature analyses carried out for this thesis indicate the persistence 
of a division of responsibility for cyber security between the Directorates-General for 
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Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and Communications Networks, Content & 
Technology (DG Connect), the External Action Service, and a number of operational 
agencies involved in the sector, such as the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA), Europol and the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-
EU).  The persistence of fragmentation remains a theme in current academic literature on 
EU cyber security.   
This is important because that current academic literature does not address the disconnect 
between fragmented policy implementation and a continuous socio-economic policy 
approach.  The fragmented policy environment described by Christou, Klimburg and 
Tiirmaa-Klaar or Sarma is not one conducive to continuity.  With the diverse range of 
policy areas in which cyber security is relevant and the differing priorities placed upon it 
by the EU’s Member States, a stable policy framework is unlikely to exist, and even less 
likely to persist.  To date, no solutions to this puzzle have been provided. 
There is, however, one point of agreement in the corpus of study as to how the EU 
approaches cyber security more generally.  Due to the inherent internationality of 
cyberspace and its concomitant threats, transnational co-operation is crucial to establishing 
security in cyberspace.  Co-operation as a tool for promoting and even achieving cyber 
security is a significant feature of the current literature, one which seemingly contradicts 
the focus on fragmentation.  This is of relevance to the thesis’s research question because a 
co-operative environment, or at least an environment where co-operation is encouraged, is 
conducive to policy continuity.  This is because co-operation in any policy area requires a 
certain degree of unity of purpose and shared values between multiple actors, such as the 
EU’s Member States and constituent institutions.  The debates in academic literature, 
however, show that the problem of fragmentation has spilled over into EU efforts to build 
and facilitate co-operation. 
2.2.2. Co-operation as a policy goal 
Bendiek and Porter (2013, p. 176) argue that co-operation between the EU, its Member 
States and private sector entities is vital to tackling a range of cyber security issues.  These 
include illegal content, emergency and crisis response (Bendiek and Porter, 2013, p. 174) 
and online child sex abuse (Bendiek and Porter, 2013, p. 169).  Janczewski and Colarik 
(2007, p. 13) add that co-operation is crucial even in deterring and tackling information 
warfare.  Cyber warfare is an issue of which the EU must be aware, but which is subject to 
issues of competence (Robinson, 2012, p. 161).  This indicates that the problem of 
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fragmentation has spilled over into EU solution-building, particularly in its definition of 
co-operation. 
Co-operation as a policy goal is acknowledged in current academic studies.  However, it is 
ill-defined and takes a number of different forms.  There is little agreement, consensus or 
consistency as to what form co-operation should take.  Robinson (2014, p. 4) notes that 
even in the relatively under-developed field of cyber defence, the EU is fostering bilateral 
arrangements with international partners such as the US, Brazil and China, as well as co-
operation with NATO.  Christou (2016, p. 105) states that, in the case of cyber-crime, co-
operation means bringing together the different interests of stakeholders including judicial 
authorities and private entities.  Cornish (2009, p. 27) notes that co-operation also referred 
to raising awareness of security issues, something often referred to in primary acquis 
literature.  Blythe (2008, p. 89) notes that attempts were also made to enforce co-operation 
between Member States.  As an example he cites Directive 2000/31/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market.  Article 19 of 
that Directive is dedicated to co-operation.  It requires Member States to establish national 
“contact points”.  These are to provide communication amongst the Member States and 
between the Commission on relevant information and changes to national legislative 
measures which may affect the smooth conduct of electronic commerce (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2008).  The point made is that co-operation, 
or at least its facilitation and co-ordination, was a standardised modus operandi for the EU 
in cyber security policy.
5
 
Co-operation in EU cyber security therefore takes many different guises.  Choucri, 
Madnick and Ferwerda (2014) provide a précis of the problem in their discussion of the 
institutional foundations of cyber security.  They argue that there is an absence of “a co-
ordinated industry response to develop collaborative threat reduction strategies”.  The 
fragmentation of EU and Member State co-operation stems from a lack of co-ordination in 
industry.  This lack of co-ordination means that co-operation is hindered.  What Choucri et 
al do not provide is a resolution to this issue.       
As an international organisation the EU has the capacity to provide this co-ordination.  
Centeno, van Bavel and Burgelman (2005, p. 60) note that, when developing tools for e-
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 Data analysis undertaken for this thesis provides empirical evidence for this position.  See Chapter 5 
Section 2.5. 
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governance
6
, the EU was acutely aware of the need for networking, co-ordination, 
collaboration and better government, as well as “democratic and co-operative policy 
formulation, citizen and civil society involvement [and] transparent and participative 
implementation of policies” (Centeno et al., 2005, p. 60).   
Sliwinski (2014, p. 469) takes this argument further.  He argues that the EU not only has 
the capacity to provide co-ordination, but the tools to do so.  Through its specialist 
agencies, such as the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) and 
the European Cyber-Crime Centre (EC3), or the Friends of the Presidency on Cyber Issues 
(Interview, Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU, 2015) the EU as a forum can 
facilitate this co-operation.  There are, however, limits to this facilitative role.  As 
Sliwinski (2014, p. 471) notes, a sector which involves any aspect of foreign and security 
policy falls under intergovernmental decision-making processes.  He argues that this 
curtails the capacity of the EU to act, given the need for unanimity in the Council of the 
European Union, “whereby national narratives hamper a truly common vision from 
emerging” (Sliwinski, 2014, p. 471).  In cyber security, co-operation and capacity-building 
work are crucial in order to enable Member States to move beyond mere co-ordination of 
efforts in a security field, especially a field with so transnational an outlook, but those 
efforts may be hampered by Union competences.   
This curtailment is predicated upon a view of the EU as a weak or limited actor in cyber 
security.  The argument is made that the EU will not be able to project itself onto the 
international stage due to “Member States dominating the European action on cyber 
security challenges over a genuine common response” (Sliwinski, 2014, p. 479).  Sliwinski 
argues that the EU is weak in this regard.  However, while the supremacy of Member 
States in cyber security may well be the case, to describe the EU as a weak actor is perhaps 
not to do it justice.  ENISA is an international advice broker and centre for information-
sharing (ENISA, 2005).  As Carrapiço and Trauner (2013) note, Europol is an intelligence 
hub and is ideally placed to influence cyber-crime policy.  Sliwinski’s position is 
predicated upon a very narrow definition and conceptualisation of “actor” in this policy 
area.   
Christou and Simpson (2014) counter Sliwinski’s pessimistic view of the EU’s influence 
on international cyber security issues.  They do this by utilising Bretherton and Vogler’s 
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 Such as transparency, access to information and increasing citizen participation in policy development 
(Centeno et al., 2005, p. 60).  
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three-part model of “actorness” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, pp. 24–30).  By having the 
presence, opportunity, and capability to act in order to shape international norms of 
Internet governance, the EU is exercising a particular influence as a facilitative 
international actor, especially when it comes to fostering co-operation.  Christou would 
later equate this facilitative capacity with what makes the EU an actor in international 
cyber security (Christou, 2016, p. 6).  This is a view supported in the wider security 
context by Zwolski (2013, p. 17) and Rozée (2013, p. 42).  As an economic union the aims 
of the EU are to ensure the safe exploitation of cyberspace for citizens and commercial 
entities rather than to engage in military or national security actions.  To that end Crago 
(1996, p. 467) argued as early as 1996 that the EU and the Internet have similar goals: “to 
transcend traditional political, geographical and cultural barriers in order to promote 
greater regional and transnational co-operation”. 
This thesis will build on Christou and Simpson’s use of Bretherton and Vogler’s model.  It 
can be used in a more nuanced fashion when referring to the EU’s “actorness”.  Christou 
and Simpson use the model to argue that the EU is an actor on the international stage, 
based on the assumption that its actorness is not yet agreed upon.  While this is a valid 
standpoint, this thesis will take the model one step further.  It will accept that the EU is an 
international actor, and will use Bretherton and Vogler’s model to justify this position.   
2.2.3. Contribution of this thesis to EU academic literature 
The result of this literature review is that there are two areas in which this thesis can make 
substantive contributions.  Although there is a growing body of scholarship studying EU 
cyber security, only recently has there been a trend towards examining the totality of the 
policy sector.  Scholars such as Christou (2016), Robinson (2012), Sliwinski (2014) and 
Bendiek (2012) have done so, but such approaches are in the minority.  The majority of 
analyses demonstrate a tendency towards specificity in EU cyber security studies.  The 
development of EU cyber security policy as a sector of Union policy-making has been 
largely neglected.  The scope and rationale for this thesis provides this holistic, whole-of-
sector analysis of policy-making processes in order to provide the overarching context and 
framework which many scholars have argued is missing from EU cyber security itself.  
This whole-of-sector analysis will help with understanding the continuity of the EU’s 
socio-economic policy approach, and so help to answer the thesis’s research question. 
Current scholarship also offers very few reasons as to why the EU adopted particular policy 
solutions.  This is reflected in those studies which argued that co-operation is the policy of 
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choice.  While acknowledging that co-operation is an important tool, there is little 
agreement on the nature of that co-operation, and still less discussion of why this choice 
was made.  This highlights the second gap in literature and is symptomatic of a larger 
omission in EU cyber security scholarship.  The EU’s policy differs from that of other 
actors.  The prevailing policy narrative is to acknowledge the importance of ICT and 
cyberspace to national security (Japan, 2013, p. 8; Russian Federation, 2013, pp. 2–3; 
USA, 2011a, p. 5) and therefore to address cyber security from a defence perspective.  A 
reading of the EUCSS demonstrates that the EU approaches cyber security from a socio-
economic direction, with no martial language save for a small section on cyber defence that 
is little more than a passing reference (European Commission, 2013a, p. 11).  There is no 
mention in EU policy of military responses to cyber threats, cyber war or warfare, or the 
co-ordination of Member States’ national security apparatus to combat state-sponsored 
cyber activity.   
Current scholarship has not asked why this is the case.  Commentators such as Christou, 
Sliwinski and Centeno et al provide insight into what the EU is doing to address cyber 
security challenges, and how it goes about this.  However, there is little discussion as to the 
reasons behind the choice of co-operation as a modus operandi.  This is a significant 
omission and it is therefore an important aim of this thesis to ask why the EU does what it 
does in cyber security.   
Because there have been limited examinations of the background to EU cyber security 
policy, there is also a lack of in-depth, theoretically informed work in this field (Christou, 
2016, p. 33).  This observation identifies a third area where this thesis can make a 
contribution.  By placing this analysis of cyber security within one of the main theoretical 
frameworks applied to EU policy-making research, this thesis can provide insight into the 
EU’s policy-making process as a whole.  
2.3. Theory 
This thesis is an examination of the EU’s policy-making mechanisms.  To carry out the 
analysis a suitable theoretical framework will be chosen from amongst those generally 
employed in analysing EU policy-making.  This is important because, in order to undertake 
an effective social science examination, “researchers need to conduct their inquiries under 
the auspices of a particular theoretical framework” (Rosamond, 2000, p. 4). 
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There is a rich heritage of theoretical approaches to the study of the EU.  It ranges from 
gender studies (Locher, 2012) and critical approaches (Cafruny and Ryner, 2003; Manners, 
2007) to quantitative assessments of elections and legislative processes (Kovats, 2009).  
That heritage also went through various phases, where particular approaches were 
preferred over others (Wiener and Diez, 2009, p. 7).  This section of the chapter will 
examine the applicability to this thesis of four of the most prominent theoretical traditions: 
neofunctionalism; liberal intergovernmentalism; constructivism and institutionalism.   
The research question and ultimate goal of this thesis is to examine the role of institutions 
and institutional arrangements in the development and continuity of a socio-economic 
cyber security policy.  Despite this premise, the choice of institutionalism as the theoretical 
framework is not a foregone conclusion.  The four approaches examined here have become 
part of a prevailing narrative for studying European Union policy development (Pollack, 
2005, pp. 357–358).  They also share an important trait: a focus on teleological processes 
of social, economic and political integration.  Work such as that of Dinan (2010) and Duke 
(2011) seeks to understand how the concept of “ever closer union” affects the relationships 
between Member States, the EU’s formal institutions, external partners and the Union’s 
policy development architecture.  This has affected analyses of fields as diverse as 
environmental policy (Golub, 1996; Knill and Lenschow, 1998) and the nature of the 
European welfare state (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
This poses a problem for conducting holistic examinations of cyber security policy in the 
EU.  The EUCSS – the exemplar of that policy – is not a function of integration.  The 
Union recognises that it is predominantly the task of Member States to “deal with security 
challenges in cyberspace” (European Commission, 2013a, p. 4).  This presents a challenge 
for positioning this thesis within common theoretical traditions due to their concentration 
on integration. 
This section of the chapter will explore each of these frameworks in turn.  Doing this will 
provide the reasons and justification as to why historical institutionalism (HI) is the most 
apposite theory for a study of EU cyber security policy-making.  The goal is not to reject 
other frameworks outright.  Instead HI will be the dominant theoretical approach for this 
research.  Neofunctionalist, intergovernmentalist and constructivist approaches will be 
used to inform the HI analysis.  This is particularly the case with constructivism.  As will 
be shown in Chapter 5, the EU has developed – i.e. constructed – an idiosyncratic 
discourse in cyber security, one representing a departure from the prevailing policy and 
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academic narrative in that sector.  Those narratives tend to focus on pessimistic, fear-laden, 
and often highly militarised approaches to achieving cyber security.  HI can provide a 
wider theoretical framework than would be possible if utilising constructivist approaches 
alone.  This is because the discourse was developed around certain core path dependencies 
laid down in the 1980s and 1990s which affected later policy options and choices in the 
2000s. 
2.3.1. Neofunctionalism 
The defining characteristic of neofunctionalism is the effect of functional spill-over on 
policy choices (Haas, 1958, p. 297).  Policy decisions made “pursuant to an initial task and 
grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded” (Haas, 1961, p. 368).  
In other words, once a decision is made, there is a tendency for mission-creep to set in, 
with relevant policy areas being drawn into the purview of the original authority (Cram, 
1996, pp. 46–47; Pollack, 2005, p. 359).   
This concept appears particularly suited to studies of the EU.  Haas (1970, p. 616) argued 
that the creation of a regional common market, a defining feature of the EU, is the facet 
most conducive to “rapid regional integration and maximisation of spill-over”.  
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the development of the EU’s Cyber Security 
Strategy was such a spill-over.  The core aim of the EUCSS was to ensure the continued 
viability and functionality of the Single Market.  During the economic recession of the 
1980s, European economies were struggling with stagnation and rising unemployment.  
The institutions of the EU, particularly the Commission, looked for ways and means to 
break this pattern.  The initiation of the Single Market in 1992 was an important part of an 
overall strategy seeking to capitalise on potential growth sectors.  The burgeoning ICT 
industry was one such sector (European Commission, 1985).  Once this precedent had been 
set – that ICT and the internet would be used for economic growth – infrastructure and 
citizen security concerns began to be drawn into the nexus of common market 
sustainability as and when these issues became apparent over the course of the timescape.  
This can reasonably be assumed to be the result of functional spill-over or unintended and 
unforeseen consequences of policy decisions (Schmitter, 2004, p. 3).  The decisions in 
question were those regarding the use of information communications technology (ICT) in 
the internal market as early as 1985 (European Commission, 1985). 
An initial examination of pertinent primary literature shows that ICT and the information 
society were considered crucial to the development and sustainability of the internal 
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market as far back as 1985 (European Commission, 1985).  The relatively simple decision 
made in that year to pursue the promotion of the ICT industry for wider economic growth 
necessarily expanded as the sector itself blossomed and citizen and data protection 
concerns arose through the increased use of Internet-enabled technologies.  The ease of 
access to these new technologies and the amount of private and corporate data being stored 
on networked systems led to increasing instances of computer-related crime, a concept 
which would become known as cyber-crime.  Similarly, fundamental rights such as citizen 
privacy and freedom of expression needed to be secured.  Not only should every citizen 
have access to information and digital services, but the platforms that supported them 
needed to ensure user details were kept private. 
Neofunctionalism lends itself as a theoretical framework to a study of EU cyber security 
policy-making because of the importance of ICT to the continued functioning of the 
common market.  This was particularly relevant in the earliest years of the EU’s interest in 
cyber issues.  As will be examined in Chapter 6, the primary purpose of the EU’s interest 
in the nascent IT sector was its potential to galvanise economic growth and fuel 
employment (European Commission, 1985, 1994, 1996b).  The prioritisation placed on 
economic maximisation endured throughout the entire policy-making timescape from 1985 
to 2013.  A core tenet of the 2013 Cyber Security Strategy of the EU – the culmination of 
the cyber policy-making process – is the protection and safety of key ICT infrastructures 
underpinning the Digital Single Market, itself a vital piece of the wider Single Market 
project (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2).  Although not following a teleological, 
deterministic path, cyber security and the EU’s approach to that field can be seen as a spill-
over of the drive to create, develop and maintain the internal market.   
However, deeper examination of both cyber security and neofunctionalism demonstrates 
that the two are not as compatible as may at first appear.  There are two problems with 
applying neofunctionalism to cyber security.  The first is a question of competences.  
Cyber security occupies a grey area between economic policy, where the Union has 
extensive competences, and national security considerations, where EU action is severely 
restricted.  The second problem is EU cyber security not being a function of integration. 
2.3.1.1. Neofunctionalism, Cyber Security and Limited EU competences in 
defence policy 
Consider the following hypothetical scenario:  the nationalised bank of an EU Member 
State experiences a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack which paralyses its online 
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banking systems, preventing account holders from carrying out transactions.  This type of 
cyber-incident is an economic, criminal act.  But if the cascading consequences of that 
incident were to affect the entire banking sector and financial infrastructure of the Member 
State, then it can become a national security concern.  The incident can potentially affect 
state stability internally or even internationally.  The issue is further complicated by the 
fact that the precise technical manoeuvres and actions undertaken in a cyber incident are 
the same whatever the target and whomever the perpetrator.  What differentiates one cyber 
incident from another are the intentions of the perpetrator, who often hides behind the 
anonymising capacities of cyberspace.  This is known as the “attribution problem” (Dunn 
Cavelty, 2012a, p. 12; Gaycken, 2011, p. 80; Tsagourias, 2012). 
The issue facing the use of neofunctionalism in this hypothetical scenario, and in this 
thesis, is one of Union competences.  Due to being both an economic and security concern, 
cyber security is subject to a continual battle of wills between EU functionaries managing 
the Single Market and the security concerns of individual Member States.  There is a 
connection between the internal market and the socio-economic consequences of insecure 
ICT infrastructures (Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014).  Large, pan-European 
networks such as the Schengen management system and the asylum-seeker database are 
areas where the EU has higher levels of competence.  However, there is a potential for 
large-scale, cascading cyber incidents to affect critical national infrastructures.  This 
means nation states, including the Member States of the EU, consider cyber security policy 
alongside, and sometimes within, national security concerns (Estonia, 2008; UK, 2011).   
Following the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987, the EU is restricted to 
political and economic aspects of security.  EU Member States are cautious about 
transferring too much power from national governments to the EU in security matters.  The 
EU therefore has very specific rules regarding the extent to which it can become involved 
in a policy area considered a national security issue.  This restriction necessarily colours 
the manner in which the EU approaches security risks emanating from cyberspace
7
.  As 
exemplified in the scaling back of efforts to prescribe specific solutions following the 
failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, Member States slowed down integrationist 
aspects in cyber security, despite that policy area’s relevance to the Digital Single Market.  
They wanted the EU to operate within the strictest interpretation of its remit in the Treaties 
(Interview, Senior Official, BIS UK, 2014).  This meant a functional spill-over could not 
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occur in cyber security policy as restrictions on EU action were tightening.  This 
prevention of spill-over - a core tenet of neofunctionalism – calls into question the 
applicability of neofunctionalism to this thesis. 
2.3.1.2. Neofunctionalism, Cyber Security and a Lack of Integration 
This applicability is dealt a further blow by the fact that, as argued by Christou (2016) and 
as stated in the EUCSS itself (European Commission, 2013a, p. 4), the EU is explicit in the 
view that responding to security challenges in cyberspace remains the responsibility of the 
Member States rather than any supranational body.  While a number of important 
initiatives were undertaken in the field of criminal justice (European Parliament & Council 
of The European Union, 2002, 2011), and the EC3 is making strong headway in tackling 
computer-related crime (Mendez, 2005, pp. 518–519), Europol itself has no executive 
powers.  It cannot make arrests on behalf of the EU or its Member States
8
 (Interview, 
Senior Official, Europol, 2014).  Similarly, ENISA, a crucial part of the EU’s approach to 
cyber security, does not provide security.  Instead it acts as an information hub (Sliwinski, 
2014, p. 477).  It is an advice broker, assisting those entities, public and private, who 
actually do the securing.   
Cyber security is not a policy sector which promotes integration.  Although it does not 
explicitly disavow any connection to the concept of ever closer union, the EUCSS 
acknowledges that the tools and responsibility for achieving cyber security are in the hands 
of the Member States.  Cyber security cannot, therefore, reasonably be considered a result 
of functional spill-over from increasing political and policy integration.  This ultimately 
makes neofunctionalism a less than ideal theoretical framework for this study. 
2.3.2. Intergovernmentalism 
According to Pollack (2005, p. 360), intergovernmentalism developed out of a concern that 
neofunctionalist research focussed on supranational entities at the expense of the nation 
state.  A more fruitful manner in which to examine the EU was to concentrate on the 
interaction of sovereign entities – i.e. intergovernmental interaction.  The reaction to 
supranationalism began with Hoffman (1966).  Instead of nation states – in this context the 
Member States of the EU – being obsolete given the rise in prevalence and power of 
supranational entities like the EU, their primacy within these international architectures 
was proving surprisingly resilient.  This resilience is predicated upon the legitimacy of 
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national self-determination – the sovereignty of the nation state – and what Hoffman called 
the  
newness of many of the states, which have wrested their independence by a 
nationalist upsurge and are unlikely to throw or give away what they have obtained 
only too recently (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 864)
9
. 
The concept of the primacy of the nation state within or in spite of any supranational entity 
is particularly relevant to a discussion of the EU and the development of Union policies, 
particularly cyber security.  As demonstrated by Sliwinski (2014), the EU has no executive 
powers in core areas of cyber security such as computer-related crime.  Similarly, cyber 
security is often considered a national security issue.  Member States are at best reluctant 
to delegate power in this area upwards to any supranational body, institution or agency.  
The EUCSS also explicitly acknowledges Member State primacy in this field.   
There are two reasons for this restriction.  On the one hand there is the explicit purpose of 
the EU as an economic rather than security entity.  The EU started life as a pooling of the 
coal and steel industries of six countries (Dinan, 2010, p. 17).  On the other hand was the 
codification of the EU’s position on security policy in the 1987 Single European Act and 
the 1992 Petersburg Tasks (see Chapter 6 Section 3.1).  These restricted the EU’s 
involvement to the “political and economic aspects of security” (European Union, 1987, p. 
1049).  The important point, according to Pollack, is that neofunctionalism had 
“underestimated the resilience of the nation-state” (Pollack, 2005, p. 360), an 
underestimation which intergovernmentalism could redress.   
Building on this notion of the primacy of the nation state within a political organisation, 
Moravcsik (1993, pp. 484–487) developed a three-step model for intergovernmental 
European integration.  This model moved away from the idea that the supranational entity 
drives the process, and is predicated upon states as rational actors bringing their 
preferences to a bargaining forum.  At the first level, the national governments aggregate 
the preferences of their constituents into recognisable and (ideally) agreed policies which 
represent the interests and goals of those nation states.  These goals are brought to the 
second level of the model, the intergovernmental bargaining table in Brussels.  National 
governments engage in “hardball bargaining” (Pollack, 2005, p. 361) amongst their fellow 
Member States in an interest-maximising mechanism.  Only once some sort of agreement 
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is made do the Member States elect to pool sovereignty in supranational institutions in 
order to ensure collective compliance and to  
overcome the almost inevitable interstate prisoner’s dilemma of enforcement, 
whereby individual governments seek to evade inconvenient responsibilities, 
thereby undermining the integrity of the entire system (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 512).   
In effect, the supranational entity is relegated to a body whose sole purpose is to ensure 
that its members comply with certain rules and obligations. 
The intergovernmentalist model would appear to suit a study of cyber security policy 
because that sector contains explicit acknowledgment that the Member States retain 
ultimate responsibility for ensuring and providing such security (European Commission, 
2013a, p. 4).  Bendiek’s (2012, p. 19) analysis acknowledges the Union’s role in 
facilitating co-ordination and co-operation between the responsible cyber security actors.  
This explicit acknowledgment would appear to give intergovernmentalism the upper hand 
as a theoretical approach for this thesis.   
The drawback for such a study of EU cyber security, however, is that there is no pooling of 
sovereignty in this particular policy area.  This omits a vital component of Moravcsik’s 
model.  As mentioned above, the EUCSS clarifies that Member States retain responsibility, 
i.e. they retain sovereignty, in securing national digital infrastructures.  Agencies such as 
ENISA and the EC3 operate as information hubs.  Member State sovereignty or authority 
is not pooled in this policy area. 
While liberal intergovernmentalism and Moravcsik’s three-level model for policy analysis 
may appear to be suited to a study of this nature they are rendered unsuitable due to the 
EU’s Member States reluctance to delegate cyber security matters upwards to EU level.  
The Member States have chosen not to give the EU competence to act.  As Craig (2010, p. 
182) argues, even after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the area of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) remain sectors of unanimous Council decision-making, and are not subject 
to the qualified majority voting processes.  They are considered sections of “special 
competence” (European Union, n.d.).  As a result Member States are reluctant to and even 
refuse to pool resources, let alone sovereignty, in a field so intimately connected to 
national infrastructure protection and defence.  In addition, in the EU policy-making 
infrastructure, cyber security is not wholly positioned within any of the policy areas subject 
to intergovernmental decision-making.   
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Cyber security is therefore a paradox for the EU which weakens the applicability of 
Moravcsik’s intergovernmentalist mode of EU study.  The Union places a socio-economic 
interpretation on the nature of cyber-risks.  These are considered issues which threaten 
citizen wellbeing and the functionality of the internal market.  This in turn means that core 
aspects of cyber security fall under the aegis of Home Affairs and the Single Market.  Both 
of these areas fall under the supranational, qualified majority voting mechanisms, rather 
than the unanimous intergovernmental processes of defence and security.  However, cyber 
security is both a hard security matter when defence policy is being discussed, but also a 
socio-economic, criminal justice matter when the internal market is on the agenda.  This 
provides an opportunity for researchers to examine a policy area which contains the best, 
or worst, of both supranational and intergovernmental worlds.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, this paradox means that intergovernmentalism is not the most suitable 
framework for analysis. 
2.3.3. Constructivism 
Constructivism also appears, at first glance, to be eminently suited to a study of the 
development of EU cyber security policy.  The core premise of constructivism is the 
existence of a “social process though which agent [i.e. actor] properties and preferences 
change as a result of interaction” (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, p. 220).  Policy choices 
are made as a result of this social process. 
The general academic and policy discourses on cyber security, beyond the immediate 
confines of the EU, contain a number of core themes.  These range from technical 
discussions regarding the vulnerabilities and security measures required for supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems (Morris et al., 2011; Simões et al., 2015) to 
the relative advantages of honey-pots over hack-back in conducting active cyber defence 
(Lachow, 2013; Dewar, 2014, p. 13).  Decisions regarding cyber security policy are made 
based on an interpretation of those discourses.  A privately-owned technology company 
will have different cyber security priorities to a state-owned energy concern or a heavily 
connected nation-state such as Estonia.  Similarly, the EU’s interpretation of these general 
cyber security discourses is predicated upon it being a socio-economic entity.  This makes 
it more of a target for corporate espionage and computer-based crime than state-sponsored 
cyber warfare
10.  The decisions made by the EU’s constituent actors – its formal 
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institutions and the Member States – are therefore informed by the Union’s own internal 
cyber security discourse. 
This has led to a particular EU interpretation of the nature of security threats and risks 
emanating from cyberspace.  Even those risks which infer state-sponsored activity 
bordering on acts of war are interpreted by the EU as threats to several socio-economic 
concerns.  These include the ongoing functionality of the Single Market, personal and data 
privacy, and taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by universal access to the latest 
in digital technology.  In short, these threats are subject to a socio-economic construction 
which has developed over time.   
As with neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism appears on the 
surface to be a theoretical framework which would provide some insight into why the EU 
does what it does in the field of cyber security.  The EU’s cyber security policy and 
strategy, set out in the 2013 EUCSS, is an interpretation or construction of those aspects of 
a general cyber security discourse which are (a) most relevant to the EU and (b) most 
suited to the EU’s core socio-economic competences.  The Union is seeking to secure 
cyberspace to ensure the security and viability of the common market.  It therefore 
focusses on reducing and tackling those risks, such as computer-related crime and attacks 
on privacy, which may have a negative effect on that market.   
While constructivism as a theoretical approach may appear entirely appropriate for this 
thesis, there are two aspects of the theory which raise red flags.  First, constructivism is 
often pitched at the level of theory or metatheory (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001, p. 219).  
Even self-confessed constructivist research such as Koslowski’s (1999) examination of the 
quasi-federal nature of Member State bargaining, or Hyde-Price and Jeffery’s (2001) 
research into the influence of Germany in the EU, assume a macro-theoretical position 
focussing on very broad themes.  While this thesis examines a long period of time (28 
years between 1985 and 2013), conducting macro-theoretic examinations is not the aim of 
this research.  Rather, the aim is to examine the single policy area of cyber security over 
that specified period of time.  This makes constructivism arguably too broad a mechanism.  
While it is indeed the case that the EU’s narrative in the field is constructed, and that 
construction is influenced by actor and institutional decisions (Wendt, 1995, p. 303), 
constructivist approaches such as those of Wendt or Checkel (1999) are perhaps better 
suited to examining large, substantive issues such as the totality of the cyber security 
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narrative – civilian, military, criminal, technical, European, American etc. – or the large-
sale problem of European integration. 
The particular reason that constructivism is not best suited to this study is the overall aim 
of the thesis.  This research seeks to contribute to academic understanding of the EU.  It 
will do this by studying the institutions, institutional arrangements, social processes and 
drivers which have led to the EU developing its approach to cyber security.  This is a 
constructivist approach.  However, the thesis also seeks to understand the causal 
mechanisms which have led the EU to adopt and maintain a position at variance with the 
prevailing cyber security narrative.  Checkel and Moravcsik (2001, p. 221) argue that 
causal mechanisms underlying social processes are often neglected in constructivist 
analyses.  Such analyses rarely account for any variation in international norms (Sikkink 
and Risse, 1999, p. 4).  It is precisely this variation or divergence which this thesis seeks to 
understand.  This makes constructivism less applicable than it at first appears. 
This research does not reject constructivism as a theoretical framework outright, however.  
Instead, constructivism will be employed to supplement and inform the framework which 
will be employed: historical institutionalism.  Analysing the causal mechanisms of a 
particular interpretation of policy over time will facilitate the examination, and develop the 
understanding of, the EU’s approach to cyber security. 
2.3.4. Institutionalism 
The final branch of theory most pertinent and appropriate to this thesis is institutionalism.  
This approach is predicated upon studying the influence of institutional forces on social, 
economic and political phenomena.  To bring clarity to this position, Hall and Taylor 
(1996) establish three “types” of institutional analysis: rational choice institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.   While not going so far as to 
claim separate methodologies for the three types, Hall and Taylor argue that these were in 
fact three different approaches to the study of the role of institutional drivers of change 
and actor preference (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Steinmo, 2008, p. 118; Bache, George, & 
Bulmer, 2011).  Although distinct, the three approaches are mutually complementary and 
share the same key trait: examining the influence of institutions on the interaction of 
rational actors.  Where they differ is in the priorities they place on key features of that 
interaction, the preferences actors bring to it, and perhaps most crucially, on the precise 
nature of institutions. 
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Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) is predicated upon understanding actor preference 
within an institutional setting.  Steinmo (2008, p. 162) argues that, in RCI, institutions 
frame individual actor behaviour and preferences.  These preferences are exogenous: they 
are brought to the formal arena of interaction and are limited by it (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 
943).  The goals and values of the institution restrict the actors’ capacity to achieve all of 
their aims in what is known as “bounded rationality” (Peters, 2005, p. 56).  Nevertheless, 
there is a certain utility to engaging with an institution and the actors within it: the reason 
actors choose to co-operate is because they get more with co-operation than without it 
(Steinmo, 2008, p. 127).   
Sociological institutionalism (SI) by contrast focusses less on the formal structures of the 
arena of interaction, and describes as institutions anything that “provides [a] frame of 
meaning guiding human action” (Bache et al., 2011, p. 26).  Accordingly, cultural 
constructs such as religions, ideologies, social class or any collection of “culturally specific 
properties” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 946) are also institutional constructions and 
influence policy decisions.  SI therefore blurs the lines between formal institutions and 
abstract culture, enabling a more nuanced study of political processes.  Furthermore, it 
stipulates that institutions affect not only the calculations made by individuals in political 
interaction, but also their most basic preferences and even their identity (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, p. 947) prior to their engagement with the institution.   
Finally, historical institutionalist (HI)
11
 scholarship argues that key decisions made at the 
inception or initiation of an institutional body continue to influence the subsequent 
evolution of the institution and determine the tenor of future policy decisions made by 
actors (Peters, 2005, p. 71).  Rather than treat institutions as arena structures where the 
political interaction is the most significant element, HI represents an attempt to show how 
political struggles are “mediated by the institutional forces in which they take place” 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 2).  
The key aspect which differentiates HI from rational and sociological variants is that an HI 
framework “recognises that political development must be understood as a process that 
unfolds over time” (Pierson, 2000, p. 264).  As shown in Chapters 1 and 3, this notion of 
temporal longevity is key to the structure and research framework of this thesis.  Policies, 
political action, social strategies and solution-building may occur on an ad hoc basis in 
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response to particular exogenous shocks.  However, the tenor and nuances of the policy 
solutions adopted are based on norms and paths set down much earlier in the policy 
process, even at the establishment of the institutions in which they are developed.  This 
leads to the concept of a “timescape”: the temporal features of decision-making that exist 
across the polity, politics and policy dimensions (Bulmer, 2009, p. 307; Meyer-Sahling and 
Goetz, 2009, pp. 326–327).  Future policy decisions and actor preferences will be directly 
affected by, for example, the values and goals of the institutions set down at their 
foundation.  In the case of the EU, the establishment of a socio-economic cyber security 
discourse makes such solutions more likely to be selected over other, more militaristic, 
national security-focused measures.  This is an effect known as “path dependency” 
(Pierson, 2000; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 2).   
Path dependency functions in a similar way to Haas’s process of functional spill-over 
(Haas, 1961, p. 368).  Certain policies and modes of actor behaviour endure over time due 
to the difficulty involved in unseating long-standing attitudes and policies.  Where path 
dependency differs from spill-over is that the initial task or decision is not expanded to 
incorporate functionally or ideologically similar areas.  Instead, subsequent tasks and 
policy choices are dependent on the initial decision.  Krasner (1984, p. 240) explains that 
when a policy is embarked upon, the institution enters a period of stasis, continuing on its 
path until an event or critical juncture shifts the policy into a new period of stasis: so called 
“punctuated equilibrium”.  The punctuation point could be an external catalytic event 
generating particular policy decisions which deviate from the original equilibrium.  In 
cyber security analyses, examples of such catalytic events include the 2007 cyber-attacks 
on the Estonian banking sector or the 2014 Snowden revelations.  Chapters 8 and 9 
examine a series of major events which occurred between 2007 and 2009 and which 
severely tested the strength of path dependent forces in EU cyber security. 
In addition to path dependency, another key feature of HI is that actor preferences and 
decisions must be contextualised, and that context studied over a period of time.  It is not 
enough to examine the immediate causes of a policy decision in situ.  The full background 
of that decision must be understood.  Such historical study of political interaction lends a 
certain empirical basis to institutionalism (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 2).  What HI does 
is provide a durational context for political and social interaction which goes beyond the 
immediate cause of political decisions (Thelen, 2002, p. 93).  Such a provision means that 
HI lends itself to the study of the European Union and EU policy-making in general – and 
this study of cyber security policy more specifically – as it enables a more nuanced study 
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beyond simple interest-based, cause-and-effect decision-making explanations.  The 
institutional structure of the EU affects the decisions taken by the constituent actors 
involved in those institutions but that interaction takes place within the overarching 
political landscape established by the Union’s operational treaties.  
In summary, HI as an approach to the study of politics  
pays attention to real world empirical questions, its historical orientation and its 
attention to the ways in which institutions structure and shape political behaviour 
and outcomes (Steinmo, 2008, p. 118).   
HI scholars are sceptical when seeking to establish large universal laws for actor 
behaviour.  Instead they focus on contextualised theory-building to develop deeper 
understandings of causal relationships through “an intense and focused examination 
of…carefully selected cases” (Thelen, 2002, p. 95).  For the study of cyber security, HI 
adds a long-term, longitudinal component missing from much of the current discourse in 
the field and other theoretical approaches.   
Bannerman and Haggart (2014, p. 1) support the point that historical institutionalism is one 
of the dominant approaches in studies of the European Union.  The topics analysed under 
its banner range from abstract, macro-level examinations of the logic of integration and 
decision-making (Kerremans, 1996; Pierson, 1996), through meso-level investigations of 
the governance of the single market (Bulmer, 1998) to analyses of specific policy fields 
such as telecommunications (Goodman, 2006) or the development of economic and 
monetary union (Verdun, 2015, 2007).  Jupille and Caporaso’s (1999, p. 430) review of 
institutionalist literature and theory as applied to the EU concluded that the “institutional 
turn” of the late 1990s provided an ability to generalize about EU actor-institution 
relationships.  This placed EU studies more centrally within the broader HI theory 
literature itself (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999, p. 441).  HI is therefore an eminently suitable 
theoretical framework for examining EU policy development in general, and cyber security 
policy more specifically.   
One final consideration brought to the fore by the range of issues to which HI analysis has 
been applied, and which highlights HI’s appropriateness to this thesis, is that it is not so 
heavily focussed on integration.  Studies of the EU which employ HI, such as the work of 
Pierson (1996), Bulmer (2008; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005) or Hall (1998) acknowledge the 
importance of integration.  Mühlböck and Rittberger (2015, p. 11) argue that HI has been 
prominently applied to this topic, in particular to studies of the Council of the European 
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Union and the Parliament.  Integration is not however, the sole focus.  As a result, HI is, as 
Bulmer (1997, p. 368) states, “agnostic on the end-goal of the integration process”.  This 
agnosticism fits with the implicit denial of integration in the EUCSS itself.  The main 
concern with employing neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism or constructivism as 
theoretical frameworks for this research is those theories’ concentration on integration.  
Cyber security is not an integrationist policy in the EU.  A theoretical framework which 
does not place so heavy a concentration on this aspect of EU policy, such as HI, is 
therefore more appropriate.  The precise mechanisms of HI as an approach to the study of 
EU policy-making processes and phenomena will be set out in Chapter 4. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there are a number of academic debates and discussions 
relating to EU cyber security policy.  Current research examines the Union’s capacity to 
respond to online criminal activity, evaluations of the relations between important 
international intelligence actors, the long-term influence of the EU as a protector of 
fundamental rights and examinations of the influence of Union policy on the technology 
industry.  An important element running through these discussions is the capacity of the 
EU to facilitate the development of security by ensuring that responsible actors co-operate 
with one another, rather than provide security itself.  As an international organisation made 
up of independent Member States, the EU is ideally placed to be such a facilitative actor 
(Crago, 1996, p. 469). 
From a cyber security policy perspective, however, there is a recognition that the EU’s 
overall approach has been fragmented.  While this highlights an important aspect of EU 
policy in this sector, it also highlights two gaps in current scholarship.  Research 
undertaken to date does not take account of steps the EU has taken to address this 
fragmentation.  Although these measures were not successful until 2013, there were a 
series of attempts between 1985 and 2013 to create a general cyber security policy.  These 
attempts are not given full consideration in the literature.  The second gap concerns why 
this fragmentation occurred.  One reason for this is that EU Member States place different 
priorities on cyber security policy.  While the existence of this variance is acknowledged in 
the literature, it is an afterthought in a number of analyses.  This misses an opportunity to 
ask why EU policy is fragmented. 
The literature review also highlighted a lack of academic attention given to EU cyber 
security as a policy sector in its own right.  While there are recent moves to address this 
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imbalance, this is still a developing field.  This thesis is therefore positioned to make a 
substantive contribution to EU academic research by conducting a holistic study of the 
development of policy in that whole sector.  Current studies have focussed on the 
operationalisation of policy – how the EU achieves cyber security – while little attention 
has been paid to why.  This thesis seeks to address this gap in the literature. 
The chapter also identified a dearth of theoretically focussed research addressing EU cyber 
security.  This means that identifying theoretical approaches suitable to cyber security is 
problematic.  The most commonly applied approaches of neofunctionalism, 
intergovernmentalism and constructivism each have particular drawbacks when being 
considered for a study of EU cyber security policy.  The most significant of these is a 
heavy focus on integration.  Because the EU recognises that cyber security is 
predominantly the responsibility of the Member States, an approach concentrating on 
integration is not entirely appropriate.  The chapter has shown that historical 
institutionalism, also a frequently applied approach to studies of the EU, is more suitable 
for two reasons.  First, it eschews a concentration on integration, and second, it is suited to 
a long term, temporal analysis.  Cyber security policy has been a part of EU policy-making 
for a longer time than is acknowledged in the literature.  The thesis can therefore make a 
second contribution to academic studies of the EU by conducting an HI analysis in a policy 
area where such studies have not been carried out. 
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Chapter 3 | Research Design, Methodology and 
Ethics 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out the methodological process by which the research was carried out.  
Two distinct source types were used to gather data for the research.  Union acquis 
communautaire was analysed in order to identify the EU’s cyber security policy itself.  
However, these documents represent the end-point of a process of development.  They 
provide little indication of influences and drivers in that process.  Elite interviews with 
relevant functionaries directly involved in the policy development process were undertaken 
in order to provide this insight.  
To carry out an effective analysis, the thesis adopted a mixed-methods approach.  In the 
first instance, a quantitative approach was used to identify the institutional and non-
institutional drivers pertinent to cyber security policy.  Such a technique was necessary 
because there are a large number of institutional forces involved in developing policy in 
the EU.  There are a similarly large number of entities and bodies involved in that process.  
Not all institutions and actors are relevant to cyber security.  A quantitative exercise was 
required to draw out those of relevance. 
This exercise encountered a methodological problem: interviews and literature sources are 
subject to differing tools for data extraction.  To mitigate this issue, a conceptual content 
analysis was developed.  This involved counting the occurrence of synonymous concepts 
rather than individual words.  The development of this conceptual content analysis enabled 
the use of a single technique to code and gather data from both literature and interview 
sources.  A model was developed which utilised conceptual, qualitative data combined 
with a quantitative HI analysis.  This model demonstrates how the gap between qualitative 
and quantitative data can be effectively bridged given the interaction between the two 
kinds of data (Tarrow, 2010, p. 102).   
Having established the pertinent institutions, actors and non-institutional elements, it was 
necessary to analyse their interaction to understand their role in cyber security policy 
development.  To do this, a qualitative analysis was conducted.  A narrative inquiry was 
carried out in order to study policy development over time and identify the causal chain 
and mechanisms (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 206) which led to the development of the 
EUCSS in 2013.  This examination of the interplay of institutional and non-institutional 
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elements over time adheres to Skocpol and Pierson’s mechanisms of an historical 
institutionalist (HI) analysis (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 3).   
The research process was greatly assisted by the use of NVivo software.  NVivo is one of a 
number of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) packages available to 
researchers (Bryman, 2008, p. 565).  Operating on a code-and-retrieve theme, NVivo 
facilitates the examination and coding of text, significantly reducing the labour involved 
when working with hard copies.  In that sense, this programme, and others that carry out 
CAQDAS are tools to facilitate the handling, management and analysis of large quantities 
of text.  As Sprokkereef (in Bryman, 2008, p. 566) notes, what these possible software 
solutions do not provide are decisions regarding the coding and analysis of the data 
extracted.  Such decisions must be made by the researcher. 
This chapter is divided into five sections.  Following this introduction, the second section 
examines how data sources were identified and selected.  The third section sets out the 
conceptual content analysis techniques undertaken to identify the institutions and actors to 
be examined in this study.  It also sets out the methodology undertaken to effectively code 
the data sources.  The fourth section of the chapter explains the narrative inquiry 
undertaken to examine the interaction of institutional and non-institutional drivers over 
time.  This section explores the qualitative aspect of the research methodology.  A fifth and 
final section provides some reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the methods 
used in this thesis. 
3.2. Identifying Data Sources 
Two source types were used to generate data for this thesis: primary literature and elite 
interviews.  Primary literature included press releases and speeches.  However, the most 
relevant literature was derived from the EU’s acquis communautaire.  As stated in Chapter 
1, Union acquis comprises  
 “the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; 
 legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; 
 declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; 
 instruments under the Common Foreign and Security Policy; 
 international agreements concluded by the Union and those entered into by the 
Member States among themselves within the sphere of the Union's activities” 
(European Union, n.d.) 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term acquis will also be used to refer to Commission 
Communications as well as resolutions and conclusions of both the Council of the 
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European Union and the European Council.  This can be justified because these documents 
fall under the definition of “declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union” cited 
above. 
This thesis used acquis as a data source because it comprises the Union’s policy in any 
sector in its purview.  Any research examining what influenced choices in the policy 
development process must include an examination of relevant acquis. 
3.2.1. Identifying, collecting, collating and cataloguing primary 
literature 
Before any analysis could begin, it was necessary to identify and catalogue acquis 
documents relevant to cyber security.  The process of selecting literature sources was 
facilitated by three specific tools.  The first of these was a list of documents relevant to 
network and information security (NIS) provided upon email request by the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content & Technology 
(DG Connect) (European Commission, 2012a).  This list was provided for previous 
postgraduate research (Dewar, 2012) and established a starting point for compiling relevant 
acquis
12
.   
The documents listed cross-referenced each other.  For example, COM (2006) 251 A 
Strategy for a Secure Information Society made direct reference to COM (2001) 298 
Network and Information Security: Proposal for A European Policy Approach (European 
Commission, 2006a, p. 3).  This confirmed both documents’ relevance to this study.  The 
earliest listed document, the 2001 Proposal for a European Policy Approach (European 
Commission, 2001a),  referred to earlier publications not on the DG Connect list.  This 
inferred the existence of a chronology or policy timescape going back to a point earlier 
than the list itself provided.  This in turn implied that the bibliography of relevant acquis 
communautaire was incomplete and could be expanded. 
Having established a core list of relevant documentation, further acquis was searched for 
and identified using two additional tools.  The first of these is the official online repository 
of EU legislation and documentation, the EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law 
database
13
.  The second was another online resource, the University of Pittsburgh’s 
Archive of European Integration (AEI)
14
.  Both of these resources provide online access to 
                                            
12
 The list itself is provided in full at Appendix 1. 
13
 Accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html  
14
 Accessible at http://aei.pitt.edu/  
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EU documents in the public domain.  This includes Commission Communications such as 
legislative white papers, and specific legislative instruments such as Regulations, 
Decisions and Directives.  Where documents already identified as relevant to this thesis 
made reference to specific instruments or publications, these were searched for first in the 
EUR-Lex database.  When not accessible via EUR-Lex, the AEI database was used. 
Searching these online databases raised challenges from the commencement of the source 
collection processes.  It was difficult to reliably and efficiently distinguish acquis relevant 
to this thesis from the tens of thousands of documents published by the EU across the full 
range of its policy areas.  When an acquis instrument of potential relevance was identified 
a test was required to confirm whether or not it was pertinent to this study.   
A hoop test (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, pp. 17–18; Bennett, 2010, p. 210) was devised to 
determine the relevance of acquis documents.  A standard metric content analysis was 
carried out on the EUCSS itself and the documents in the DG Connect list.  This identified 
eight keywords and phrases frequently occurring in all the documents.  Due to differences 
in the spelling of “online” and “on-line”, this equated to nine discrete search terms.  These 
search terms were: 
1. Cyber 
2. Information 
3. Network 
4. Digital 
5. Internet 
6. Communication 
7. Online 
8. On-line 
9. Electronic 
 
When a document was identified as potentially relevant, these keywords and phrases 
provided a schedule of terms which were searched for to confirm this.  Where they 
occurred the documents were categorised as relevant and catalogued in an Excel 
spreadsheet.  An additional benefit for employing this keyword hoop-test was the fact that, 
other than Commission Communications, few EU documents were published with sector 
specific titles.  European Council and Council of the European Union’s Resolutions use 
meeting dates or committee names for referencing, because the topics “information 
technology” or “online communications” comprise two of several different policy areas 
discussed at those meetings.  Commission Communications by contrast are sector and 
issue specific, and so use discrete titles.  By repeating this process of document cross-
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referencing, referral and hoop testing a library of 143 relevant pieces of acquis was 
compiled.  This primary literature comprised legislative instruments, Council Resolutions 
and Conclusions, Treaties and Commission Communications
15
.  
Within the Excel spreadsheet the complete library of acquis was categorised by publishing 
actor or legislative instrument, and then placed in chronological order
16
.  This immediately 
yielded two significant findings: first, that the Commission was the actor most involved 
with policy-making in cyber security.  Of the 143 documents published, including 
legislation and treaties, 48, or 33.5%, were published by the Commission alone.  While this 
was to be expected considering the Commission’s role as a policy initiator, this finding did 
not confirm whether or not the Commission was the most powerful actor in this sector.  
Instead it signified that it was the most involved actor, and established the Commission as 
an important target when seeking participants for interview. 
Arranging the acquis in chronological order also provided a full timescape for the research: 
the period between 1985 and 2013.  This was a period of 28 years beginning with the 
Commission’s plans to initiate a single market between the Member States, and 
culminating in the publication of the EUCSS itself, the end product of the cyber security 
policy-making process.   
Finally, the chronology identified a series of milestones in the development of cyber 
security policy.  Key documents were published in 1985, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2013 
which bookmarked specific periods of ideational development.  These documents would be 
the foci for examining the timescape, the final stage in the research.  To effect and 
facilitate that analysis, all the primary literature documents were uploaded into NVivo 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). 
The acquis collection process is illustrated in Diagram 3-1 below. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
15
 The spreadsheet containing the complete of acquis communautaire is provided in Appendix 2. 
16
 See Appendix 3 for the spreadsheet of acquis arranged chronologically by publishing actor. 
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Diagram 3-1: Acquis collection process 
 
3.2.2. Elite interviews 
The second source of data was a series of elite interviews, of which 29 were referable.  
Elite interviewing was chosen as a data collection tool because primary literature could 
provide only one part of an analysis of policy-making processes.  The EU’s acquis by its 
very nature represents the end point of development.  It is a finished product which 
provides few insights into its developmental or generative processes.  Interviews with 
functionaries who wrote the acquis can provide experiential insights, motivations and 
indications of specific drivers not immediately obvious or clear from policy documents.  
Elite interviews therefore complete the analysis. 
 
 
Gather data sources
Initial List of relevant 
cyber acquis provided
by DG Connect
14 Hard copies of 
literature collected 
through Eurolex and AEI
129 New references identified from initial list 
and references in new documents through 
Eurolex and AEI
Keyword content Analysis:
List produced
Hoop Test using keywords to test relevance
143 Relevant acquis
documents included: key 
words identified  
Acquis excluded as non-
relevant: No key words 
identified
Literature grouped by 
publishing actor (Appendix
3)
Interview targets identified
Literature grouped by 
chronology (Appendix 3)
Timeframe identified
Hard copies from Euro-lex & AE1
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3.2.2.1. Selection/identification of Participants  
There were two types of interview participants.  The first type comprised relevant officials 
and bureaucrats.  This included functionaries of the EU’s formal institutions and its 
agencies as well as current Member State civil servants working within the field of cyber 
security.  This included representatives from Europol, the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA), relevant Directorates-General at the European 
Commission, Members of and functionaries from the European Parliament, and national 
government representatives.  The second type of participant comprised academics and 
researchers at universities and private research agencies with specialisms in European or 
general cyber security.  Participation was secured with representatives from agencies 
including the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) in Tallinn, the Security 
and Defence Agency (SDA) in Brussels and Chatham House in London. 
The selection of primary literature sources outlined in Section 3.2.1 above enabled the 
identification of organisations and agencies closely involved with cyber security in the 
European Union.  The categorisation of acquis communautaire by publishing actor and by 
document type identified the European Commission, the Council of the European Union 
and the European Council as important actors, which in turn established these as “targets” 
for interview participants.  Of particular note at this juncture is the fact that the European 
Parliament was not identified in the acquis collection exercise as an actor involved in 
policy development.  Nevertheless, functionaries and MEPs from the European Parliament 
were targeted for participation in the research to establish if this was a trend or an 
aberration in the acquis. 
The acquis collection exercise also highlighted subsections within actors where 
participants should be sought.  This was particularly prevalent in the European 
Commission.  The collegiate nature of that actor meant that several departments within it – 
known as Directorates-General (DGs) – were involved in the development of cyber 
security policy.  An investigation into the acquis, commencing with the EUCSS itself, was 
able to highlight those DGs most relevant to this research.  These were the Directorate-
General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and the Directorate-General for 
Communications Networks, Content & Technology (DG Connect).  The EUCSS also 
demonstrated that the European External Action Service (EEAS) was a core member of the 
group developing that strategy.  Interviews were sought at these three bodies in the first 
instance. 
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Because the acquis only referenced actors or actors’ departments, identifying specific 
participants was problematic.  Use was made of contacts established at academic and cyber 
security industry conferences in the three years prior to 2014 to either (a) request their 
specific participation or (b) request information on who should be approached.  One 
functionary from the EEAS closely involved with the EUCSS had been interviewed for 
previous research.  When approached again, they were amenable to participating a second 
time.  An email was also sent to the contact at DG Connect who had provided the initial 
list of cyber security acquis.  While this individual was not able to participate personally, 
they forwarded the request to others in the department and two interviews were secured as 
a result. 
Where specific individuals had not already been approached at conferences, a search of the 
European Commission’s website identified those DG officials who work in cyber security.  
DG and agency organigrams
17
 proved useful in identifying if not specific individuals then 
specific units within the DG which could be contacted.  This was the case with DG 
HOME.  This method of participant identification proved effective and two interviews 
were secured.  Communication with potential participants was conducted via email.   
The majority of interviews were not scheduled at this initial point of contact due to the 
difficulty of arranging meetings in advance with functionaries and participants at numerous 
international locations across Europe.  Once initial contact was made and participation-in-
principle was secured the majority of prospective participants requested to be contacted 
again on, or immediately prior to, the researcher’s arrival at their location.  This enabled 
the arrangement of a fieldwork schedule according to these participation-in-principle 
agreements.  On arrival at the various locations, prospective participants were contacted 
once again and, when a meeting was agreed, were sent a further email confirming the date 
of the interview.  This confirmation also included the interview questions, participant 
information and a participation consent form, in order to adhere to the University of 
Glasgow’s ethics requirements18.   
In addition to the initial group of participants identified through the author’s own personal 
networks, further potential participants were identified through a snowball or chain referral 
system (Burnham et al., 2008, pp. 207–208).  As described by Biernacki and Waldorf  
                                            
17
 The organigram for DG Home is included at Appendices 6 respectively.  That for DG Connect is restricted 
access only. 
18
 See Appendices 7, 8 and 9 for sample questions and participant information provided under research ethics 
guidelines. 
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(1981, p. 151) a chain referral process is “created through a series of referrals that are made 
within a circle of people who know each other”.  In the case of this research, participants 
were specifically asked who should be approached for more information in this policy 
sector.  The process proved extremely beneficial, as not only were specific individuals 
identified who had not been so before, but initial participants could act as gatekeepers and 
as referees.  This expanded the pool of participants considerably, including into areas of 
difficult access.  As Faugier and Sargeant (1997, p. 793) note, “the presence of even 
minimal contacts may help in the process of selecting and contacting subjects for study in 
otherwise very hard-to-target populations”.  While Faugier and Sargeant cite this as a 
positive aspect of chain referral in certain areas of social medical research, the issue is also 
relevant when identifying, selecting and securing interviews in sensitive political science 
research such as this thesis.  Chain referral was also beneficial in identifying and securing 
participants in large bureaucratic entities such as the Commission and when researching a 
potentially restricted, security-related topic such as cyber security. 
In total, 31 interviews were undertaken.  The process for acquiring interview participants is 
summarised in Diagram 3-2 below. 
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Diagram 3-2: Participant Acquisition Process 
 
 
3.2.2.2. Conducting the elite interviews – ensuring consistency, fidelity and 
reliability 
To ensure consistency, semi-structured interviews were conducted where each participant 
was asked the same series of questions (with certain necessary allowances and 
amendments relating to the specific institution or agency they represented).  The semi-
structured interview was selected as a data collection tool as certain specific details were 
needed in order to effect analyses which would assist with answering the research question.  
For instance, participants were asked which institutional impact was, in their view, the 
most significant in this policy sector, and what was the role of their particular organisation 
or agency in the policy-making process.  The semi-structured nature of the interviews 
Sources from  
1: Acquis
2. Carrying out a search of 
the literature for the literature 
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Sources from Academic & Research Agencies identified 
through:
1. Networking (Dewar, 2012)
Interview Phase 1:
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transcribed
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meant that participants could provide their own insights and views which may have been of 
benefit to this research because an aim of the interviews was to gather data on other 
potential drivers and influences in this policy sector.   
In addition to specific questions relating to the main research question, open-ended 
questions were also posed, designed to enable the participant to freely express experiences, 
views and opinions on the development process.  This facilitated identifying elements not 
obvious in the primary literature.  The aim was to provide participants with the opportunity 
to “indicate the presence of [other] factors and their effects on individual cases” (Lester, 
1999, p. 1) as part of an indicative phenomenological study.  Rudestam and Newton (2014, 
p. 109) state that such amendments and free-flowing conversation are accepted practices in 
semi-structured interviews of this kind. 
To enable as detailed a response as possible, participants were sent questions in advance of 
the scheduled interview in order that they could prepare.  This also facilitated initial 
contact with subsequent potential participants because subjects were also asked specifically 
who else should be approached. 
The interviews were audio-recorded to facilitate later data analysis and to ensure as high 
fidelity as possible of the information gathered
19
.  To adhere to ethical standards prior 
permission was sought from the participants to audio-record the interviews.  The aim of 
audio-recording was to ensure that as much information and pertinent data as possible was 
captured in the interview.  As much as 75% of information in an interview can be lost 
without audio-recording, where the researcher does not possess some form of speedwriting 
skill (Bucher et al., 1956, p. 359). 
Audio-recording of interviews was a very useful tool to ensure the fidelity of analysis to 
the data and comments gathered from participants.  Rudestam and Newton (2014, p. 111) 
classified recorded interviews as “high fidelity and medium structure”, meaning that they 
enabled the researcher to utilise data representing as accurately as possible the participants’ 
views while also enabling a freer form of conversation and data collection than, for 
example, a paper-and-pencil test.  Audio-recording also enabled the subsequent analysis of 
comments to be carried out more effectively than by relying on field-notes alone.   
Once undertaken, interviews were transcribed verbatim into text in order that the same 
analytical techniques used on primary literature could be applied to ensure consistency of 
                                            
19
 I.e. to have as accurate a record and account of the views and information provided by the participant. 
73 
 
data collection.  The value of audio-recording interviews cannot be understated.  Weiss 
(1995, p. 193) argues that, in data analysis, using anything less than an accurate, high-
fidelity transcription of the recording is “playing with the evidence, no matter how benign 
the intent.” 
There were a number of limitations with audio-recording.  On occasion, permission was 
given for the recording but restrictions were placed on attribution or citing the participant 
directly.  Similarly, there were interviews where permission to audio-record was withheld.  
In these instances, field notes were taken and typed-up to provide a digital text document 
for analysis.  As a result, of the 31 interviews undertaken, 29 were referable in one form or 
another (either anonymously, by institution or by name).  The participation consent form 
included a section on permission for audio-recording
20
.  The withholding of permission to 
record or to attribute did not affect the quality of the data, however.  Other recorded and 
attributable interviews provided enough triangulation of data and results so that there was a 
minimal reduction in reliability of the data and subsequent findings. 
Interviews were conducted during the fieldwork phase of the research study.  Funding for 
this fieldwork was secured from the Centre for Russian, Central and East European Studies 
(CRCEES) at the University of Glasgow, as well as a successful application for one of four 
annual overseas fieldwork scholarships from the Universities’ Association for 
Contemporary European Studies (UACES). 
The interviews themselves were conducted over two periods.  The first consisted of seven 
weeks in May and June 2014 and was divided between five locations.  These were:  
 London;  
 Athens (which included a meeting at ENISA in Heraklion, Crete);  
 The Hague;  
 Tallinn;  
 and Brussels.   
These locations were not arbitrary selections but deliberate choices or delimitations 
(Rudestam and Newton, 2014, p. 105).  They represent the locations of certain national 
ministries which lead their country’s cyber security policy as well as the headquarters of 
core EU agencies.  ENISA is headquartered in Heraklion, and has an operational office in 
Athens.  Europol and the Dutch National Cyber Security Centre are based in The Hague.  
                                            
20
 See Appendix 9 for a sample participant consent form. 
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The ICDS and the European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT 
Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) are headquartered in 
Tallinn.   
Brussels was visited last because, as the location of the actors for this study
21
, this was the 
most important location in seeking to understand the development of EU policy.  
Conducting all other interviews before this portion of the fieldwork provided certain 
advantages.  It enabled chain referral (Burnham et al., 2008, pp. 207–208) to be employed 
to its maximum potential, and provided the opportunity for participants to identify, or 
corroborate the identification of, specific individuals in Brussels.  It also provided the time 
to contact and try to secure participation from Brussels-based participants. 
Over the course of the first, primary fieldwork period, 29 interviews were conducted.  
According to Cresswell (1998, p. 64), this total constitutes a “reasonable” sample for a 
study of this kind, especially considering the high level of some participants in their 
respective organisation (directors of ENISA for example), and the sensitive nature of cyber 
security as a policy sector.  Josselson and Lieblich (2003, p. 268) argue that a sufficient 
sample in a social science study of this kind is between 5 and 30 participants.  While this 
number is not based on a precise calculation, it allows for a minimum number of 
participants required to provide sufficient data for analysis and a reasonable maximum 
number to avoid saturation (duplicated and redundant results).  
Following the data collection and analysis exercise a second tranche of interviews was 
required as a follow-up.  This was conducted solely in Brussels over a period of 1 week in 
February of 2015.  Two goals were achieved in this second period.  A number of 
participants unavailable during the primary tranche were able to be interviewed, and a 
number of unexpected research findings arising from the analysis of primary literature and 
interview data – namely the lack of a role for the European Parliament in this sector – were 
confirmed.  Over the course of the two tranches of fieldwork a total of 31 interviews were 
carried out, with 29 of these being referable and two being completely anonymous and 
non-referable
22
. 
As stated above, once the interviews were conducted, audio-recordings and field-notes 
were word-processed into digital text format.  This was in order that the sources could be 
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 The formal institutions of the EU, namely the Commission, European Council, Council of the European 
Union and the European Parliament.  See Chapter 4 Section 4.3. 
22
 A full list of referable interviews undertaken is provided at Appendix 10. 
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uploaded into NVivo software and the same analyses undertaken on both literature and 
interview sources.  Having both primary literature and textual transcripts of interviews 
helped to ensure the consistency of data collection techniques and the reliability of the 
resulting data.   
3.3. Data collection and Analysis 
Once uploaded into NVivo the text-based data sources – acquis and interview transcripts – 
were ready for the main empirical analysis.  This raised a methodological problem.  Text-
based sources and interviews tend to be treated as different types of sources in 
methodological discussions (Bryman, 2008; Berg, 2004; Hycner, 1985).  Because 
interviews involve direct contact with subjects, data extraction involves the identification 
of more sociological, linguistic units of meaning from “between the lines” of the 
participants’ statements (Hycner, 1985, pp. 280–294).  By contrast, purely text-based 
sources can be subjected to a content analysis where the occurrence of words and phrases 
are counted and inferences drawn from the quantitative data.   
This raised a methodological challenge.  The thesis sought to engage in a fact-finding 
exercise prior to the important stage of explaining (King et al., 1994, p. 5) policy 
development processes.  On the one hand, therefore, the aim was not to carry out a purely 
linguistic or sociological analysis.  On the other hand, a standard, literature-based content 
analysis would not have yielded the data necessary to analyse policy development.     
In order to analyse both source types consistently, a conceptual content analysis was 
developed for this thesis.  This was achieved by combining methodological techniques 
developed by Hycner and Berg.  Similar ideas, rather than individual words, were 
identified and counted.  Themes, concepts and units of meaning of relevance to the 
research question were identified and coded (Hycner, 1985, p. 284).  This was a similar 
exercise to a content analysis, but focussed on more abstract concepts rather than 
individual words.  The “counts” of textual elements which characterise content analysis 
provided a tool for identifying specific units of meaning from which this researcher could 
learn about participants’ views of social phenomena (Berg, 2004, pp. 241–242).  The fact 
that this “Hycner-Berg” technique could be effectively applied to both interviews and 
textual documents made this tool invaluable to this research. It could be applied effectively 
to both textual primary literature sources such as the acquis communautaire and the 
transcripts of elite interviews. 
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An additional benefit of employing a conceptual rather than standard, metric content 
analysis became apparent because different words and phrases were used to describe the 
same elements and concepts over the course of the 28 years between 1985 and 2013.  An 
example of this is the term “cyber security”.  This term was used in Union acquis from 
2002 onwards.  In the preceding years terms such as “online security”, “network and 
information security” and “online” or “internet safety” were used interchangeably to refer 
to the risks, threats, concerns and issues which comprise cyber security in its most recent 
iteration.  Conducting a standard content analysis, where the occurrences of specific words 
are counted, would therefore miss out occurrences of the same concept, where different 
words were used in their description.   
3.3.1. Generating Data: Coding the acquis and interview 
transcripts 
The first step in the data analysis process was to generate a coding schedule to be applied 
to all text-based sources – the primary literature and interview transcripts.  This coding 
schedule would comprise key concepts to be sought in all text sources and reflect the aims 
of the research.  Institutional drivers, actor participation and non-institutional elements 
would be identified and coded. 
Because the research sought to identify the institutional drivers behind a specific policy 
sector – cyber security – a control schedule was generated by conducting a content analysis 
of the EU’s Cyber Security Strategy (EUCSS).  In order to understand the development of 
the EU’s policy choices, it was first necessary to identify which processes and concepts 
were most relevant to that policy.  Because the EUCSS represented the sum total of the 
EU’s policy choices and the end-point of its development process, it contained the 
elements which could be sought in preceding policy documents that would explain the 
development process.  This was achieved by conducting an open coding of the EUCSS. 
This action yielded a schedule of 43 discrete codes, labelled “nodes” in NVivo software.  
Some of these nodes referred to similar concepts, but involved separate entities.  For 
example, co-operation between EU Member States or co-operation between EU agencies 
were similar but coded separately.  These discrete nodes were collated into what Hycner 
(1985, p. 287) labelled “clusters”.  From 43 separate nodes, 16 clusters were distilled.  
Some clusters contained only single nodes.  Others such as “facilitation” contained as 
many as seven.  The purpose was to derive, as closely as possible, collective units of 
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meaning referring to what Berg (2004, p. 239) described as the unit’s essence or telos23.  
They facilitated the identification of latent content.  This is data inferred from the words 
used.  It contrasts with manifest content, where information is specifically expressed (Berg, 
2004, p. 242).  These thematic clusters would be sought in the complete library of text 
sources.  The complete NVivo node list – i.e. the digital control coding schedule – is 
available at Appendix 11. 
Coding the data sources according to the control schedule involved reading acquis and 
transcripts to identify units of meaning in the conceptual content analysis.  This reading led 
to the identification of a number of further ideational and institutional elements found in 
the acquis and interviews, but which were not set out in the EUCSS.  Due to the 
prevalence and recurrence of these elements, two further supplementary coding schedules 
were initiated: one for acquis, the other for interviews.  All acquis and interview transcripts 
were thereafter coded three times, first with the EUCSS control and then with the two non-
EUCSS coding schedules.  This exercise ensured the capture of as much relevant data as 
possible relating to the research question. The non-EUCSS schedules are provided at 
Appendix 12. 
As with the control schedule derived from the EUCSS, the units of meaning derived from 
the acquis and the interviews were arranged in thematic clusters.  It should be 
acknowledged at this point that a degree of the researcher’s own judgement was employed 
to determine whether or not two or more units of meaning were synonymous due to the 
inconsistent use of terminology.  This is a potential limitation in the data collection 
process.  According to Hycner (1985, p. 288), the researchers’ own suppositions may 
generate a bias in the resulting data.  In the case of this thesis, this potential bias from the 
researcher’s presuppositions could be minimised.  This was achieved by developing 
clusters and synonyms derived from specific sources in the texts and verbatim statements 
in the interviews, rather than the researcher projecting an inference or interpretation of 
what was meant in, for example, an interview. 
Two additional activities were employed to enhance the reliability and validity of data.  
The first was further eliminating redundancies once the coding was completed (Hycner, 
1985, p. 286).  While care was taken throughout the data collection process to avoid 
duplication of nodes or synonymous concepts, similar units of meaning were inadvertently 
identified and coded separately.  To ensure the transparency, reliability and validity of the 
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 This is similar to the Platonic base “form” of a concept. 
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data collected, a “clean-up” of the NVivo nodes (the CAQDAS codes and units of 
meaning) was undertaken prior to examination and analysis of the results.  This clean-up 
clustered together or corrected synonymous concepts to ensure as little aberrant duplication 
as possible.  The final data set was as free from duplication redundancies as was possible 
to achieve. 
To further enhance data reliability and validity, triangulation was also employed.  
Triangulation is a corroborative technique which involves the use of several methods or 
sources at once “so that the biases of any one method might be cancelled out by those of 
the others” (Seale, 1999, pp. 472–473).  Tarrow (2010, p. 108) argues that triangulation is 
a useful tool for the corroboration of findings derived from both qualitative and 
quantitative data collection techniques.  Findings from the primary literature – such as the 
preference for the EU towards facilitating co-operation – were also identified 
independently in certain of the elite interviews.  Such triangulation exercises increased the 
reliability of the findings by reducing the reliance on one particular type of data source. 
The process by which data was generated is summarised in Diagram 3-3 below. 
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Diagram 3-3: Data generation process (coding) 
 
Following the conceptual content analysis exercise undertaken to extract data from the 
acquis and interview transcripts, those data were tabulated according to the most 
frequently occurring elements.  What was being sought were the actors most frequently 
involved in the policy-making process, the institution of greatest influence in this sector 
Control paper 
processed in N-
Vivo (EUCSS,
2013)
5 codes identified 
from interviews
32 codes identified 
from acquis
43 control codes 
identified
Documents manually 
processed to identify extra 
codes (concepts)
Number of occurrences of each code 
identified
Removal of redundancies
Three key variables identified from 
number of occurrences:
1. competences
2. Actors
3. Ideas
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and the most frequently occurring non-institutional elements.  To effect an HI analysis 
these three details were required to be identified over the entire course of the timescape.  
Specifying actors, institutions and elements in this manner would concentrate the analysis 
on the interaction of those three aspects over time, a key component of an HI analysis.  
These data tables are presented in the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
The quantitative exercise outlined above was vital in preparing data for a more qualitative 
analysis.  As Goldstone (1991, pp. 50–62) states: 
To identify the process, one must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out 
which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple 
principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to generate the 
observed sequence of events.  (emphasis in original) 
Any institutional analysis of policy development must first identify which institutions and 
actors are relevant in the sector under examination.  This identifies who and what are 
involved and of importance to the policy development process.  Once this has been 
achieved, how and why they are involved can be investigated.  To achieve this, a 
qualitative narrative inquiry approach was employed. 
3.4. Narrative Inquiry: Employing HI techniques 
The content analysis exercise outlined in the previous section identified which institutions 
and ideational elements were most at work over the course of the timescape.  The next 
stage of the thesis involved examining how these elements influenced the development of 
the EU’s discourse in this policy sector.  This formed the bulk of the analysis required to 
answer the research question.  Analyses examining the totality of the timescape between 
1985 and 2013 looked at the inter-relationship of the institutions and ideational elements to 
chart their interplay over time (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 3).  As Thelen and Steinmo 
(1992, p. 13) state, the purpose of institutionalism “is to demonstrate the relationships and 
interactions among a variety of [elements] in a way that reflects the complexity of real 
political interactions”.  The results of this analysis form the empirical chapters of this 
thesis.  
To effect this analysis a complex-form, detailed narrative inquiry was conducted.  This was 
achieved by chronicling the interaction and influence on policy of the institutions, actors 
and non-institutional elements to “identify the causal chain and causal mechanisms – the 
causal process” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 206).  Narrative inquiry involves examining 
social phenomena and experience over time (Etherington, 2013, p. 3).  Studies employing 
81 
 
narrative inquiry tools “have temporal dimensions and address temporal matters: they 
focus on the personal and the social in a balance appropriate to the inquiry: and they occur 
in specific places or sequences of places” (Clandinin et al., 2000, p. 54).  Because of the 
focus on these temporal considerations, narrative inquiry lends itself to an historical 
institutionalist analysis.  
The first task was to extrapolate from the quantitative data the occurrences of the 
institution, actors and non-institutional elements.  These three elements were then 
identified in each of the core cyber security documents published between 1985 and 2013.  
These results were tabulated to show their occurrence and interaction over the timescape.  
It also facilitated the analysis of their interaction in their historical context at key points in 
the timescape.  This meant that the interaction of these elements was examined in time 
rather than merely over time (Bulmer, 2009, p. 307).   
Bennett and Checkel (2015, p. 6) provide an analogy for this type of study.  Although they 
use it to refer to process tracing, the analogy fits a narrative inquiry approach.  They liken 
it to a row of 50 dominoes lying after they had previously been standing.  Merely looking 
at the dominoes only provides a start and an end point.  It does not provide any information 
“about whether the first domino caused the last to fall through a domino process, or 
whether wind, a bump of the table or some other force caused the dominoes to fall”.  They 
argue that evidence relating to that intervening process must be gathered so that it can be 
fully understood.  Analysing the interaction of institutions, actors and non-institutional 
elements in their historical context provides these insights into the process by which the 
EU’s cyber security policy was developed. 
3.5. Reflections on methodological strengths and 
limitations 
3.5.1. Methodological Strengths 
The combination of source types – interviews and primary literature – served to provide a 
rounded, holistic body of data for analysis.  Elite interviews and acquis communautaire 
functioned in a symbiotic relationship to provide data for a narrative inquiry approach 
which uncovered the interaction of elements crucial to policy development.  The Union’s 
acquis is a finished product.  It represents the end-point of policy development.  What it 
lacks, however, is insight into the process of development.  This is the focus of this 
research.  Elite interviews with functionaries and officials intimately involved with that 
development provided this insight.  Participants were able to shed light on internal 
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machinations and ideational drivers which affected particular decisions and policy choices.  
Just as an analysis of EU policy cannot be undertaken without recourse to the acquis, an 
analysis of EU policy development cannot be undertaken without examining the 
background processes not presented in that acquis. 
Utilising both primary literature and elite interviews necessitated the development of a 
conceptual content analysis.  This allowed both source types to be analysed using the same 
techniques, a methodological tool which increased the validity and reliability of data 
gathered.  Analysing two separate source types in the same manner reduced the likelihood 
of data redundancies and errors by treating all sources equally.  The identification of 
institutions, actors and non-institutional elements identified from two sources treated in the 
same manner is therefore more reliable. 
The research methodology also successfully used a mixed-methods approach.  While 
quantitative data was extracted to identify important institutional and non-institutional 
elements, a qualitative narrative inquiry was conducted to examine the interaction of those 
elements.  The object of the research is to understand the institutional dynamics behind the 
EU adopting a particular policy approach.  Simply identifying the institution of relevance 
in a quantitative analysis only partially answers the research question.  Applying a 
complex-form, detailed narrative inquiry approach where the interaction of those elements 
is examined over time and in their historical and political context provided a more 
nuanced, clear and complete understanding of the developmental processes involved. 
3.5.2. Limitations 
There were certain limitations to the research methodology (Rudestam and Newton, 2014, 
p. 105).  One such limitation was encountered when identifying core elements of the study.  
The identification of actors most relevant to cyber security could be carried out through the 
collection and categorisation of acquis, with triangulation being effected through interview 
data.  Identifying the most important institution(s) was more problematic.  According to 
Hall (1992, p. 96), institutions are the standard operating procedures, patterns of behaviour 
and rules within which actors in complex political systems interact.  In the EU these rules 
are many and varied.  They range from the system of voting in the Council of the European 
Union when passing legislative proposals or the rules governing the length of time the 
European Parliament has to consider strategy proposals from the Commission, to the 
general competences of the Union as a whole.  Identifying a specific rule or system of 
behaviour which has greater or lesser significance in a single policy area was a significant 
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challenge for this research.  This challenge was exacerbated by the fact that Union acquis 
does not specify which one of these myriad rules was most at work in a specific document.  
To resolve this challenge, interview participants were specifically asked which institutional 
influence – which set of procedures or rules – was the most important in EU cyber security 
policy development.  The responses indicated that the competences were the most 
important aspect governing why the EU does what it does vis-a-vis cyber security.  On the 
face of things the concept of Union competence is simple: “what the EU can or cannot do” 
(Bache et al., 2011, p. 248).  Union competences not only spell out in which policy areas 
the EU can become involved but also to what extent.   
One problem did arise with this exercise.  The interviews undertaken tended to concentrate 
on the final years of the policy-making timescape.  This was due primarily to the tenure of 
EU bureaucrats and functionaries at their various posts.  It was not possible to interview a 
functionary who had been in position for the duration of the 28 year timescape.  The EU 
itself had undergone a number of significant structural changes in that period and each 
actor had evolved.  Policy sectors had developed and individuals moved from one sector to 
another.  Those interviewed for this research understandably had better knowledge about 
the most recent developments than the entire timescape.  Another reason for analysing 
primary literature and interviews using the same technique was that this mitigated the 
temporal specificity of those interviews.  Details could be gathered from the historic acquis 
which could not be gleaned from interviews with participants more recently involved in the 
process.  This is not to say that the interview data is deficient.  It is merely to acknowledge 
that there is a time-limited nature to the data derived from interviews due to the periods for 
which interview participants were in office. 
The time-specific nature of the interviews posed a problem for triangulation, however, 
given that the timescape of this thesis is the 28 years between 1985 and 2013.  Due to the 
natural turn-over of staff in the institutions, agencies and bodies, selected participants were 
not party to the full policy-making timescape.  Deliberations and choices of the pre-2007 
period corroborating statements for this earlier timeframe were particularly problematic. 
To overcome this, a three-stage process was employed to provide corroboration for the 
earliest periods of policy development, those prior to 2007.  The independent interviews 
from academic and research institutes, EU functionaries and national representatives had 
already provided triangulation for identifying Union competences as the most important 
institutional driver in this field in the post-2007 period.  To find corroboration relating to 
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pre-2007, acquis from this period was analysed to find evidence for competences directly 
influencing policy-making.  The first step to achieving this was to identify what the 
competences were at that time.  At the earliest point in the timescape, the Single European 
Act (SEA) of 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the framework for EU 
action.  The SEA limited Union capabilities in security matters to political and economic 
aspects of security (European Union, 1987, p. 1049) while the Maastricht Treaty confirmed 
wide competence for the EU in economic and social affairs, and more limited competence 
in criminal justice and foreign policy (Bache et al., 2011).  This established a base-line of 
competence for the earliest phase of the cyber security policy-making timescape
24
.   
The second step was to employ a hoop test to analyse Union acquis documents from this 
period to identify whether these competences had any influence on their development.  As 
a result of a desire to boost economic growth and reduce unemployment, the burgeoning 
ICT sector had been co-opted as a core element of the Single Market Programme (SMP) 
(European Commission, 1985, p. 20).  The management and development of the SMP was 
also subject to the socio-economic competences of the EU as set out in the SEA and the 
Maastricht Treaty.  This meant that, logically, cyber security was also subject to those 
same competences.  Although the competences required to be confirmed only once, this 
triangulation with the acquis was repeated in later phases and provided corroboration of 
the influence of Union competences on cyber security over the period of the timescape not 
covered by the interviews. 
The consequence of this two-step exercise was that Union competence could, with a 
certain degree of confidence, be established as the institutional dynamic with the greatest 
influence on the development of cyber security policy in the EU.  The combination of 
triangulation of interview data from the period 2007-2013 with the hoop test exercise 
relating to earlier, pre-2007 periods provided support for this conclusion where interview 
data was sparse. 
Other limitations encountered were of a more practical nature.  Certain of the interviews 
were not audio-recorded and two were held completely off the record, including one at a 
very high level within the EU.  As a result the data from this interview could not be put to 
as full a use as other, recorded, sessions.  While of limited benefit to the data collection and 
analysis of this research, the interview was beneficial for establishing a context for the 
                                            
24
 This exercise was made much easier by the fact that no major changes to Union competence were 
undertaken between 1992 and 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.  Competences needed only 
to be confirmed once.  
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EU’s policy in this sector, and illuminating certain aspects of actor interaction at high 
level.  This corroborated certain findings and provided useful background for the main 
analytical activities, while enabling permissions from participants, or the lack thereof, to be 
respected.  This is an important ethical consideration. 
There were also practical limitations which affected the collection and collation of Union 
acquis.  The hoop test and cataloguing exercise identified publicly available policy 
instruments.  However, there were at least three documents not included in the compiled 
library.  This was due to issues of access.  Two documents were not available in a digital 
format in the first instance and hard-copies could not be located.  An access request to the 
Council of the European Union Secretariat for the third document was refused.  This 
means that the thesis utilised all possible available literature, while acknowledging that this 
collected library did not include all the relevant acquis communautaire.  Nevertheless, 
those documents which were examined included those of greatest significance to the policy 
development process.  Thus, a level of literature inclusion was attained that enabled a 
reliable analysis. 
While it is important to acknowledge access issues when conducting policy research, in 
this instance such issues did not affect the quality of the analysis.  It is always beneficial to 
have access to all the documents pertaining to a policy area.  However, this thesis is an 
historical institutionalist analysis which examined a policy in a period prior to digitisation.  
The collection techniques and resulting library of policy documents was deemed, if not 
complete, then as comprehensive as possible in order to conduct an effective analysis. 
It is also beneficial to acknowledge the inconsistent use of terms in a field which was itself 
rapidly evolving.  Terms such as “cyber security” only began to be used midway through 
the timescape, but, through a process of retroactive continuity
25
, have been applied to all 
areas of online safety and security throughout the timescape.  To resolve this issue and 
mitigate its limitation, a conceptual content analysis, rather than a standard word-count, 
was conducted to identify synonyms.  A subsequent clean-up exercise was undertaken to 
remove redundancies and false positives.  While this is also a form of retroactive 
continuity and is not fool-proof, this combination of techniques reduced the impact of 
multiple terms for conceptually similar ideas. 
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 See Section 1.5.2.1.: Retroactive Continuity: Applying modern terms to historic concepts 
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3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter set out the research design, methodology and ethical considerations required 
in order to collect data for this thesis and conduct a suitable analysis.  Data was collected 
from two source types: EU acquis communautaire and elite interviews.  These 
complemented each other as important data regarding policy development could not be 
gathered from acquis analyses alone.   
While primary literature sources were collected from online databases and physical 
libraries, interviews were secured at the European Commission, the Council of the EU, the 
European Council and the European Parliament.  These were the four institutions most 
relevant to this research.  In addition, interviews with specialists from a number of research 
organisations and academic institutions were also secured.  To ensure ethical 
considerations were maintained, interviews were audio-recorded but only when permission 
was given. 
A conceptual content analysis based on a combination of Hycner and Berg’s analytical 
methodologies was also developed.  This enabled both source types to be analysed in the 
same manner using NVivo CAQDAS software.  Doing so increased the reliability of the 
data collected as there were fewer redundancies caused by using different collection 
methods.  
There were a number of strengths to this methodology and research design.  The use of 
both interviews and acquis meant that not only was it possible to establish a complete 
picture of policy development, triangulation of findings was also possible.  This was 
particularly beneficial given the temporal nature of the research.  Findings from the earliest 
points in the timescape could be triangulated and corroborated with information from later 
stages. 
That temporal nature also yielded certain limitations.  It was not possible to interview 
functionaries who worked on policy at the earliest points in the timescape.  Due to the 
changing nature of the EU itself, as well as time-limited placement of functionaries at the 
EU’s institutions, there was no-one who had been in post continually between 1985 and 
2013.  In addition, certain of the interviews were not audio-recorded due to permission 
being withheld.  A final limitation to overcome was the inconsistent use of key terms such 
as “cyber security”.  Although this could to a certain extent be mitigated by the process of 
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retroactive continuity, a conceptual content analysis technique, rather than a standard word 
count, was employed to ensure that conceptually similar terms were identified. 
The methodology for this research therefore employed a mixed-methods approach to 
gather sources and data as well as conduct analyses of that data.  While a number of 
techniques were derived from previously conducted studies, such as adapting Hycner’s 
model for phenomenological studies, the combination of methods employed enabled the 
identification of actors, institutions and non-institution elements.  It also enabled an 
effective analysis to be carried out in order to provide an answer to the research question.  
The following chapters – the empirical section of the thesis – set out and examine the 
results of this data collection and analysis process. 
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Chapter 4 | Theoretical Framework: Applying 
Historical Institutionalist Elements and 
Functions  
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter explains how historical institutionalism (HI) will be applied in this thesis.  As 
set out in Chapter 1, three mechanisms of HI postulated by Pierson and Skocpol (2002, p. 
3) will be used to frame the research and analyse the data gathered.  Pierson and Skocpol 
argued that HI techniques address  
big, substantive questions that are inherently of interest to broad publics as well 
as to fellow scholars. To develop explanatory arguments about important outcomes 
or puzzles, historical institutionalists take time seriously, specifying sequences and 
tracing transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality. Historical 
institutionalists likewise analyze macro contexts and hypothesize about the 
combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one 
institution or process at a time. Taken together, these three features – substantive 
agendas; temporal arguments; and attention to contexts and configurations -- add 
up to a recognizable historical institutional approach that makes powerful 
contributions to our discipline’s understandings of government, politics, and public 
policies. (Emphasis in original) 
The question this thesis will answer – the substantive question – is: have institutions and 
institutional arrangements led the EU to develop and continue with a socio-economic 
approach to cyber security?  This question will be answered by analysing the effect of 
institutional forces over a period of 28 years, therefore taking time seriously.  Finally the 
thesis hypothesizes about the interaction of institutions and processes in the specific sector 
of cyber security policy.  As set out in Chapter 1, the third supplementary question the 
thesis will answer examines the influence of the interaction of institutional frameworks and 
non-institutional elements on policy continuity.  In order to employ these HI mechanisms 
successfully, it is first necessary to clarify the institutions and actors which will be studied.   
This chapter will first set out the institutions which will be studied in the thesis.  This is 
important because the term “institution” is an ill-defined concept (Scharpf, 1997, p. 38).  
Conceptualisations range from enduring, stable patterns of behaviour and cognitive 
structures (Huntington, 1968, p. 12; Smith, 1988, p. 91) to wider collections of behaviours, 
norms and standard operating procedures (March and Olsen, 1989, pp. 21–6).   
This thesis will adopt Hall’s (1992, p. 96) definition of institutions as “formal rules, 
standard operating procedures and customary practices” which affect actor behaviour and 
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effect policy choice.  In the case of the EU, the rules, procedures and practices for policy-
making are underpinned by its Treaty-defined competences.  Union competences dictate 
the manner in which actors interact, with which procedures they develop policy and in 
which policy areas the EU is able to operate.  Any research seeking to understand the 
policy-making process and choices made in a specific field will therefore need to examine 
the effect of Union competences on that policy field. 
After clarifying that the collection of Union competences is the institution of greatest 
relevance to the thesis, the chapter will set out the actors who operate according to those 
competences.  In doing so, a variation to traditional studies of the European Union will be 
posited.  Such studies focus on the actions of the Member States and political groupings 
within the EU’s seven formal institutions.  This is logical given that most theories of IR, 
such as realism and liberalism, place the sovereign state at the highest level of action.  This 
thesis will instead adopt Scharpf’s (1997, p. 52) definition of “composite actors” in order 
to consider the formal institutions of the EU as actors operating within the institutional 
setting of Union competences.   
To support this departure from academic conventions, the “actorness” of these entities will 
be tested by applying Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006, pp. 24–35) three-step framework – 
presence, opportunity and capability.  The chapter presents the argument that the 
institutions are actors due to their presence within the structure of the Union, their capacity 
to effect policy decisions and change, and the existence of opportunities to do so.  The 
chapter therefore shows how Bretherton and Vogler’s framework of “actorness” was 
combined with Scharpf’s definition of composite actors to create a new “Scharpf-
Bretherton-Vogler” conceptualisation or model of social actor.  This new model will be 
applied to the formal institutions of the EU to further evidence their role as political actors.   
Using this categorisation of “composite actor” will be beneficial in helping to understand 
the reasons why the EU rather than its Member States made particular choices in cyber 
security.  It will also facilitate a more nuanced understanding of policy development within 
the over-arching institutional structure of the EU.  Finally, it resolves potentially confusing 
issues of nomenclature when referring to the EU’s “formal institutions” within an 
institutionalist analytical framework. 
The chapter will also look at two important functions common to HI and the study of social 
and political phenomena and how they relate to this thesis.  The first is path dependency.  
The fundamental premise of path dependency is that decisions made when an institution or 
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policy is initiated have an ongoing influence into the future (Peters, 2005, p. 70).  Although 
this is a deceptively simple idea, as both Mahoney and Peters argue (Mahoney, 2000, p. 
507; Peters, 2005, p. 70), it is a core function of HI study and a useful tool for explaining 
decisions made in the later stages of a policy timescape.  If a policy path remains in place 
long after its establishment, the case can be made that the choices made at the 
commencement of the policy path dictate the nature of that path. 
The second function which will be employed to analyse EU cyber security policy over time 
is closely related to path dependency.  While path dependency can explain policy 
continuity, the concept of “punctuated equilibrium” can explain policy change.  Punctuated 
equilibrium refers to a significant force intervening to amend a policy path or divert it from 
an established direction (Peters, 2005, p. 21). 
The chapter is divided into five sections.  Following this introduction, the second section of 
the chapter will clarify the institution which will be studied in this thesis.  The third section 
will set out which actors are relevant to the analysis.  The fourth section will look at the 
influence of path dependency and punctuated equilibrium on the analysis while the fifth 
and final section will provide some concluding remarks on the selection of HI as the 
theoretical framework for this research.   
4.2. The institutions relevant to this thesis 
This thesis takes as its starting point Hall’s definition of the term “institution”.  Hall 
describes institutions as “the formal rules, compliance procedures and customary practices 
that structure the relationships between individuals in the polity and the economy” (Hall, 
1992, p. 96).  The term “institution” therefore includes systems of norms and accepted 
patterns of behaviour that become entrenched in an interactive, political system, as well as 
bricks-and-mortar, existent organisations (Bannerman and Haggart, 2014, p. 10).  Hall’s 
definition has been chosen for this research because of this breadth of meaning.  The 
European Union is itself an existent institution made up of agenda-setting bodies and 
operational agencies.  However these groups and agencies interact according to a complex 
system of norms, patterns of behaviour, compliance procedures and customary practices.  
This system is underpinned by the EU’s competences.  These competences set out the 
policy areas in which it can operate, and the extent to which it can involve itself in those 
areas.   
91 
 
This is an important contribution to EU studies and the field of cyber security.  The 
analysis of the influence of abstract institutions such as norms and standard modes of 
behaviour on EU cyber security policy has not been carried out.  As examined in the 
Chapter 2.3, HI analyses of EU policy tend to focus on the influence and interaction of 
existent bodies.  This thesis seeks to understand the influence of more abstract institutional 
forces on policy-development.  
4.2.1. Classifying Union Competences as an Institution 
The capacity for the EU to engage with particular policy fields is a closely governed and 
monitored aspect of its structure (Bache et al., 2011, pp. 248–50).  The areas in which the 
EU becomes involved, and the manner of that involvement, are governed by Treaty-
defined competences.  As Bache, George and Bulmer point out (2011, p. 248), the concept 
of Union competences is relatively simple: it refers to what the EU can or cannot do.  Prior 
to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, this capacity was governed by the 
principle of subsidiarity.  This is the concept whereby decisions should be made as close to 
the level of the citizen as possible, except where it makes more sense to handle an issue at 
national or European level (European Union, 1995; Follesdal, 2013, p. 1).  As Kersbergen 
and Verbeek (2007, p. 225) argue, this meant that: 
The European  Community  (Union)  can only  justifiably  legislate  and  pursue  
policies  in  areas  that  fall  exclusively within  its  competence,  if  the  Member  
States  are  incapable  of  acting  adequately on their own or if the scale and effects 
are such that the Community (Union)  can  achieve  the  objectives  more  
effectively. 
Transnational issues such as the customs union or the common agricultural policy were 
handled at the EU level for the simple reason that it made sense to do so.   
The simplicity of this definition is deceptive, however.  The reality is that Union 
competences are a complex set of rules separating policy areas and specifying levels of 
Union and Member State involvement in those areas.  It even leads to differing voting 
procedures and requirements, depending on the subject under discussion.  Under Article 3 
TFEU, the EU has exclusive supranational competence in the areas of the customs union, 
Eurozone financial matters, establishing competition rules for the internal market and 
conservation of marine resources under the common fisheries policy (European Union, 
2009a, p. 51).  The EU shares competence with national Member State governments in 
areas such as wider internal market policy, the environment, the area of freedom, security 
and justice, energy policy and consumer protection (European Union, 2009a, p. 51).  
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Finally in measures relating to areas such as health, industry, culture and tourism 
(European Union, 2009a, p. 52) the EU can only support national governments.  
Supporting competence is the weakest form of EU operational capacity.   
To further complicate the matter, security competence is defined elsewhere.  The Single 
European Act of 1987 restricted the EU in its capacity to act and develop policy in security 
matters.  It categorically stated that the EU can only involve itself in political and 
economic aspects of security (European Union, 1987, p. 1049).  This restriction has never 
been lifted and remains a red line for members of the EU.  It means that national security 
matters remain the responsibility of the Member States.  As a result there is a separate, 
unofficial category of “special competence” (European Union, n.d.) relating to the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  This means that the CFSP is 
characterised by specific institutional features, such as the limited participation of 
the European Commission and the European Parliament in the decision-making 
procedure and the exclusion of any legislation activity (European Union, n.d.).  
CFSP policy is defined and implemented exclusively by the European Council and by the 
Council of the EU.  This has particular implications for cyber security given the need to 
reconcile the potential national security implications of large scale cyber incidents with the 
inherent transnationalism of digital networks. 
This division of competences is a crucial operational practice and “institutional factor” 
(Hall, 1992, p. 97).  It establishes and governs patterns of behaviour and interaction of the 
key actors involved in policy-making.  The combination of defining policy areas and levels 
of involvement means that the competences define the very nature of the European Union 
itself and describe the basis for all EU functionality.   The competences organize policy 
development “into something more than a seamless flow of activities and events” (Orren 
and Skowronek, 1996, p. 111).  Union competences will therefore be studied over time in 
order to identify their long-term influence on cyber security policy-making. 
It should be noted that special care must be taken when examining the institutional role 
played by Union competences in the context of policy development.  The patterns of 
behaviour and standard operating procedures established by the competences affect all 
areas and aspects of EU policy, Member State behaviour and interaction, and the political 
structure of the Union itself.  This is important because, in one respect, the answer to the 
research question is simply that the Treaty-defined competences dictate what, how and 
why the EU does what it does.  This includes establishing the parameters for tackling 
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“computer crime”, the term in the Treaties most analogous to cyber security (European 
Union, 2009a, p. 81).  Evidence for the importance of the competences comes from the 
acquis and interviews undertaken for this thesis.  Eleven of the 31 interviews carried out 
during fieldwork specifically cited Union competence as the institution of greatest 
influence on cyber security.  Comments from EU officials stated that the reason the EU has 
adopted a socio-economic cyber security policy is due to the restrictions placed upon it by 
its competences (Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 2014; 
Interview, Senior Official, DG MARKT, European Commission, 2014; Interview, Senior 
Official, EEAS, 2014).   
This answer belies the complexity of the institutional effects of the competences on policy 
development, particularly in the field of cyber security.  The interview data cited above 
presents evidence of what the influence of the competences on EU cyber security policy 
was in the run-up to the publication of the 2013 EUCSS.  It does not explain how or why 
they had the influence they did.  This is needed in order to identify and understand the 
precise institutional influence of the competences in relation to the research question for 
this thesis.  There is considerable fluidity in terms of how policy is engaged with.  The 
remit and scope for action within a policy area is very broad despite the competences, as 
set out in the Treaties, appearing to restrict the Union to a specific, prescribed set of policy 
fields with certain no-go areas such as national security and defence.  In other words the 
EU can, and does, do a great deal while remaining within the confines of its competences 
(Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 2014).  For example, 
while retaining shared competence in Internal Market affairs, the European Commission 
has a right of initiative in this field.  It can propose legislation and policy in any area 
affecting the Single Market without waiting for instructions or requests from the 
Parliament, the Council of the European Union or the European Council.  As a result the 
EU can be involved in a huge range of issues, from personal privacy (European 
Commission, 1992a; European Parliament and Council of The European Union, 2002) to 
establishing secure industrial systems (European Commission, 2006b, p. 8).   
An influence of the competences is that they govern how the EU can approach an issue.  In 
order to become involved in a security matter the Union must approach these issues from a 
socio-economic standpoint.  This is what the EU has done in cyber security policy.  The 
threats and risks emanating from cyberspace have an overt national security element when, 
for example, critical information infrastructures are threatened or targeted.  The EU can 
interpret these issues as risks to the ongoing functionality of the Internal Market and hence 
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tackle the risks to that functionality.  As will be demonstrated in Chapter 8 below, the EU’s 
response to instances of inter-state aggression in cyberspace such as the attacks on Estonia 
of 2007 prioritises these incidents’ impact on the EU’s capacity to function as an economic 
entity.  The primary referent object of cyber security policy is the economic and financial 
functionality of the Single Market and the citizens who live and work within it. 
This fluidity of action within the institutional confines of Treaty-defined competences is of 
vital importance to this thesis as it provides a potential answer to the primary research: the 
competences of the EU necessitated a particular interpretation or construction of cyber 
security risks and threats which led to the EU developing its idiosyncratic, socio-economic 
approach to those threats.  This research seeks to expand on this partial answer, and 
identify and understand the influence of competences on the development of cyber security 
policy.  In addition, the thesis seeks to understand any correlation between the 
competences and the continuation of the EU’s socio-economic cyber security narrative. 
For the purposes of this research, therefore, the institutions to be examined are the 
competences of the EU.  The empirical data analysis will seek to clarify the influence of 
Union competences on cyber security policy.  It will examine why and in what manner the 
competences necessitated particular policy choices in this field.   
4.3. Actors for this study – clarifying “actorness” 
In an HI analysis it is also necessary to define the actors operating within the institution 
under examination.  Current EU scholarship traditionally considers the Union’s Member 
States to be the actors operating within a particular institutional setting (Bulmer and 
Padgett, 2005; Pierson, 1996).  An example of this is Bulmer’s (2009) examination of the 
evolution of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) into the present European 
Union.  This study focussed on the relationship between the supranational institutions of 
the EU and the Member States.  This thesis, however, will consider the seven formal 
institutions of the EU – the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council 
of the European Union, the European Council, the Court of Auditors, the Court of Justice 
and the European Central Bank – as the actors whose choices will be examined.  
There are two reasons for considering these bodies as actors.  The first reason is that this 
thesis seeks to understand why the European Union and not the Member States developed 
a particular cyber security policy.  To do this it is necessary to examine policy 
development in the context of the interaction of the formal institutions of the EU.  That 
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interaction occurs according to the formal rules, compliance procedures, customary 
practices and norms defined by Union competences.  Within this context, each formal 
institution operates as a single, gestalt entity.   
The second reason is a matter of practicality concerning nomenclature.  The term “formal 
institution” has particular legal meaning when discussing the bodies of the European 
Union.  The term refers explicitly to the seven principal, organisational bodies listed above.  
Referring to these entities as “institutions” in an institutionalist analysis can lead to 
confusion.  By considering these entities as actors, and referring to them as such, this 
confusion is avoided.  
To further justify the consideration of these bodies as actors, the thesis will adopt Scharpf’s 
(1997, p. 52) conceptualisation of “composite actors”.  Scharpf argues that entities with an 
intentional capacity over and above the individuals which comprise them are better 
described as composite actors, entities with their own preferences and strategy choices.  
The reasoning behind this argument is that such gestalt entities – for example the European 
Council or the European Commission – are existent organisational bodies with an 
independent capacity for purposive action: they have a life and “actorness” of their own.  
Such a term suits the formal institutions of the European Union.  Within the architecture of 
the EU these entities have specific purposes and roles which influence the choices and 
actions of the others.  Furthermore, there is a capacity for one actor, such as the European 
Court of Auditors, to hold another to account, further emphasising the independence of 
those entities within the EU context.   
This conceptualisation of composite actors lends itself to the analysis in this thesis as it 
will examine the internal machinations of the Union itself in which the Commission, 
Parliament et al take part, rather than the actions of Member States within the European 
Council, party political groups within the Parliament or potential business interests within 
the ECB.  In addition, the use of the term “composite actor” resolves the difficulty of 
nomenclature by not employing the confusing term “formal institution” in an institutional 
analysis.  Such a resolution more accurately portrays these bodies’ functions and roles in 
the EU policy development process and internal Union architecture. 
Further support for considering these “formal institutions” as actors can be found in 
Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006, pp. 24–35) framework of “actorness”.  Although this 
framework was designed to provide evidence and support for the notion that the EU as a 
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whole is an actor on the global stage, the framework can be effectively applied to the 
“formal institutions” of the EU.   
4.3.1. Defining “Actorness” 
According to Bretherton and Vogler, the definition of an actor in international relations 
hinges on an entity’s presence, opportunity and capability to act in the circumstances under 
examination.  The seven “formal institutions” of the EU are existent bodies, constituted by 
Union Treaties.  These Treaties confer on these bodies a presence in the policy process.  
They establish their parameters of action within the policy development process and also 
identify them as contributors to that process in their own right.  As such presence does not 
necessarily equate to purposive action, but is “a consequence of being” (Kaunert and 
Zwolski, 2014, p. 595).  
Opportunity is defined by Bretherton and Vogler as “the context which frames and shapes 
EU action or inaction” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 24).  In other words, there needs to 
be a policy area or issue in which the entity can act.  The “formal institutions” of the EU, 
in particular the European Commission, are tasked with ensuring that availability.  In the 
field of cyber security, opportunity for the “formal institutions” to act is provided by the 
need to ensure the security of the pan-European ICT infrastructure in the context of its 
relevance to the internal market.  The European Council had the opportunity in the late 
1980s and early 1990s to take action to ensure that viability by tasking the Commission 
with formulating concrete proposals to boost jobs and growth.  One of the resulting 
avenues was through the promotion of ICT.   
Finally, the EU’s entities need more than a reason and an opportunity to act.  They must 
also have the capabilities to do so.  They must “capitalise on presence and respond to 
opportunity” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 29).  By virtue of the competences conferred 
upon, for example, the Commission, that entity can take some form of affirmative action in 
seeking to resolve policy or practical issues.  In the case of cyber security, it can assign 
specific tasks to various agencies such as ENISA, Europol or eu-LISA.   
This thesis proposes to merge Scharpf’s postulation of “composite actors” with Bretherton 
and Vogler’s conceptualisation and characterisation of “actorness”.  This new “Scharpf-
Bretherton-Vogler” model of actorness can be applied to the formal institutions of the EU.  
By accepting the gestalt nature of the Commission, the Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council of the European Union these bodies can be considered as composite 
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actors, entities which speak with their own voice.  In the field of cyber security these 
bodies have presence, opportunity and capability to act, thereby conferring upon them 
“actorness” under Bretherton and Vogler’s definition. 
The actors of relevance for this study are therefore the formal institutions of the EU.  
However, only four of the seven bodies which make up the modern EU are directly 
involved in the cyber security policy-making process: the European Commission, the 
European Council, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament.  The 
final three – the Court of Auditors, the Court of Justice and the European Central Bank – 
will not be examined in this thesis.  The reason for this is that their purpose, function and 
tasks do not relate to the development of EU cyber security policy.  While the Commission 
can refer Member States to the Court of Justice for failing to ensure ratification and 
implementation of legislation as per the Treaty regulations, the Court does not produce, 
determine or otherwise approve that legislation or make any policy decisions.  The Court 
of Auditors is a body which exists solely to examine the financial actions of the other 
institutions while the ECB operates exclusively in financial and economic services.  As 
such it may be a user of cyber security policy, but does not contribute to its developmental 
processes.  
4.3.1.1. The Role of the Formal Institutions in EU Policy-making 
 
Before embarking on an examination of the interaction of the relevant actors within an 
institutional setting, it is beneficial to set out their roles in the policy development process.  
The European Council sits at the apex of EU decision-making.  It is comprised of the heads 
of state and government of the EU’s Member States and, since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, is presided over by a permanent President.  As of 1 December 2014, this 
is Donald Tusk, a former Prime Minister of Poland (European Council, 2014).  This 
institution meets to discuss and steer the overall strategic direction of the Union as a whole, 
respond to major problems such as the 2008 economic crisis (Interview, Senior Official, 
DG MARKT, European Commission, 2014) and provide leadership for the EU at the 
highest political level (Dinan, 2010, p. 205).  Despite having no legislative powers, its 
pronouncements – published as Conclusions and Resolutions – form the basis for 
subsequent strategy paths and policy development.  Alongside the Treaties, these 
Resolutions establish and govern patterns of behaviour and procedural norms for the EU’s 
constituent actors. 
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In line with the overall strategic direction set by the European Council, Union legislation is 
passed into law by two representative bodies – the Council of the European Union, and the 
European Parliament.  The Council of the European Union is the institution representing 
Member State governments.  It is where national, policy-specific ministers meet (European 
Council & Council of the European Union, 2014).  Since the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the Council of the European Union shares legislative co-decision with the 
European Parliament.  The Parliament is the only directly-elected EU body (European 
Parliament, n.d.).  It represents the citizens of the Union.  Its members do not sit in national 
blocs, but rather in larger groupings of Member State parties which share political ideology 
such as the European Peoples’ Party26 or the Socialists and Democrats27. 
The final institution involved in policy development is the European Commission (the 
Commission).  Described as the engine room of EU policy and analogous to a national 
civil service (Robinson, 2012, p. 162) the Commission is responsible for the preparation, 
implementation and monitoring of EU policy and legislation and describes itself as the 
guardian of the Treaties (Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 
2014).  It is divided into 28 departments called Directorates-General (DG).  These are 
comparable to national ministries.  They are each responsible for a policy portfolio and 
headed by a Commissioner.  Commissioners are representatives from each of the EU 
Member States and are known collectively as the College of Commissioners.  In the field 
of cyber security, the most relevant DGs are those responsible for Communications 
Networks, Content and Technology (DG Connect), Migration and Home (DG HOME) and 
Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROWTH, formerly DG 
MARKT until the appointment of the Junker Commission in 2014).  This thesis will 
therefore concentrate on the roles, actions and interactions of these four actors. 
4.4. Path Dependence and Punctuation Points 
In addition to specifying the actors and institutions to be examined, two further aspects of 
institutionalist analyses are significant for this thesis.  These are path dependence and 
punctuated equilibrium.  They are two closely related functions of historical 
institutionalism.  These concepts stem from the notion that HI scholars “have a view of 
institutional development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences” 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 938).  The fundamental premise is that decisions made at the 
                                            
26
 The EPP is comprised of centre-right, pro-EU Member State political parties (EPP, n.d.) 
27
 Made up of left-wing national parties, such as the UK’s Labour party and the German Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands (S&D, n.d.). 
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commencement or at very early stages in a political or social process continue to have an 
influence on decisions made later on, until a critical juncture occurs to shift the path in a 
new direction. 
4.4.1. Path dependence 
Path dependence (PD) as a concept has been described in a number of ways.  Pierson 
(2000, p. 251) argued that PD is predicated upon the premise that specific patterns of 
timing and sequence matter in socio-political analyses, and that small events can lead to 
large consequences.  Thelen (1999, p. 385) describes PD as the process of “locking-in” 
policy choices as all relevant actors adjust their strategies to accommodate the prevailing 
pattern.  Both of these conceptualisations imply a strong element of institutional 
“stickiness” (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 7).  Once a choice is made it becomes difficult 
for actors to change those choices or deviate from the path embarked upon.  This inertia 
occurs even when the resulting outcomes of those decisions are suboptimal or “manifestly 
inefficient” (Pollack, 2007, p. 3).  It not only sets actors on particular policy paths, but 
excludes other choices and avenues for policy development (Bulmer, 1998, p. 367; 
Pierson, 1996).  There is a caveat to using PD as an explanatory mechanism.  Given the 
conceptualisations mentioned above, Mahoney (2000, p. 507) cautions against using PD to 
reduce the study of socio-political phenomena to mean “little more than the vague notion 
that history matters or that the past influences the future”.  Mahoney is criticising the 
potential for socio-political studies to be oversimplified and reduced to historical causality.  
This can be avoided by acknowledging that PD is a function of a wider institutionalist 
approach which examines the interaction of institutions and ideas, rather than a single 
explanatory mechanism on its own.   
Path dependence is of particular relevance to this thesis.  The object of this research is to 
understand what influence institutions have had on cyber security policy development and 
continuity.  Answering this question from an HI perspective – i.e. over time – must involve 
an examination of, or at least an identification of, path dependent processes, in particular 
when examining policy continuity.  The research undertaken to answer the thesis’s 
questions will identify the extent to which cyber security policy choices made at the 
beginning of the timescape affected and effected choices or options at later stages. 
A focus on PD also enables this thesis to apply one of the few specific methodological 
tools used in HI analyses.  To identify path dependence Mahoney (2000, p. 507) argues 
that scholars must  
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trace a given outcome back to a particular set of historical events, and show how 
these events are themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the 
basis of prior historical conditions. 
As set out in Chapter 3, this technique was carried out in order to identify the 
commencement of EU interest in cyber security, thus establishing a timescape for the 
thesis.   
4.4.2. Punctuated equilibrium 
Although the institutional dynamic of path dependence is characterised by policy inertia 
and a resistance to change, there is a mechanism in HI scholarship by which policy paths 
can alter or be redefined.  Once a path is embarked upon, a policy enters a period of 
consolidation or stasis.  However, there are historical examples of major social and 
political crises necessitating changes in policy.  Hall (1992, pp. 90–113) cites the example 
of the shift in UK economic policy from Keynesianism to monetarism in the 1970s.  While 
there were institutional dynamics making policy-makers amenable to change, the catalysts 
for this shift were economic stagnation and rising inflation.  Such catalytic events have the 
capacity to punctuate the equilibrium of established policy choices and amend or change 
the prevailing institutionalised options.  This was the case in UK economic policy in the 
1970s. 
This mechanism is known as “punctuated equilibrium” (Krasner, 1984, p. 240).  The 
central premise is that particular catalytic events occur which act as critical junctures or 
punctuation points in a policy path.   They cause re-evaluations of past choices and enable 
previously locked-out policy options to be once again available.  As Collier and Collier 
(1991, p. 29) argue, these critical junctures can cause either a temporary change in policy 
direction or “an extended period of reorientation”.  Thelen (1999, p. 385) goes a step 
further.  She argues that the initial policy choice is itself a critical juncture and can cause a 
lock-in of subsequent paths.  This is a similar conceptualisation to that of Lindner and 
Rittberger (2003, p. 448) who argue that the construction and creation of institutions is a 
phase distinct from their operation. 
As will be examined in Chapters 8 and 9, in the case of EU cyber security policy, three 
such catalytic events occurred in the later years of the timescape.  They put severe 
institutional stresses on the established socio-economic policy path.  In 2007 Estonia 
suffered a series of cyber-attacks against its financial and e-government infrastructure.  
These attacks were allegedly state-sponsored and highlighted the EU’s inability to act in 
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defence/military matters.  In 2008 the global financial crisis highlighted the extent of 
network connectivity in international industry and financial sectors including those of the 
EU.  This in turn formalised the consideration of cyberspace and ICT as a “critical 
infrastructure” for society.  In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, which radically 
altered the architecture of the EU and clarified its competences, paving the way for the 
EUCSS to be developed.  This thesis will examine the effect of these catalytic events on 
the development of EU cyber security policy in order to identify whether they had any 
impact on that policy sector.  This will provide an opportunity to assess the strength of path 
dependence in the context of EU cyber security.   
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter clarified the institutions and actors relevant to this thesis and concludes the 
first, preparatory, section of the thesis.  The chapter established certain core components 
necessary to carry out an effective HI analysis.  The first of these are the institutions and 
actors to be researched.  Following an empirical exercise involving analysing acquis and 
interview data, the institution on which this thesis will focus is Union competence.  This 
defines not just the policy areas in which the EU can operate, but also the degree of 
involvement permitted.  Certain policy sectors, such as military or national security, are red 
lines for Member States.  As a result the Union has a very limited, highly regulated 
competence in these areas.  In other areas such as the Eurozone and the customs union, the 
EU enjoys exclusive competence, where it acts as a supranational entity over and above the 
Member States.  This thesis will examine the influence of competence on EU cyber 
security policy over the course of 28 years. 
An HI analysis must also be clear on which actors are going to be the focus of the study.  
In addition to identifying the competences as the institution of greatest relevance to cyber 
security, the empirical exercise undertaken also identified which actors made policy 
decisions in this sector.  Due to their policy-making remits these are the European Council, 
the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament.  Also examined was the nature of these entities as actors.  They are not unitary 
bodies, but represent the combined will of their constituents.  These entities can however 
be considered actors with the application of a Scharpf-Bretherton-Vogler conceptualisation 
of “actorness”.  By combining Scharpf’s definition of a composite actor with Bretherton 
and Vogler’s three-part test of actorness – presence, opportunity and capability – the EU’s 
formal institutions can be considered as actors operating within the institutional confines of 
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Union competences.  This classification is important because it resolves the confusing 
issue of nomenclature by not referring to these entities as “formal institutions” in an 
institutionalist analysis.   
The chapter has also examined certain facets of HI relevant to this thesis.  Path dependence 
and punctuated equilibrium are two features common to HI analyses of the EU (Bulmer, 
2009, 1998; Pierson, 1996; Pollack, 2006).  The first examines the institutional forces 
which lead to policy continuity.  The second goes some way to explaining policy change.  
Although these functions appear to be mutually exclusive, they are in fact complementary.  
As Bulmer (2009, p. 307) argues, path dependency and punctuated equilibrium are “dual 
dynamics”.  Particular choices, even small ones, can have long term consequences and lead 
to policy stasis and consolidation.  However, major events such as external crises can 
punctuate that equilibrium and lead to a re-evaluation of policy choices.  This has the 
potential to create new or divergent policy paths.  Path dependence examines incremental 
development and punctuated equilibrium explains radical change.  They are nevertheless 
two sides of the same coin.  Political development, however incremental, is often 
“punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape [it]” (Pierson, 2000, p. 251).  
Analysing this potential effect will form a core part of the following, empirical, chapters. 
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Chapter 5 | The EU’s Cyber Security Discourse 
5.1. Introduction 
The EU’s cyber security policy must be established before it can be analysed.  This chapter 
will set out and clarify that policy.  The chapter will provide evidence from analyses of the 
EU’s acquis communautaire and elite interviews to argue that the EU has developed a 
specific socio-economic discourse focussing on resilience and co-operation.   
A policy ‘discourse’ is the manner in which particular phenomena, policy issues or themes 
are framed and given meaning (Gasper and Apthorpe, 1996, p. 2).  An analysis of 143 
acquis documents collated for this thesis identified a socio-economic interpretation of risks 
and incidents originating in cyberspace.  This infers a policy framework built around 
political, social and economic aspects of security.  This sets it apart from the policies of 
other actors which have included national security or military considerations.  Evidence 
from content analyses of EU acquis as well as analyses of interviews will be presented in 
this chapter to demonstrate that this idiosyncratic socio-economic discourse was 
constructed around five core ideational elements: maximising economic potential, building 
trust in digital networks, protecting fundamental rights, tackling cyber-crime and 
facilitating co-operation.   
The chapter will make three arguments.  It will show that the five core elements occur in 
Union acquis at all stages of the development of EU cyber security policy between 1985 
and 2013.  They first occur in the initial phase of development between 1985 and 2001.  At 
that time they constituted important aspects of the establishment of the Single Market and 
attempts to develop information and communications technology (ICT) as a commercial 
sector.  Once these policy paths were established, the five elements formed the kernel of 
the first formal attempts to create a cyber security policy, the Commission Proposal for a 
Network and Information Security Strategy of 2001 and the Strategy for a Secure 
Information Society of 2006.  The second document was published at the end of a period of 
consolidation of policy goals.  These five ideational elements would in turn form core 
aspects of the EUCSS published in 2013.   
In addition to arguing that there exists an identifiable Union discourse in this policy sector, 
the chapter will demonstrate that that discourse continued unchanged throughout the 28-
year timescape.  While the cyber-threat landscape, and the security challenges emanating 
from cyberspace, evolved and changed between 1985 and 2013, the EU’s basic discourse – 
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the manner in which it framed these phenomena – demonstrated an unusual element of 
continuity.  While this chapter presents evidence of that continuity, subsequent chapters 
will explore the reasons behind it in order to answer the primary research question: have 
institutions and institutional arrangements led the EU to develop and continue with a 
socio-economic approach to cyber security? 
Finally, the chapter will also present evidence that the discourse is not an ad hoc construct.  
By conducting historiographical analyses of both Union acquis and interview data, it will 
be shown that the discourse is the result of a long term developmental process which began 
in 1985.  The combination of core ideational elements informed the development of policy 
and subsequent additions to the acquis throughout the 28-year timescape until the 
publication of the EUCSS of 2013. 
The following section of the chapter sets out the EU’s policy discourse.  It examines in 
detail the EU’s Cyber Security Strategy, the formal acquis document in which Union 
policy in this sector is set out.   The section also introduces the five core ideational 
elements.  Each element is then examined individually, to demonstrate ideational 
continuity throughout the policy development timescape.  This is achieved by 
demonstrating the elements’ presence in six acquis milestones in the EU’s cyber security 
timescape.  These milestones are: 
- 1985 Commission Communication on Completing the Internal Market 
- 1994 Bangemann Report 
- 1996 Commission Communication on Illegal and Harmful Content 
- 2001 Commission Proposal for a Network and Information Security Strategy (NIS 
Proposal) 
- 2006 Strategy for a Secure Information Society (SSIS) 
- 2013 EUCSS 
5.2. The EU’s cyber security discourse: An Historic 
Framework Based on Five Ideational Elements 
On 7 February 2013 the Commission released the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European 
Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace (EUCSS) (European Commission, 2013a).  
This document sets out in detail the EU’s cyber security policy.  The Strategy itself is 
divided into four parts.  The first section sets out the context and general principles for the 
Strategy, including ideational drivers which underpin the EU’s cyber security response as a 
whole.  The second part is the most developed section and examines five core strategic 
goals: 
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1. achieving cyber resilience;  
2. drastically reducing cyber-crime;  
3. developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP);  
4. developing the industrial and technological resources for cyber security;  
5. and establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union 
to promote core EU values.   
The section sets out how the EU intends to achieve these goals including naming key 
operational agencies – for example, ENISA and Europol – and assigning them specific 
tasks.  These tasks include providing specialist analytical and operational support to 
Member States' cyber-crime investigations (European Commission, 2013a, p. 10) and  
assisting the Member States in developing strong national cyber resilience 
capabilities, notably by building expertise on security and resilience of industrial 
control systems, transport and energy infrastructure. (European Commission, 
2013a, p. 7) 
The third section of the EUCSS sets out the EU’s view on the roles and responsibilities of 
various actors at national, EU and international level.  It establishes how the Union will 
promote and facilitate channels for co-ordination and collaboration with these various 
bodies (European Commission, 2013a, p. 18).  A fourth and final section concludes the 
Strategy by clarifying that the document is a joint effort between the Commission and the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).  This 
makes the EUCSS the first joint project made possible by the changes to the structure of 
the EU brought in by the Treaty of Lisbon (European Commission, 2013a; Interview, 
Senior Official, EEAS, 2014)
28
.  
From a policy analysis perspective the most important part of the Strategy is Section 1.1 – 
the Context.  That section sets out the ideational framework on which the Strategy itself is 
based.  It presents the EU’s interpretation of the inherent risks resulting from an increased 
use of ICT in every-day life.  Every other facet of the Strategy, and the EU’s cyber security 
response as a whole, is shaped by this interpretation.   
The Context section is important for understanding the EU’s cyber security policy because 
it is here that the EU departs from prevailing political narratives.  A number of important 
actors treat cyber security as a national security matter.  The US reserves the right to 
respond to cyber-incidents using “all necessary means”, including military force (USA, 
                                            
28
 See Chapter 9. 
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2011a, p. 14).  In its National Strategy for Protection against Cyber Risks, Switzerland 
states that law enforcement agencies “are called to focus on cyber-attacks as severe 
offences relating to national security” (Switzerland, 2012, p. 30).  Japan treats cyber-
incidents which have a “crisis management” component in the same way as national 
security matters given their potential severity (Japan, 2013, p. 8).  The Context section of 
the EUCSS, by contrast, places EU policy within a socio-economic, rather than national 
security or quasi–military narrative.  Rather than concentrating on fighting or mitigating 
potential cyber-risks and threats, the EU focusses on the positive opportunities provided by 
ubiquitous wired technology.  These opportunities can be used to protect fundamental 
rights and to promote economic growth.  These goals are achieved by developing a 
discourse constructed upon five main themes, core norms, which run through all sections 
of the EUCSS.  These elements are:  
1. a concentration on maximising the economic potential of cyberspace,  
2. creating citizen, corporate and political trust in new digital and online technologies,  
3. protecting fundamental rights,  
4. tackling cyber-crime  
5. achieving these four goals through facilitating co-operation.   
 
Although distinct concepts, these ideational elements operate together to inform the 
Union’s discourse.  While engendering trust in new technology and tackling online 
criminal activity were crucial to the economic viability of the internal market, so too was 
ensuring that EU citizens’ rights to privacy were protected while online.  The way that 
these four policy goals were to be achieved was through ensuring that all the actors co-
operated with one another and shared relevant information.  Just as the EU was ideally 
positioned to tackle online criminal activity, so too was it ideally positioned to act as a 
facilitator of this co-operation.  It had the resources and capacity to act as a conduit for 
information and best practice between its Member States, the private sector and 
international partners.   
The importance of these five elements is evidenced by their prevalence not just in the 
EUCSS, but throughout the acquis.  The occurrence of these concepts is shown in Table 5-
1 below.  Out of 143 pieces of Union acquis studied for this thesis, the elements occurred a 
total of 548 times.  The most frequent element was co-operation, which alone occurred 229 
times, signifying the importance of this concept in EU cyber security policy. 
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Table 5-1: Ideational Elements in EU cyber security policy 
Element Economics Trust Rights Cyber-Crime Co-operation 
Number of 
Occurrences 
120 45 63 91 229 
 
Having clarified the prevalence of these five ideational elements in Union acquis, and their 
significance in the EUCSS itself, the following sections of the chapter examine each 
concept in turn.  These sections set out the concepts’ influence on the EU’s wider cyber 
security discourse. 
5.2.1. Maximising the Economic Potential of Cyberspace 
The EUCSS states that ICT has become the “backbone of [the EU’s] economic growth and 
is a critical resource which all economic sectors rely on” (European Commission, 2013a, p. 
2).  The vital importance of ICT, and secure ICT infrastructures, to the economic growth 
and vitality of the Union is stressed in this phrase, and at every opportunity in the Strategy 
itself.  Although ICT was crucial to protecting and promoting fundamental rights, the 
baseline ideological driver for the EU according to the EUCSS is the ability to utilise the 
economic and commercial opportunities presented by the exponential increase in ICT 
usage in all walks of life.  Even the Union’s focus on online criminal activity stems from a 
concern for the effect such activity has on the EU’s economy as well as a strong concern 
for citizen welfare (European Commission, 2013a, p. 3). 
Considering cyber security as a corollary to economic policy was, however, nothing new 
for the EU.  The exercise of gathering Union acquis in this field demonstrated an interest 
in the ICT sector as far back as 1985.  In a Commission Communication of that year on the 
establishment of the Single Market, the IT sector was considered to be one where 
economic growth and employment could be promoted (European Commission, 1985, p. 
20).  This interest continued over the next 28 years and into the EUCSS.  Economic 
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maximisation was a concept important in all six acquis milestones in the policy-making 
timescape.  This prevalence is shown in Table 5-2 below: 
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Table 5-2: Linear continuity of “economics” as an ideational element 
 
  
1985 – Completing the 
Internal Market 
1994 - Bangemann Report and 
1996 - Illegal and harmful 
content 
2001 – NIS Proposal 
2006 – Strategy for a Secure 
Information Society 
2013 - EUCSS 
 
This general policy will 
put particular emphasis on 
certain sectors. These 
include information 
technology and 
telecommunications, 
construction and 
foodstuffs. In the 
information technology 
and telecommunications 
sector, the Commission 
wants to establish specific 
rules which take account 
of the requirement for 
much greater precision 
and more rapid decision-
making so as to ensure 
compatibility, 
intercommunication and 
interworking between the 
users and operators 
throughout the 
Community. (European 
Commission, 1985, p. 20)  
 
The information society has the 
potential to improve the quality 
of life of Europe’s citizens, the 
efficiency of our social and 
economic organization and to 
reinforce cohesion. 
(Bangemann, 1994, p. 11) 
 
Driven by its meteoric growth, 
and its rapid evolution from· a 
government/academic network 
to a broad-based communication 
and trading platform, the 
Internet is currently 
revolutionising a number of 
economic sectors, with the 
emergence of a vibrant and fast 
growing "Internet Economy". 
Simultaneously, the Internet has 
also become a powerful 
influence in the social, 
educational and cultural fields 
(European Commission, 1996a, 
p. 3) 
 
Security is becoming a 
key priority because 
communication and 
information have become 
a key factor in economic 
and societal 
development.  Networks 
and information systems 
are now supporting 
services and carrying 
data to an extent 
inconceivable only a few 
years ago. Their 
availability is critical for 
other infrastructures such 
as water and electricity 
supply. (European 
Commission, 2001b, p. 
1) 
 
The relevance of the ICT sector 
for the European economy and for 
European society as a whole is 
incontestable. ICT is a critical 
component of innovation and is 
responsible for nearly 40% of 
productivity growth. In addition, 
this highly innovative sector is 
responsible for more than a 
quarter of the total European 
R&D effort and plays a key role 
in the creation of economic 
growth and jobs throughout the 
economy.  More and more 
Europeans live in a truly 
information-based society where 
the use of ICTs has rapidly 
accelerated as a core function of 
human social and economic 
interaction. According to 
Eurostat, 89% of EU enterprises 
actively used the Internet in 2004 
and around 50% of consumers 
had recently used the Internet 
(European Commission, 2006a, p. 
5) 
 
Information and 
communications 
technology has become the 
backbone of our economic 
growth and is a critical 
resource which all 
economic sectors rely on. 
It now underpins the 
complex systems which 
keep our economies 
running in key sectors such 
as finance, health, energy 
and transport; while many 
business models are built 
on the uninterrupted 
availability of the Internet 
and the smooth 
functioning of information 
systems. (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 2) 
110 
 
As shown in Table 5-2, the initial EU interest in ICT came about as the result of a desire 
between 1985 and 1996 to extricate the EU from an economic recession.  This is shown by 
the Commission earmarking ICT for particular attention alongside the construction and 
foodstuffs industries.  This attention is particularly evident in ensuring EU-wide 
technological compatibility.  By the mid-1990s economic benefits would be something all 
tiers of society could enjoy and not just the larger industrial economy.   
By 2001, ICT was seen as a core component of the Single Market, as shown in the NIS 
proposal of 2001 (European Commission, 2001b, p. 1).  The primary aim of that Proposal 
was to ensure the economic viability of information networks and infrastructures.  It 
argued that security itself was a commodity bought and sold on the open market (European 
Commission, 2001b, p. 2).  The NIS Proposal’s rationale was to focus on data protection, 
securing a functioning economy, and protecting critical physical infrastructures.  This 
combined the financial focus of the EU with Union security and ensured that “market 
imperfections” – gaps caused by security solutions not being considered profitable – were 
addressed (European Commission, 2001b, p. 2).  Additional evidence of this importance 
can be found in the eEurope initiative of 1999 which was intended to help develop a 
knowledge-based economy (European Commission, 1999, 2001b, p. 4, 2000a, p. 2). 
Building on policy choices made in the 1990s and early 2000s, by 2006 there was a clear 
understanding that an information society making full use of its opportunities meant that 
knowledge and innovation would be the “engines of sustainable growth” in European 
economies (European Commission, 2005, p. 3; European Council, 2003a, p. 14).  This 
stemmed from a recognition that European society and the economy as a whole was 
becoming increasingly dependent on digital information (Council of The European Union, 
2002b, p. 2).  Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) could create jobs in the ICT 
sector (Council of The European Union, 2003, p. 1).  A knowledge-based economy 
supported by efficient broadband internet networks would enhance competitiveness and 
growth (European Council, 2003b, p. 3).  This was a core policy choice of the 2006 
Strategy for a Secure Information Society (SSIS) which would continue into the EUCSS in 
2013.  As the “backbone” of EU economic growth (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2) a 
stable, uninterrupted internet was vital to large corporate interests as well as social sectors 
such as health and transport. 
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5.2.2. Promoting Trust in Digital Systems 
According to the EUCSS a close corollary to ensuring the economic vitality of the Single 
Market and digital infrastructure is developing the trust that citizens and operators have in 
that infrastructure (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2,12).  The logic behind this position 
was that, if individual citizens trust that their financial and personal data will remain secure 
when they are using the internet and cyberspace, then there will be an increase in online 
economic transactions such as commercial purchases and money transfers.  A 2012 
Eurobarometer survey found that a large proportion of internet users in Europe were not 
confident about their ability to use ICT for making online purchases or for banking (TNS 
Opinion & Social & European Commission, 2012, p. 68).  The EU interpreted this as a 
lack of trust in the online commercial domain as a whole.  A goal of the Strategy was to 
make the EU the safest online commercial space in the world. 
The concept of “trust” as an ideational element also continued throughout the 28 year 
timescape.  This is shown in Table 5-3 below. 
Table 5-3: Linear continuity of “trust” as an ideational element 
1994 – Bangemann 
Report; 1996 - illegal 
and harmful content 
2001 – NIS Proposal 2006 – SSIS 2013- EUCSS 
 
A great deal of effort 
must be put into 
securing widespread 
public acceptance and 
actual use of the new 
technology. 
(Bangemann, 1994, p. 
12) 
 
There is a risk that some 
users, alarmed by the 
many reports of security 
threats, simply choose to 
avoid e-commerce 
altogether. Others who 
are either uninformed or 
underestimate the risk 
may be too careless. 
Some companies may 
have an interest in 
underplaying potential 
risks, for fear of losing 
customers. (European 
Commission, 2001a, p. 
20) 
 
A breach in NIS can 
generate an impact 
that transcends the 
economic dimension. 
Indeed, there is a 
general concern that 
security problems 
may lead to user 
discouragement and 
lower take-up of ICT, 
whereas availability, 
reliability and 
security are a 
prerequisite for 
guaranteeing 
fundamental rights 
on-line. (European 
Commission, 2006a, 
p. 5) 
 
For new connected 
technologies to take off, 
including e-payments, cloud 
computing or machine-to-
machine communication, 
citizens will need trust and 
confidence. Unfortunately, a 
2012 Eurobarometer survey 
showed that almost a third of 
Europeans are not confident 
in their ability to use the 
internet for banking or 
purchases. An 
overwhelming majority also 
said they avoid disclosing 
personal information online 
because of security 
concerns. Across the EU, 
more than one in ten Internet 
users has already become 
victim of online fraud.  
(European Commission, 
2013a, pp. 2–3) 
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Historically, trust in new digital systems came in a number of forms.  In its earliest 
iterations in the Bangemann Report of 1996 it was simply the acceptance by EU citizens of 
new digital technologies and ways of doing business (Bangemann, 1994, p. 12).  Citizen 
support for the new measures such as using digital technology to promote economic 
growth and create jobs was vital if the EU’s new “information society” was going to take 
off and succeed (European Commission, 1994, p. 13).  Building trust and confidence were 
primary objectives for promoting digital commerce (European Commission, 1997a, p. 13).  
By 2001, however, there was a concern that many citizen and commercial users would 
simply opt not to use e-commerce due to their perceptions of security threats (European 
Commission, 2001b, p. 20).  Consumers and businesses had to be confident that their 
transactions would not be compromised and that identity data was secure.  This focus on 
identity protection became a core component of EU policy, and was codified in legislation 
passed in 2004 (European Parliament & Council of The European Union, 2004, p. 3).  
Building on this legislative foundation, the 2006 SSIS was explicit in acknowledging the 
relationship between trust in digital networks and nascent cyber security.  It stated that: 
A breach in NIS can generate an impact that transcends the economic dimension.  
Indeed, there is a general concern that security problems may lead to user 
discouragement and lower take-up of ICT (European Commission, 2006a, p. 5). 
Trust was considered crucial to cyber security and this consideration continued into the 
EUCSS.  For new technologies such as cloud computing and machine-to-machine 
communications, EU citizens “will need trust and confidence” (European Commission, 
2013a, p. 2). 
One way to ensure, or at least promote, this trust was through ensuring that citizen privacy 
was protected online.  According to both the 2006 SSIS and the 2013 EUCSS, therefore, 
trust was of particular pertinence to another core ideational element of the EU’s discourse: 
“guaranteeing fundamental rights online” (European Commission, 2006a, p. 5).  
5.2.3. Protecting Fundamental Rights 
One of the key tools used to build trust in the online domain was the protection of 
fundamental rights, particularly the right to personal privacy.  As stated in the EUCSS, 
cyber security itself can only be sound and effective if 
it is based on fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and EU core values. Reciprocally, 
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individuals' rights cannot be secured without safe networks and systems.  Any 
information sharing for the purposes of cyber security, when personal data is at 
stake, should be compliant with EU data protection law and take full account of the 
individuals' rights in this field (European Commission, 2013a, p. 4).   
According to Clemente (Interview, Clemente, Chatham House, 2014), the logic behind this 
was, if citizens are protected from online fraud and if their privacy and personal data is 
secure, they will be encouraged to use the internet and cyberspace for business and social 
transactions.  This will in turn promote economic growth.   
Of the 148 references to the protection of fundamental rights made in Union acquis over 
the course of the 28 year timescape there are 60 references to the right to privacy alone.  
This includes the issue being cited as one of the central principles underpinning EU cyber 
security policy (European Commission, 2013a, p. 4).  In the early stages of policy 
development, privacy was a concern for users of new digital technologies.  It was of such 
concern that a regulatory framework to ensure privacy was proposed in 1993 (European 
Commission, 1993, p. 24).  In a rare move in this policy sector, legislation in the form of a 
Directive on electronic communications networks was passed (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, 2002a, p. 42).  This demonstrated the EU’s commitment to 
this policy goal. 
Personal privacy as a fundamental right to be protected therefore has a longstanding 
presence throughout the EU’s cyber security policy-making timescape.  This was 
recognised by the EU in a 1992 reference to Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Commission, 1992a, 
p. 7).  Such protection was vital to the functioning of the information society (European 
Commission, 1995, p. 85, 2000b, p. 9,12).  It made no difference to the protection of 
privacy that personal information was being stored in digital formats.   
The policy goal of protecting fundamental rights extended beyond ensuring data protection 
and personal privacy.  One of the key principles for cyber security established by the 
EUCSS is “access for all” (European Commission, 2013a, p. 4).  Digital illiteracy or a lack 
of access to the internet for individuals and businesses meant that citizens may be 
disadvantaged in an economic sense.  They would not have access to the same economic 
opportunities as wired individuals or businesses.  In addition, the unhindered flow of 
information translated into an avenue for freedom of expression and the exercise of 
fundamental rights.  The EUCSS cites the use of ICT and the internet as mouthpieces for 
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protesters in the Arab Spring (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2) as an example of the 
effectiveness of wired technology in this regard.   
Just as privacy was not a new concept for the EU, neither was ensuring access to the 
internet and its opportunities.  Between 1985 and 2013 this access was recognised as a 
fundamental right in and of itself.  It included the right to access new technology and to 
gain digital literacy (Bangemann, 1994, p. 11; European Council, 2001, p. 22).  According 
to the Council of the European Union, a lack of access should not hinder the uptake of 
social and economic opportunities (Council of The European Union, 1997, p. 4).  What 
changed by the time the EUCSS was published was the explicit recognition of this right to 
access as a core component of cyber security policy (European Commission, 2013a, p. 16).  
The internet and cyberspace were considered as tools not just for commercial and 
economic opportunities, but for promoting social justice. 
Such an ideological standpoint represents a departure by the EU from the prevailing cyber 
security narrative, particularly when considering government surveillance.  The EUCSS 
explicitly warned against government misuse of cyberspace for surveillance of and control 
over their own citizens (European Commission, 2013a, p. 3).  This caution extended into 
the private sector with warnings against the mass collection of data by major corporations 
(Reding, 2012) and the right for citizens to have data removed from online searches under 
the so-called “right to be forgotten” (Bennett, 2012, p. 162).  The focus for EU cyber 
security is not just the supranational concept of the economic viability of the internal 
digital space.  That focus takes account of the individual citizens who use that space.  This 
is reflected in the underlying purpose of critical infrastructure protection (CIP).  The 
importance of protecting critical infrastructures from cyber incidents is included in the 
EUCSS (European Commission, 2013a, p. 7,16).  The purpose of that protection, however, 
is to ensure usability and trust for the end-user rather than using such concepts as an excuse 
to invade privacy with heavy-handed surveillance (Deibert, 2009, p. 327).  Over time, the 
EU has positioned itself in the cyber discourse not just as a champion of fundamental 
rights and freedoms but as a check on overzealous government monitoring.   
The enduring focus of the EU on privacy is shown in the excerpts cited in Table 5-4 below.  
As with the previous ideational elements, these excerpts are taken from specific acquis 
milestones published between 1985 and 2013: 
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Table 5-4: Linear continuity of “protection of fundamental rights” as an ideational element 
1994 – Bangemann 
Report; 1996 - illegal 
and harmful content 
2001 – NIS Proposal 2006 – SSIS 2013 - EUCSS 
 
Certain issues do not 
involve protection of 
public order, but rather 
the protection of the 
rights of individuals 
(protection of privacy 
and reputation) and of 
an environment 
allowing creation of 
content to flourish 
(intellectual property). 
(European 
Commission, 1996a, p. 
10) 
 
Protection of privacy 
is a key policy 
objective in the 
European Union. It 
was recognised as a 
basic right under 
Article 8 of the 
European Convention 
on human rights.  
Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
of the European 
Union also provide 
the right to respect 
for family and private 
life, home and 
communications and 
personal data. 
(European 
Commission, 2001a, 
p. 24) 
 
A breach in NIS can 
generate an impact 
that transcends the 
economic dimension. 
Indeed, there is a 
general concern that 
security problems 
may lead to user 
discouragement and 
lower take-up of ICT, 
whereas availability, 
reliability and 
security are a 
prerequisite for 
guaranteeing 
fundamental rights 
on-line. (European 
Commission, 2006a, 
p. 5) 
 
Support the promotion and 
protection of fundamental 
rights, including access to 
information and freedom of 
expression, focusing on: a) 
developing new public 
guidelines on freedom of 
expression online and offline; 
b) monitoring the export of 
products or services that might 
be used for censorship or mass 
surveillance online; c) 
developing measures and tools 
to expand Internet access, 
openness and resilience to 
address censorship or mass 
surveillance by 
communication technology; d) 
empowering stakeholders to 
use communication 
technology to promote 
fundamental rights. (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 16) 
 
5.2.4. Tackling Cyber-Crime 
A prominent method used to protect fundamental rights and promote trust was to tackle the 
problem of data theft and privacy breaches.  This was done by tackling computer-related 
criminal activity known as cyber-crime.  As early as 1996 the EU recognised such activity 
as one of the fastest growing forms of crime (European Commission, 1996a, p. 3).  
According to the EUCSS, such criminal acts were transnational (i.e. were conducted 
irrespective of national borders) and caused a variety of social and economic problems.  
These ranged from privacy breaches and the online exploitation of children (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 9) to stealing critical proprietary data or holding companies to 
ransom (European Commission, 2013a, p. 3).   
By 2013 the EU’s interpretation of cyber-crime extended beyond criminal activity for 
personal or corporate gain to include economic espionage and state-sponsored activity 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 3).  This is important as it is another departure from the 
prevailing academic and political narrative.  National actors such as Japan and the US cite 
these as latent national security threats (Japan, 2013; USA, 2011b, p. 40).  Academic 
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scholarship examining such issues tends to place these activities within a national security, 
“cyber warfare” analytical framework (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011; Lindsay, 2013; 
Lischka, 2013).   
The EU by contrast considers these issues as threats to the economic viability of 
cyberspace.  This interpretation positions these state-sponsored activities firmly within a 
socio-economic discourse.  The EU’s response to the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 was 
to treat it as a criminal threat to the ongoing functionality of the internal market
29
.  
Although the scale of the incident was acknowledged (European Commission, 2010b, p. 2) 
along with its technical sophistication (European Commission, 2009a, p. 4), at no point 
does the EU use militaristic language such as “cyber war” to describe it.  Instead the 
incident was interpreted as one which could have an adverse effect on commercial and 
citizen use of the internet and the digital domain in much the same manner as other forms 
of “economic” cyber-crime.  Even espionage is categorised by the EU as an economic 
threat in the EUCSS (European Commission, 2013a, p. 3).  This provides further evidence 
of an underlying discourse in EU cyber security policy.  If the standard approach to cyber 
security issues is to treat these as socio-economic threats, then any incident would be 
treated as a criminal act.  This includes those with alleged state involvement. 
As shown in the comparison table 5-5 below, throughout the 28-year timescape the EU 
was not blind to the fact that there are those seeking to take advantage of the openness and 
accessibility of cyberspace for criminal or state gains (European Commission, 2001a, 
1996a).  
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 The Estonian cyber-attack of 2007 is examined in greater detail in Chapter 8 Section 2 of this thesis. 
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Table 5-5: Linear continuity of “tackling cyber-crime” as an ideational element 
 
As early as 1994, fewer than 10 years after the EU expressed interest in ICT, it was 
recognised that digital data and content could be used for illegal or harmful purposes.  Any 
medium of information exchange could be exploited for criminal gain (European 
Commission, 1996a, p. 3).  Throughout the EU’s cyber security historiography, however, 
all references to such activity refer to it as criminal.  Network and information security 
breaches (European Commission, 2001a, p. 19), exploitation of weaknesses in critical 
infrastructure (European Commission, 2006a, p. 6) and “state-sponsored activity” 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 3) are all acts to be responded to by law-enforcement 
agencies, and not state security apparatus.  
Rather than play into the prevailing, negative, national security-focussed narrative the EU 
maintained the position that cyberspace offers huge opportunities for commerce, private 
sector innovation and social freedoms.  As stated in the EUCSS, cyberspace “breaks down 
barriers between countries, communities and citizens, allowing interaction and sharing of 
1994 – Bangemann 
Report; 1996 - 
illegal and harmful 
content 
2001 – NIS Proposal 2006 – SSIS 2013 - EUCSS 
 
Reflecting these 
opportunities, the 
vast majority of 
Internet content is for 
purposes of 
information for 
totally legitimate 
(and often highly 
productive) business 
or private usage: 
However, like any 
other communication 
technologies, 
particularly in the 
initial stages of their 
development, the 
Internet carries an 
amount of potentially 
harmful or illegal 
contents or can be 
misused as a vehicle 
for criminal 
activities. (European 
Commission, 1996a, 
p. 3) 
 
The proposed policy 
measures with regard to 
network and information 
security have to be seen 
not only in the context of 
the existing 
telecommunications and 
data protection legislation 
but also in relation to the 
more recent cyber-crime 
policies. The 
Commission has recently 
published a 
Communication on 
cyber-crime which 
foresees, amongst other 
initiatives, the setting up 
of an EU Forum on 
cybercrime with the aim 
of enhancing mutual 
understanding and co-
operation at EU level 
between all interested 
parties. (European 
Commission, 2001a, p. 
19) 
 
Making proposals for 
improving co-
operation between law 
enforcement 
authorities and 
addressing new forms 
of criminal activity 
that exploit the Internet 
and undermine the 
operation of critical 
infrastructures.   
This will be the subject 
of a specific 
Communication on 
cybercrime. (European 
Commission, 2006a, p. 
6) 
 
The EU economy is 
already affected by 
cybercrime activities 
against the private sector 
and individuals. 
Cybercriminals are using 
ever more sophisticated 
methods for intruding 
into information systems, 
stealing critical data or 
holding companies to 
ransom. The increase of 
economic espionage and 
state-sponsored activities 
in cyberspace poses a 
new category of threats 
for EU governments and 
companies. (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 
3) 
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information and ideas across the globe” (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2).  There is no 
mention in the EUCSS of cyber war or cyber warfare.  All security threats to, and 
emanating from cyberspace, were classified as socio-economic risks, further highlighting 
the nature of the EU’s underlying policy narrative or discourse in this field. 
5.2.5.  Co-operation as a modus operandi 
According to the EUCSS, the central methodological approach of the EU to achieving its 
conceptual goals is facilitating co-operation.  Cyberspace is a borderless domain and 
cyber-risks and threats have a cross-border dimension (European Commission, 2013a, p. 
9).  The EU institutions and bodies are ideally placed to facilitate the development of a co-
ordinated and collaborative approach to mitigating these risks (Interview, Smith and Jones, 
eu-LISA, 2014).  That includes bringing the private sector into formal joint-working 
protocols such as the European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R) 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 6) or co-ordinating international cyber security exercises 
between nation states (European Commission, 2013a, p. 7; Interview, Purser, ENISA, 
2014).   
The reason for this focus on co-ordination in the EUCSS was a recognition that such work 
on the part of the EU should not be carried out at the expense of Member State initiatives, 
or in lieu of Member State capabilities.  The EU sought to “bring together law enforcement 
and judicial authorities and public and private stakeholders from the EU and beyond” 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 10).  The aim was to complement rather than supersede 
the work of the Member States.  This also enabled the EU to maintain its adherence to 
subsidiarity. 
This is exemplified by the fact that the EU engaged in an arms’-length approach to 
achieving security predicated upon encouraging and incentivising the private sector and 
national agencies.  In the 2006 Strategy for a Secure Information Society (SSIS) the EU 
established itself as a facilitative actor.  Its function was not to prescribe specific solutions 
or recommend specific technical measures (Interview, Purser, ENISA, 2014).  This 
reflected a longer-term trend of seeking to develop co-operation between actors throughout 
the cyber security policy-making timescape, as shown in Table 5-6 below.   
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Table 5-6: Linear continuity of “co-operation” as an ideational element 
 
The rationale was that if all actors co-operated and co-ordinated their efforts, cyber 
security would be closer to being realised (European Commission, 2013b, p. 8,9).  The 
purpose the EU was giving itself between 1985 and 2013 was to facilitate that co-
operation.  This is because it is acknowledged that no single actor can achieve cyber 
security on its own (European Commission, 2010b, p. 3, 2013a, p. 17; European 
Parliament and Council of The European Union, 2011, p. 6).  Co-operation, information-
sharing, on-going dialogue, co-ordinated regional, national and international measures are 
the fundamental aims of the EUCSS.  The Strategy tasked agencies such as ENISA and 
Europol with pursuing those aims (European Commission, 2013a, p. 10).   
The concept of co-operation also defined what kind of cyber security actor the EU was 
seeking to be.  Due to restricted competences and an explicit acknowledgement that 
1994 – Bangemann 
Report; 1996 - illegal 
and harmful content 
2001 – NIS Proposal 2006 – SSIS 2013 - EUCSS 
 
Even if a published 
document is removed 
from one server as a 
result of intervention 
by the authorities, it 
can easily and quickly 
be copied to other 
servers in other 
jurisdictions, · so that 
it continues to be 
available unless and 
until such sites are also 
blocked. Thus 
additional international 
co-operation is 
required to avoid "safe 
havens" for documents 
contrary to general 
rules of criminal law. 
(European 
Commission, 1996a, p. 
12) 
 
Co-operation is essential 
to ensure early warning 
throughout the Union 
through the 
instantaneous exchange 
of information on the 
first signs of attack in 
one country. Therefore 
co-operation with the 
CERT system within the 
European Union should 
be strengthened as a 
matter of urgency. A first 
action aiming at 
strengthening the 
public/private co-
operation on 
dependability of 
information 
infrastructures (including 
the development of early 
warning systems) and 
improving co-operation 
amongst CERTS has 
been agreed in the 
context of the eEurope 
action plan. (European 
Commission, 2001a, p. 
21) 
 
The global dimension 
of network and 
information security 
challenges the 
Commission, both at 
international level 
and in co-ordination 
with Member States, 
to increase its efforts 
to promote global co-
operation on NIS, 
notably in 
implementing the 
agenda adopted at the 
World Summit on the 
Information Society 
(WSIS) in November 
2005. (European 
Commission, 2006a, 
p. 7) 
 
To promote cyber 
resilience in the EU, 
both public authorities 
and the private sector 
must develop 
capabilities and co-
operate effectively. 
Building on the 
positive results 
achieved via the 
activities carried out to 
date further EU action 
can help in particular to 
counter cyber risks and 
threats having a cross-
border dimension, and 
contribute to a co-
ordinated response in 
emergency situations. 
(European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 
5) 
120 
 
responsibility for achieving cyber security remained with the Member States, the EU set 
itself up as a facilitative actor.  It was to be a lynchpin in international efforts designed to 
tackle transnational cyber risks.  This is a role which the EU has the capacity, resources 
and crucially the competence to play
30
.  It has set up specialist agencies tasked with 
operationalising certain aspects of co-operation and co-ordination in specific policy areas.  
The European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
facilitate co-ordination and co-operation in foreign and defence policy.  The European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) assists Member States with ensuring 
the resilience of infrastructures vital to the internal market and  Europol, through the 
European Cyber-Crime Centre (EC3), co-ordinates vast amounts of data and law 
enforcement resources in tackling online criminal activity.  On a conceptual basis, co-
operation was therefore a core element of the EU’s entire approach to tackling cyber 
security threats and risks, and continued to be so throughout the 28 year timescape of 
policy development. 
5.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the EU developed a specific approach to cyber security as a 
policy sector over the 28 years between 1985 and 2013.  That approach – its discourse – 
was focussed on treating the field as a socio-economic issue.  Cyber security challenges, 
including criminal activity, breaches of privacy and even state-sponsored acts of 
aggression, were treated as threats to the ongoing functionality of the internal market.  
From the time the internal market was initiated, ICT and the burgeoning Internet were seen 
as vital sectors for the EU which could be used to promote economic growth and 
employment.  Cyberspace and cyber security were crucial for the ongoing economic 
wellbeing of the Union.  The EU’s unique position as a transnational actor meant that it 
was ideally positioned to tackle such issues as cyber-crime, with a view to promoting 
private citizen and commercial trust in new technologies.  The EUCSS, representing the 
sum total and culmination of a policy-making process, is the exemplar of this discourse.  
Its initial chapters – in which the context for all EU cyber security policy in 2013 is set out 
– are founded upon that socio-economic discourse.   
The chapter also included a comparative analysis of the EUCSS with its conceptual 
predecessors.  The results of this analysis demonstrate that it was not a stand-alone 
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 See Chapter 4 Section 3.1 on “actorness”. 
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document.  It was the culmination of a long-term process of applying a discourse 
constructed around five core ideational elements created at the initiation of the EU’s 
interest in ICT in 1985.  These elements are: maximising economic potential; promoting 
trust; protecting fundamental rights; tackling cyber-crime and achieving these through 
fostering co-operation.  These elements persisted in an unaltered manner throughout the 
EU’s timescape in this policy sector.  In the 143 pieces of Union acquis identified for this 
thesis, these five ideational elements are the most frequently occurring concepts, 
underpinning the EU’s cyber security policy narrative.  They are paths from which the EU 
did not deviate throughout the 28 years of the policy-making process and underpin the 
EU’s socio-economic discourse. 
The EUCSS is therefore not just a part of a policy discourse, but the result of a cumulative, 
linear, evolutionary progression.  By comparing key elements, namely five ideas 
underpinning a socio-economic policy, this chapter has demonstrated that linearity.  By 
tracing the policy-making process through its various iterations in 1996, 2001 and 2006 the 
chapter has shown that the policy discourse was static.  In the 28 years between 1985 and 
2013 the threat landscape may have changed and new tools developed to address those 
threats, but the EU’s underlying discourse did not change.  It remained focussed on the 
socio-economic priorities key to EU policy. 
While not inferring a deterministic policy-making progression, the continued presence of 
these ideational aspects represents the strongest element of path dependency in EU cyber 
security policy and policy-making.  The strength of this path dependency will be 
demonstrated in subsequent chapters of this thesis, when the resilience of the discourse to 
institutional stresses is examined. 
The next task of this thesis is to examine how this path dependent discourse came about 
and look at why the EU’s discourse remained static.  As stated in Chapter 1, a 
supplementary question for this thesis is whether or not the institutional influence of Union 
competences – the rules and standard procedures regulating policy-making – created an 
environment in which only socio-economic solutions could develop.  The following 
chapters will examine the empirical data gathered to answer this question.  This will 
address a key aspect of the substantive research question of this thesis by identifying an 
institutional arrangement which contributed to policy continuity in cyber security. 
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Chapter 6 | Creating Path Dependence 1985-2001 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter set out the European Union’s discourse in cyber security.  It 
demonstrated that ideas established in the 1980s, at the earliest points of the policy 
development process, continued to affect subsequent decisions and the framing of the EU’s 
discourse until 2013.  The aim of this chapter is to build on this discussion of the EU’s 
discourse by explaining how those path dependencies were established.  This is important 
because the aim of the thesis is not simply to identify which institutions and institutional 
arrangements affected cyber security policy.  By focussing on the period between 1985 and 
2001, the chapter also seeks to examine how and why those arrangements led to the 
development of the EU’s idiosyncratic, socio-economic cyber security discourse and 
influenced its continuity. 
The choices which established path dependence in EU cyber security policy can be traced 
back to four important events which occurred early in this sector’s timescape.  These 
events are the establishment of the Single Market, the publication of the Bangemann 
Report, the signing of the Single European Act and the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty.  Each of these events established particular institutional dynamics which affected 
the later development of cyber security policy. 
This chapter will first examine the how the initiation of the Single Market in 1985 affected 
cyber security policy.  This event was one of the most important milestones in the history 
of the EU itself.  As an economic program it was intended to extricate the EU from the 
deep recession of the 1980s by any and all means available.  ICT and the developing 
Internet were viewed by the EU as areas of great social and commercial opportunity, 
economic growth and employment.  Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in this 
sector were to be supported and encouraged to grow in order to boost employment within a 
single, internal market for goods and services.  This focus on the developing cyber domain 
as a place of commercial opportunity initiated a core ideational element of the EU’s cyber 
security discourse: economic maximisation.  That maximisation was initiated by the 
publication in 1994 of the Bangemann Report.  This was one of the most important 
documents in the EU’s cyber security policy timescape, as it contained the conceptual 
seeds for all elements of the EU’s discourse and “cyber” policy. 
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At the same time as the importance of ICT for the nascent Single Market was being 
established, a parallel process was occurring which further entrenched this socio-economic 
focus: the Treaty-based codification of Union competences.  This chapter will examine the 
effect of the restriction of Union competences in security matters, formalised in the Single 
European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, on EU cyber security policy.  As a consequence 
of the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht and the Single European Act, EU action and 
capacity in security matters – its competences – were restricted to “political and economic 
aspects” (European Union, 1987, p. 1049).  While not considered controversial or 
problematic at the time, this restriction had far-reaching consequences for the future 
development of cyber security policy.  The lack of Union competence in “hard” security 
issues would place cyber security considerations on a path of non-military, socio-economic 
policy development.   
This section of the chapter will also examine the importance of timing: the EU’s 
competences influenced the extent to which the EU could become involved in a security 
matter, cyber security.  However, those competences were solidified and codified after the 
commencement of the EU’s interest in ICT as a social and commercial sector.  This is an 
important element of an HI analysis as it marks the point where path dependencies were 
established in cyber security.  Although Union interest in ICT and its concomitant security 
issues began before the EU started to codify its competences, once those competences were 
in place the earlier interest in cyber security could not be expanded.  Its socio-economic 
focus was locked in place.  
The argument will be made in this chapter that the combination of a conscious interest in 
ICT as a tool for economic growth coupled with restricted Union competences in security 
matters created a socio-economic path dependency in cyber security.  As a result of 
restricted competences and the positioning of ICT policy in the Internal Market area, 
security risks and issues such as increased online criminal activity, data or identity 
protection issues and copyright infringement were treated as threats to the functionality of 
the nascent internal market and citizen wellbeing.  In other words they were treated as 
socio-economic issues.  When examining potential security and safety risks, there was little 
mention of national security or military issues.  This socio-economic focus of cyber 
security coalesced by 2001 into a Commission proposal for a network and information 
security strategy.  This proposal, the first document representing an identifiable cyber 
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security policy in the EU, codified the socio-economic preferences of the Union in this 
policy sector, further entrenching the nature of the EU’s discourse in this field. 
The chapter is divided into six sections.  Following this introduction, the second section 
examines the establishment of identifiable “cyber” policies in the context of the initiation 
of the Single Market.  The third section explores the formalisation of Union security 
competences, examining the important fact that this formalisation occurred after the 
commencement of the EU’s cyber security discourse, but had a significant influence on 
that discourse's subsequent development.  The fourth section of the chapter examines the 
EU’s responses to nascent cyber security concerns during this period.  The fifth section 
examines the EU’s first formal attempt to develop a recognisable cyber security strategy, a 
document entitled Network and Information Security: Proposal for a European Policy 
Approach, published in 2001.  The sixth section concludes the chapter. 
6.2. Establishing Union “cyber” policy 
6.2.1. The Initiation of the Single Market and the Focus on ICT 
As set out in Chapter 5, the EU’s cyber security discourse is predicated upon five core 
ideational elements: maximisation of economic opportunities, establishing trust in systems 
and networks, protecting fundamental rights, tackling cyber-crime and achieving these 
through promoting and facilitating co-operation.  The chronological and historiographical 
development of this discourse inferred a linear, but not deterministic progression from a 
concentration on the commercial opportunities of digital technology in the mid-1980s to 
the publication of the EUCSS in 2013.   
The exercise undertaken to establish the timescape of policy development (described in 
Chapter 3) also established that the conceptual germ for EU cyber security policy can be 
found in the initiation of the Single Market Programme (SMP).  Begun in 1985 (Bulmer, 
1998, p. 365), the SMP was the EU’s strategy for building a common, unified market for 
European goods and services, as well as facilitating the movement of those goods 
(European Commission, 1985, p. 6).  In the early 1980s Europe as a whole was mired in an 
economic recession (Young, 2010, p. 111).  While the economies of the USA and Japan 
were improving thanks to markets in consumer electronics and defence, Europe was falling 
behind (European Commission, 1993, p. 9; Staab, 2013, p. 93).  The thinking was that an 
internal market would greatly increase economic growth across the membership of the 
Union.  Citizens would have a wider choice of products and services, originating not just in 
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their home country but other Member States.  Capital would move freely from one national 
banking sector to another and citizens would have the right to live and work anywhere in 
the EU (Staab, 2013, p. 92).  This would not only generate wealth but create jobs.  The EU 
was therefore seeking any and all avenues to reverse the downward economic trend and 
tackle unemployment.  The SMP was the centre-piece of Union policy designed to achieve 
these goals.   
To advance this project, on 14 June 1985 the European Commission under Jacques Delors 
presented to the European Council a White Paper entitled Completing the Internal Market 
(European Commission, 1985).  This Communication is one of the most important 
documents produced by the Commission (Dinan, 2010, p. 79).  It positioned that actor as 
the “institutional entrepreneur” of the SMP (Fligstein and Mara-Drita, 1996, p. 11).  In 
addition to setting out why the EU should establish a single economic area, the White 
Paper also defended market liberalisation as a means to stimulate growth across the Union 
membership.  In its most ambitious chapters, it also set out a timetable for the creation and 
implementation of the Single Market (Dinan, 2010, p. 79; European Commission, 1985, p. 
57).  Although a massive project which would radically alter the economic and political 
face of Europe, the Commission envisaged its establishment by 1992 (European 
Commission, 1985, p. 62).   
Due to its significance in setting up core concepts such as the free movement of goods, 
services and people, the White Paper was a milestone in the evolution and development of 
the EU as a whole.  It was also the first step in the process that would lead to the 
development of the EU’s unified response to cyber security challenges, the EUCSS of 
2013.  In its 1985 Communication the Commission identified a number of sectors where 
EU action could potentially be beneficial.  As well as telecommunications and foodstuffs, 
information technology (IT) was singled out for specific attention  (European Commission, 
1985, p. 20).  As part of the construction of the internal market, a service industry based 
around IT – a relatively new sector at the time – would be encouraged. 
IT and the Single Market therefore complemented one another.  It was recognised that 
sectors such as audio-visual industries, information and data processing and computerised 
marketing and distribution could only achieve their potential within a “large unobstructed 
market” (European Commission, 1985, p. 30), i.e. a single marketplace where goods and 
services could move freely.  The ultimate aim of the Single Market as regards IT was to 
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reduce, and prevent the creation of, obstacles to innovation and economic growth inherent 
in a fragmented market (European Commission, 1985, p. 6).  Creating a permissive, 
facilitative environment where burgeoning industries and sectors such as IT could develop 
would in turn facilitate wealth and job creation, economic growth and promote the 
functioning of the internal market once it was launched.   
The IT sector was seen as an untapped domain of commercial opportunity.  This 
conceptualisation represented the initiation of a core element of the EU’s interest in this 
sector: using new digital and information technologies to promote economic growth by 
exploiting the potential of this new domain
31
.  Demonstrating a remarkable degree of 
prescience, it was argued that, with the right regulatory framework, the digital domain 
could become a flourishing economic space in its own right (European Commission, 
1985).  An unobstructed single market with reduced controls and a permissive 
environment, created through the removal of internal boundaries, customs protocols and 
the establishment of free movement of goods and services would support this digital 
domain.  This would in turn enable SMEs to capture the full potential of digital media to 
stimulate growth and create jobs. 
The importance of stimulating employment as a goal for the EU in this period was further 
cemented in 1993 by another White Paper from the Commission entitled Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment: The Challenges.  This White Paper was produced at the 
behest of the European Council (European Council, 1993a, p. 7).  Its self-professed “one 
and only reason” (European Commission, 1993, p. 9) for publication was to counter 
unemployment.  This was a core motivation for EU economic policy at the time, a goal to 
be achieved through addressing weaknesses in Member State national economies.  
Although nine million jobs had been created since 1985, more needed to be done to 
stimulate industry in a measured way without a “dash for economic freedom” causing 
further damage to the nascent recovery (European Commission, 1993, pp. 9–10).   
What makes this White Paper of relevance and importance to the future development of a 
Union cyber security policy is that a core element of this medium-term strategy was the 
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 The importance of ICT to economic growth would be repeated in the EUCSS.  “Information and 
communications technology has become the backbone of our economic growth and is a critical resource 
which all economic sectors rely on. It now underpins the complex systems which keep our economies 
running in key sectors such as finance, health, energy and transport; while many business models are built on 
the uninterrupted availability of the Internet and the smooth functioning of information systems.” (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 2). 
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recognition of the need for ever greater and swifter development of new information 
technologies (European Commission, 1993, p. 15; European Council, 1993b, p. 9).  Two 
“development themes” were promulgated by the Commission in this second White Paper.  
As was the case in 1985, specific economic sectors were listed where EU attention should 
focus.  One was trans-European transport and energy networks (European Commission, 
1993, p. 28).  The second was information networks (European Commission, 1993, p. 22).   
Recognising an increase in the use of electronic multimedia in social and commercial life, 
the EU sought to build on its previous promotion of that sector by developing a digital 
version of the single market.  Information highways would be constructed with the same 
goals as international motorways: to enable the free, unfettered flow of information to 
support international commercial enterprises (European Commission, 1993, p. 14, 1995, p. 
12,21).  The idea was to develop a European digital space, an idea representing another 
step in the incremental development of EU cyber, and hence cyber security, policy. 
This digital domain was a cornerstone of EU economic and social development for a 
number of reasons.  Not only would European economies benefit from an increased 
communicative and co-operative capability afforded by developments in IT and other 
forms of digital media, but the EU itself was ideally placed to act as a facilitator of that 
communication and co-operation (European Commission, 1993, p. 65).  This facilitative 
role would become a key feature of later EU cyber security policy.  The EU’s Cyber 
Security Strategy (EUCSS) of 2013 proposed that the EU act as a facilitator of security.  It 
aimed to ensure the spread of knowledge and best practice, as well as bringing actors 
together rather than legislate or stipulate specific technological solutions (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 18; Christou, 2016).  
Once ICT and a digital domain had been posited as a beneficial tool for economic and 
social development by the Commission, the European Council noted the benefits these 
brought to the manner in which European economies were managed and maintained.  As 
stated in the European Council’s conclusions of December 1993: 
The new information and communication technologies…have brought about 
fundamental changes in the structures and methods of production. Europe must 
adapt itself quickly to these developments and must control their consequences. 
Those economies which are the first to complete this transformation will have a 
significant competitive edge. (European Council, 1993b, p. 11). 
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Due to this acknowledgment, and in additional recognition of the influence of information 
and communications technologies (ICT) on European society as a whole, the European 
Council tasked the Commission to report on specific measures to develop and implement a 
European digital space.  The result was another milestone in EU cyber security policy-
making: the Bangemann Report of 1994. 
6.2.2. The 1994 Bangemann Report 
The Bangemann Report was one of the most important documents in the foundation and 
development of EU cyber security policy.  The reason for this is that the origins of all the 
core elements in that policy discourse can be traced back to this document.  While the 
initiation of interest in ICT can be found in the White Paper establishing the Internal 
Market in 1985 (European Commission, 1985), it was in the Bangemann Report that this 
interest began to coalesce into a more recognisable “cyber” policy. 
The Bangemann Report was specifically requested by the European Council in a meeting 
in Brussels in 1993 (European Council, 1993b, p. 11).  The Commission was tasked with 
sponsoring and co-ordinating a committee of experts who would examine the fundamental 
social and economic changes brought about by emergent ICT.  At the time it was 
recognised that Europe as a whole had to adapt to these new technologies as “those 
economies which are the first to complete this transformation [to ICT] will have a 
significant competitive edge” (European Council, 1993b, p. 11).  Once again economic 
factors were the primary driving force for this measure.  To ensure this economic 
competitive advantage, the European Council therefore requested: 
that a report be prepared for its next meeting by a group of prominent persons fully 
representative of all relevant industries in the Union and of users and consumers, 
designated by the Council and the Commission, on the specific measures to be 
taken into consideration by the Community and the Member States in this sphere 
(European Council, 1993b, p. 12). 
The report was to cover the development and interoperability of infrastructure networks 
“for facilitating the dissemination of information” as well as basic trans-European services 
such as databases and email (European Council, 1993b, p. 12).   
The purpose of the Bangemann Report was to examine the economic and social 
implications and potential of digital infrastructures and new media.  However, it 
inadvertently established certain policy choices which became standard goals and aims for 
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all cyber policies produced since.  This included those documents dealing with security and 
safety issues.  In effect, the Report created crucial path dependencies in this particular field 
(Fligstein and Mara-Drita, 1996, p. 5).  This linear connection between the Bangemann 
Report and the EUCSS can be demonstrated with a tabular comparison of key elements of 
both documents.   
Table 6-1: Comparison of the Bangemann Report and the EUCSS
32
 
Bangemann Report 1994 
(Bangemann, 1994) 
European Cyber Security Strategy 2013 
(European Commission, 2013a) 
Economic factors including market forces Information and communications technology 
has become the backbone of our economic 
growth and is a critical resource which all 
economic sectors rely on. 
Data protection and online privacy must be 
enshrined rights 
Protecting fundamental rights, freedom of 
expression, personal data and privacy  
Cybersecurity can only be sound and effective if 
it is based on fundamental rights and freedoms 
as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and EU core 
values. Reciprocally, individuals' rights cannot 
be secured without safe networks and systems. 
Any information sharing for the purposes of 
cyber security, when personal data is at stake, 
should be compliant with EU data protection 
law and take full account of the individuals' 
rights in this field. 
Creation of Jobs The EU should make the best of the Horizon 
2020 Framework Programme for Research and 
Innovation, to be launched in 2014.  (Horizon 
2020 is the financial instrument implementing 
the Innovation Union, a Europe 2020 flagship 
initiative aimed at securing Europe's global 
competitiveness. Running from 2014 to 2020, 
the EU’s new Framework Programme for 
research and innovation will be part of the drive 
to create new growth and jobs in Europe). 
Intellectual property and online piracy must be 
combatted 
Across the EU, more than one in ten Internet 
users has already become victim of online fraud. 
EU (particularly Commission) must promote 
actor co-operation 
The Commission and High Representative will 
increase policy co-ordination and information 
sharing through the international Critical 
Information Infrastructure Protection networks 
such as the Meridian network, co-operation 
among NIS competent authorities and others. 
Private sector involvement crucial Our freedom and prosperity increasingly depend 
on a robust and innovative Internet, which will 
continue to flourish if private sector innovation 
and civil society drive its growth. 
 
                                            
32
 In this table, general references to the document source have been placed in the column heading, rather 
than for each individual point.  This was done for ease of reading. 
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As shown in Table 7 above, the Bangemann Report and the EUCSS share certain vital 
components, indicating a direct connection between the concepts initiated in 1994 and 
those published in the EUCSS of 2013.  The Bangemann Report makes clear that 
economic factors such as market forces (Bangemann, 1994, p. 16) and the creation of jobs 
(Bangemann, 1994, p. 10) underpin the Union’s interest and strategic outlook in ICT.  This 
position is a cornerstone of the EUCSS as it is acknowledged that cyberspace “has become 
the backbone of our economic growth and is a critical resource which all economic sectors 
rely on” (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2; Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014).  
In 1994, data protection and online privacy were fundamental rights to be enshrined both 
in the information society and in future policy (European Commission, 1996c, p. 12).  
These are to be ensured via technical and regulatory measures (Bangemann, 1994, p. 
22,131).   
The protection of fundamental rights such as privacy and safety, online or offline, are core 
tenets of the EUCSS (European Commission, 2013a, p. 4).  Dr Udo Helmbrecht, the 
Executive Director of ENISA, stated that basic civil rights cannot be ensured without data 
protection (Interview, Helmbrecht, ENISA, 2014).  This view is echoed by officials from 
eu-LISA (Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014).  The precursors to the regulatory 
framework for intellectual property rights and combatting online piracy were also 
established in 1994 (Bangemann, 1994, p. 21).  This would form a core element of tackling 
cyber-crime by 2013 (European Commission, 2013a, p. 9) including the establishment of 
the European Cyber Crime Centre at Europol (Europol, 2013a).   
The linear connection is not restricted simply to policy aims or strategic goals, however.  
The Bangemann Report also states that the way these goals would be achieved was for the 
EU, in particular the Commission, to facilitate actor co-operation, particularly the pooling 
of resources (Bangemann, 1994, p. 12).  This view is echoed by the Commission 
facilitating the sharing of information and best practice amongst core interested parties 
under the terms of the EUCSS (European Commission, 2013a, p. 16).  There was also in 
1994 a growing recognition of the importance of the private sector in this regard (European 
Council, 1994a).  An entire chapter of the Bangemann Report is devoted to securing 
private finance and ensuring that the private sector accept responsibility and take a lead 
role in the development of future initiatives (Bangemann, 1994, p. 34).  The role of the 
private sector in EU cyber policy does not diminish over the next 28 years.  In 1996 the 
private sector was seen as crucial for developing Internet and multimedia use in education 
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(European Commission, 1996d, p. 16), and by 2013 it was a lynchpin in securing the EU’s 
digital space (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2,5). 
Core path dependencies in cyber security policy were established when the Bangemann 
Report was endorsed by the European Council (European Council, 1994b, pp. 7–8).  A 
strong economic focus was instituted, centring on employment and economic growth.  As 
established in Chapter 5 of this thesis on the EU’s discourse, Union cyber security policy 
acknowledges that ICT infrastructures form the backbone of economic and social life.  The 
choices made in the Bangemann Report focussed policy attention on socio-economic 
factors such as wealth creation and employment.  This in turn would lead to the adoption 
of a more socio-economic approach to the manner in which the EU would seek to secure 
its digital space.  The aim was for the EU to become a digital domain in which to do 
business with confidence, in safety and with access to numerous new commercial 
opportunities. 
In 1994 these policy choices sought to maximise the potential for new technologies and 
ICT to contribute to the economic and social development of the EU (European Council, 
1994b, p. 8).  This policy was part of the wider international movement towards digital and 
online media in that it set in train a crucial policy choice – a path dependence – which 
ultimately would differentiate it from other cyber security strategies of the 2010s.  As 
examined in Chapter 1, the EU takes a very different approach to cyber security to most 
other actors.  A number of key cyber security actors take a more active position against 
external intrusions (Dewar, 2014, p. 14) or “attacks” under the laws of armed conflict 
(Dinstein, 2012, p. 264).  Although a legitimate policy choice, it is one predicated upon a 
pessimistic view of cyberspace as a domain replete with myriad threats, threat agents and 
potential disasters which may occur leading to concentrations on worst-case scenarios 
(Dunn Cavelty, 2012a, p. 22) . 
The EU in 2013 takes a more optimistic view.  It seeks to establish a digital space where 
people can live, interact, communicate and do business safely and securely, confident in 
the knowledge that their data is safe and the infrastructures they are using are resilient 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 2, 1994, p. 5).  This positive position was established in 
the Bangemann Report and persisted for the next two decades.  The developing digital 
space, what would eventually be labelled as “cyberspace”, was seen not as a realm of 
danger, but as one of great commercial opportunity for European society to enjoy and 
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exploit (European Commission, 1996b, p. 2, 1994, p. 3).  Exploited opportunities needed to 
be safe and secure, but this did not detract from the EU’s positive attitude to cyberspace 
and digital media, an attitude which persists in the EUCSS with its description of “an open 
and free cyberspace” (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2).  According to officials at eu-
LISA, the fundamental purpose of the EU’s involvement as a body in digital and online 
technology is to promote a free, open and secure internet (Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-
LISA, 2014). 
The initiation of the Single Market and the publication of the Bangemann Report 
established a number of vital path dependencies for EU cyber security policy which would 
both affect and effect policy choices in later decades.  A focus on maximising growth and 
employment cemented the economic prioritisation of EU policy as regards cyberspace as a 
whole.  A consequence of this was that the EU considered cyberspace as a domain filled 
with opportunities, rather than threats, a view which was perpetuated throughout the 
timescape of cyber security policy development.   
However, at the same time as socio-economic paths were being laid down a clarification of 
the EU’s capacity to act in core policy sectors was also occurring.  Against the backdrop of 
the establishment of the Single Market, the EU’s competences were being codified, in 
particular those relating to security and external policy.  While the Single Market and the 
Bangemann Report would create strong path dependencies in cyber security policy with 
respect to its economic foci, highly specified competence in security matters would have 
an equally important influence on the ability of the EU to respond to the security issues 
that arose along with the increased social and commercial use of ICT and the internet.  
6.3. The Influence of Competence on Establishing Cyber 
Security Principles 
6.3.1. The 1987 Single European Act 
In the years between 1985 and 2001, the period in which EU cyber security policy 
foundations were established, two important Treaties entered into force which had a direct 
impact on all areas of policy-making, including cyber security: the Single European Act of 
1987 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
In September 1985, two months after the Commission published its landmark White Paper 
on completing the Internal Market (European Commission, 1985), a move commenced to 
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re-evaluate and reform the Treaties governing the functioning of the European 
Communities.  Amidst acrimonious debates in the European Council, an intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) began (Dinan, 2010, p. 80).  Buoyed by the relative success of the Single 
Market, negotiations progressed towards a radical reshaping of the Communities system 
through a Single European Act (SEA). 
One of the most important elements of the SEA was that for the first time a treaty base for 
European political co-operation (EPC) was set out (Smith, 2015, p. 287).  This established 
measures for future co-operation across the whole range of Union activities and moved the 
EU away from intergovernmentalism (Staab, 2013, p. 18).  The SEA also mentioned the 
concept of “security” for the first time in this EPC framework.  What is of particular 
consequence for cyber security policy-making is that it restricted the EU to “political and 
economic aspects” of security (European Union, 1987, p. 1049).  In 1987 this softer 
approach to security was of greater symbolic significance than of practical importance.  In 
its infancy as the European Coal and Steel Community the EU’s purpose was to facilitate 
the development of an international system which veered away from military conflict.  It 
did this by promoting economic, social and political co-operation (Dinan, 2010, pp. 17–
18).  To have this enshrined in a treaty seemed logical.  This restriction was codified in the 
Petersberg Tasks of 1992 which specified that any military action under an EU banner 
would be restricted to peace-making, peacekeeping and rescue tasks (EEAS, n.d.).  The 
SEA and Petersberg Tasks were, however, of crucial significance for future attempts to 
address security problems, in particular those which arose from cyberspace. 
The SEA’s restriction of European involvement in security and foreign policy issues to 
their political and economic aspects drastically reduced the EU’s capacity to develop a 
truly holistic approach to cyber security.  The scale of interconnectedness of the Internet, 
as well as the number of critical infrastructures which would rely on a functioning 
cyberspace by 2013, was a problem unforeseen in 1987.  To borrow a phrase from chaos 
theory, the drop in the ocean that was the logical restriction of the EU to non-military, non-
defence security considerations would create serious ripples (Gleick, 1997) when it was 
recognised by the 2000s that these areas were intricately linked due to the nature of 
cyberspace.   
Because this issue was not foreseen, the EU continued on its softer security path post-SEA.  
By 1992 the restriction to socio-economic aspects of security was further entrenched by the 
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signing and entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, better known as the 
Maastricht Treaty.  While the SEA established the parameters for security policy, the 
Maastricht Treaty set up a policy-making framework which would further curtail the EU’s 
capacity to develop policy in foreign and security matters.  It placed this sector in an 
intergovernmental policy-making and legislative process.  This would require unanimous 
decision-making in the Council of the European Union.  By contrast, economic decisions 
could be passed by a qualified majority.  This divided system would become known as the 
Pillar System of the EU. 
6.3.2. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the creation of policy 
pillars 
It is not the aim of this section of the chapter to enter into a lengthy analysis of the terms of 
the Maastricht Treaty.  Such analyses have been conducted elsewhere (Bache et al., 2011; 
Bulmer, 1997; Dinan, 2010).  However it is beneficial to briefly consider the terms of the 
Treaty and how it affected Union policy- and decision-making in general before examining 
its precise impact on cyber security policy paths. 
While the SEA established a co-operative framework for EU policy, the Maastricht Treaty 
was the first major revision of the Union’s structure, policy-making processes and 
organisation since the 1957 Treaty of Rome.  At its heart were measures to introduce 
elements of political union (Europa, n.d.).  In addition to tools for co-operation, the Treaty 
initiated specific measures to promote greater political and economic integration.  These 
included preparations for economic and monetary union (Dinan, 2010, p. 82; Staab, 2013, 
pp. 19–21) and the creation of a “European Union” founded on the European Communities 
(European Union, 1992, p. 7).  Core aims of the Treaty were the completion of the Internal 
Market project begun in 1985 (European Union, 1992, p. 4) predicated upon the free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital (European Union, 1992, p. 12).  One of 
the most important aspects of the Treaty was the establishment of jurisdictions of 
responsibilities between the Member States and the EU: the areas of “competence” for 
each party.   
For the EU, these competences were designed to set out in which areas the Union could 
create legislation and policy.  As examined in Chapter 4, under this system, there were 
certain areas of “exclusive competence”, where the EU had sole jurisdiction.  Under the 
principle of subsidiarity, it made more sense for the supranational entity that was the EU to 
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draft policy or legislation than for the individual Member States to do so due to the nature 
or scale of the policy area (European Union, 1992, p. 13; Interview, Purser, ENISA, 2014).   
One level down from exclusive competence was shared competence, where decision-
making would be carried out by both the EU and the Member States.  The majority of 
areas of Union policy would fall under this heading and incorporate the policy- and 
decision-making processes of the Treaty of Rome.  Decisions in these policy areas would 
be taken via the “Community Method”, whereby votes in the Council of the European 
Union were passed by a qualified majority (QMV).  The functioning of the Internal Market 
and other aspects of economic policy fell into this category, including the nascent field of 
cyber policy.  This comprised the first “pillar” of the new European Union. 
The European Commission was afforded a right of initiative in this area, whereby it could 
propose policy and legislation if it saw a need (without instruction from the Council of the 
European Union or the Parliament).  These proposals were subject to final decisions being 
made by the Council. 
The Treaty also established two other fields of policy-making.  These were the areas of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
33
, and co-operation in the fields of Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA).  The key difference in these areas was the method of decision-
making.  Rather than using QMV, unanimous intergovernmental decisions were required.   
The result of this division of remits was a system of three specific areas of Union policy, 
defined by their decision-making setup.  These became known as the “Pillars of the EU”, 
illustrated in the diagram below
34
. 
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 The Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar was established despite the EU having very limited 
external competence (See Chapter 4).  The aim of the CFSP was to enable the EU to speak on the 
international stage with one voice (European Union, 2016).  Although military competence is highly 
restricted, in the field of diplomacy and international partnership, the EU speaking as a single entity has more 
“clout” than were each individual Member State to engage in its own. 
34
 Image Source 
http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_three_pillars_of_the_european_union_maastricht_7_february_1992-en-
37b4b8c8-0f00-4c1c-bec8-bcdf4b26807d.html  
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Diagram 6-1: The Pillars of the EU post Maastricht 
 
As stated above, the Internal Market fell into the First Pillar, the Communities.  Due to 
their importance to the Internal Market, ICT (cyber) issues also came under this policy- 
and decision-making system.  This enabled the EU to engage proactively with those issues 
in an economic sense due to its shared competence.  Union cyber security policy contains 
at its core a strong economic focus.  The origins of this economic focus have been shown 
to be traceable to the initiation of the internal market in 1985 (European Commission, 
1985, p. 20), and to subsequent moves to establish a secure information society 
(Bangemann, 1994; European Commission, 1996a, p. 96).  The Treaty of Maastricht 
served to solidify this approach by placing cyber issues within a decision-making Pillar, 
the bulk of which concentrated on the functioning of the internal market. 
Placing cyber policy within this First Pillar had another consequence, however, particularly 
since criminal justice matters were handled under the Third Pillar of JHA.  It further 
restricted the manner in which the EU could address security issues emanating from 
cyberspace.  The reduced security competence enshrined in the SEA and the codification 
of foreign and security policy into the intergovernmental CFSP Pillar therefore restricted 
EU cyber security policy to socio-economic matters.  It is significant, however, that this 
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institutional restriction was put in place after the EU’s socio-economic interest in ICT was 
established.  What that restriction did was prevent any deviation from already established 
paths and lock out other potential avenues of cyber security policy or solutions outside of 
the socio-economic discourse. 
This does not mean that the EU was naïve in its perception of the developing digital 
domain, or its own information society (European Commission, 1996e, p. 5).  As the 1990s 
progressed, the EU became increasingly aware of the capacity for cyberspace and the 
internet to be abused (European Commission, 1996a).  However, the placing of criminal 
justice policy in a separate Pillar to the Internal Market complicated the capacity of the EU 
to respond to this abuse.  It necessitated a creative approach on the part of the Union to 
such issues in order to be able to effectively address them and ensure the viability of the 
Single Market.  That approach would be to interpret online criminal activities as threats to 
the ongoing functionality of the Single Market, thus making them socio-economic issues. 
6.4. Responding to Increasing Security Concerns 
The initiation of the Single Market in 1985 and the Bangemann Report of 1994 were 
crucial milestones in the development of EU cyber security policy because they established 
the Union’s economic focus in this sector.  The provisions of the SEA and the Treaty of 
Maastricht were similarly important as they codified the capacity of the EU to engage in 
security matters.   
While the EU was keen to exploit the economic, social and political opportunities of new 
digital media, the path to that exploitation was not without issue.  The chronology of EU 
cyber security acquis demonstrates that, by 1996, concern was emerging that the Internet 
was being used to transmit harmful or illegal material – such as extreme pornography or 
content inciting racial hatred – as well as being “misused as a vehicle for criminal activity” 
(European Commission, 1996a, p. 3).  This established a conceptual basis for the need for 
some sort of security policy addressing citizen and business interaction over the Internet.  
This set the stage for more specific network and information security (NIS) policies in the 
future. 
The combined effects of these two paths can be seen in the Commission’s 1996 
Communication entitled Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet (European 
Commission, 1996a).  This was another milestone in the development of cyber security 
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policy as it established the core security components of what would become the EUCSS 
within the socio-economic framework established by its antecedents.  Chief amongst these 
components was a list of security concerns set out in the Communication’s introduction.  
The Commission cited these threats and risks as having the potential for direct 
repercussions on the functioning of the Internal Market
35
 (European Commission, 1996a, 
p. 3).  They are significant contributions to the cyber security policy timescape and hence 
merit citing here in full (emphasis in original): 
 national security (instructions on bomb-making, illegal drug production, terrorist 
activities);  
 protection of minors (abusive forms of marketing, violence, pornography);  
 protection of human dignity (incitement to racial hatred or racial discrimination);  
 economic security (fraud, instructions on pirating credit cards);  
 information security (malicious hacking);  
 protection of privacy (unauthorised communication of personal data, electronic 
harassment);  
 protection of reputation (libel, unlawful comparative advertising);  
 intellectual property (unauthorised distribution of copyrighted works, e.g. software 
or music) 
 
The list of security threats is significant for two reasons.  The first is that it retained the 
socio-economic prioritisation placed on ICT resulting from that sector’s importance to the 
Single Market (European Council, 1993a, p. 26) and formalised in the Bangemann Report.  
Protection of copyright, fraud prevention, illegal advertising and abusive marketing are 
predominantly economic concerns as they could affect user confidence in the EU’s digital 
space (European Commission, 1996a, p. 16).  Data privacy and the protection of minors 
(European Commission, 1996a, p. 3) are predominantly social concerns, focusing on 
citizen safety and wellbeing. 
The second reason this list is significant is perhaps more pertinent to the evolution of a 
recognisable “cyber security” policy.  Issues such as the dissemination of bomb-making 
instructions, terrorist activities, protection of personal privacy, the incitement to racial 
hatred
36
 and electronic harassment
37
 were specifically cited as security and safety issues.  
A comparative exercise examining the content of the EUCSS and the Commission’s 
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 This further reinforces the economic approach of the EU to this field. 
36
 Comparable to Conway’s (2005) conceptualisation of extremist propaganda as “cyber-cortical warfare”. 
37
 More colloquially known by 2015 as “trolling” (Hardaker, 2010; Herring et al., 2002). 
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Communication on Illegal and Harmful Content (an exercise similar to that carried out 
between the EUCSS and the Bangemann Report in the previous section) demonstrates the 
similarity and linear progression evident between the two documents.  This comparison is 
shown in Table 6-2 below. 
Table 6-2: Comparison of the EUCSS and COM (1996) 487 
COM (1996) 487 
(European Commission, 1996a) 
European Cyber Security Strategy 2013 
(European Commission, 2013a) 
national security (instructions on bomb-
making, illegal drug production, terrorist 
activities);  
protection of minors (abusive forms of 
marketing, violence, pornography);  
Cybersecurity efforts in the EU also involve the 
cyber defence dimension. To increase the 
resilience of the communication and 
information systems supporting Member States' 
defence and national security interests, cyber 
defence capability development should 
concentrate on detection, response and recovery 
from sophisticated cyber threats. 
protection of human dignity (incitement to 
racial hatred or racial discrimination);  
Cybercrime comprises traditional offences (e.g. 
fraud, forgery, and identity theft), content-
related offences (e.g. on-line distribution of 
child pornography or incitement to racial 
hatred). 
 
The EU international engagement in cyber 
issues will be guided by the EU's core values of 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and the respect for fundamental 
rights. 
economic security (fraud, instructions on 
pirating credit cards);  
Across the EU, more than one in ten Internet 
users has already become victim of online fraud. 
information security (malicious hacking);  Cybercriminals are using ever more 
sophisticated methods for intruding into 
information systems, stealing critical data or 
holding companies to ransom. The increase of 
economic espionage and state-sponsored 
activities in cyberspace poses a new category of 
threats for EU governments and companies 
protection of privacy (unauthorised 
communication of personal data, electronic 
harassment);  
Protecting fundamental rights, freedom of 
expression, personal data and privacy.  
Cybersecurity can only be sound and effective if 
it is based on fundamental rights and freedoms 
as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and EU core 
values. Reciprocally, individuals' rights cannot 
be secured without safe networks and systems. 
Any information sharing for the purposes of 
cyber security, when personal data is at stake, 
should be compliant with EU data protection 
law and take full account of the individuals' 
rights in this field. 
protection of reputation (libel, unlawful 
comparative advertising);  
 
intellectual property (unauthorised distribution 
of copyrighted works, e.g. software or music) 
Cybercrime comprises traditional offences (e.g. 
fraud, forgery, and identity theft), [and] content-
related offences. 
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The only category which does not continue directly from 1996 to 2013 is that of protection 
of reputation.  That being said, the specific subheading under the 1996 category includes 
libel and unlawful comparative advertising.  It can be inferred that the modern 
phenomenon of “trolling” – publishing negative, deliberately damaging or hurtful 
comments on social media – could conceivably fall into both the 1996 category as being 
damaging to reputations and the 2013 category of protecting human dignity and rights
38
. 
In the same way that there is a demonstrable linear progression from the economic policies 
of the Bangemann Report to the EUCSS, there is also such a linear progression from the 
Commission’s Communication on Illegal and Harmful Content to the EUCSS.  When 
combined with the path dependencies established in 1994, this demonstrates that the EU’s 
cyber Security Strategy was a product of policy decisions made in the 1990s.   
This continuity or linearity is further demonstrated by the enduring nature of the security 
challenges faced.  Security concerns regarding the exponential increase in the use of ICT 
by private citizens and commercial enterprises had up until this point been focussed on the 
protection of “natural persons” when their data was being processed via digital 
technologies (European Council, 1992, p. 29).  To ensure adequate protections, and to 
engender trust in the new digital infrastructure, in 1992 the Commission issued proposals 
for two Directives which addressed issues which would become more widely known as 
“data protection”.  One related to the protection of computer databases (European 
Commission, 1992a) and the other related to citizens’ personal and private information 
contained in those databases (European Commission, 1992b).   
The objective of these Directives was to address the disparity of legal protection across 
Union membership and to recognise that unauthorised access to such databases could have 
“the gravest economic and technical consequences” (European Commission, 1992a, p. 1).  
There was an acknowledgment that some form of coherence and harmonisation of efforts 
across the Member States in the field of digital information protection would improve 
citizen and corporate trust in new media as well as facilitate the development of the 
internal market as a whole (European Parliament & Council of The European Union, 1995, 
p. 31, 1996, p. 20).  This demonstrated that the focus for the EU at this point was not on 
the physical infrastructure underpinning cyberspace, but on digital information.   
                                            
38
 The protection of human dignity and minors in audio-visual and information services was itself the subject 
of a separate Commission Green Paper published in the same year, demonstrating the importance placed by 
the EU on this particular sub-field (European Commission, 1996f). 
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In a rare move in the field of cyber security policy, legislation was passed between 1995 
and 1997 to protect personal data, databases and personal privacy (European Parliament & 
Council of The European Union, 1995, 1996, 1997)
39
.  The move towards legislation 
began in 1991 when it was recognised that computer programmes necessary for networked 
communication were not sufficiently protected by current legislation in all Member States.  
Such legislation that did exist was not standardised (Council of the European Union, 1991, 
p. 1).  The same was true of computer databases where citizen and corporate information 
was being stored (European Parliament & Council of The European Union, 1996, p. 1).  
The primary purpose of this legislation, therefore, was to introduce that missing coherence 
by bringing all Member States up to a certain minimum level of legal protection for both 
databases and the software on which those databases ran.  Coherence and harmonisation 
would later become core elements of EU cyber security policy and action (Interview, 
Purser, ENISA, 2014). 
In addition equivalency of protection would be achieved across the Union Membership, 
particularly for personal and private citizen data (European Parliament & Council of The 
European Union, 1995, p. 32).  This was to be achieved by all Member States being 
required to “bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions” (Council 
of the European Union, 1991, p. 7) required in order to ensure compliance.  The appetite 
for legislation continued with the passing in 1997 of the Data Protection Directive.  That 
Directive sought to achieve: 
the harmonisation of the provisions of the Member States required to ensure an 
equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular 
the right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the 
telecommunications sector and to ensure the free movement of such data and of 
telecommunications equipment and services in the Community (European 
Parliament & Council of The European Union, 1997, p. 4). 
The ultimate goal of this legislation, however, was to facilitate the free movement of data 
within the Union while at the same time ensuring a high level of protection for individuals 
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 While it was, and still is, unusual for the EU to pass formal legislation on cyber issues, it is important to 
note that the legislation passed in this first Phase were Directives.  In the typology of EU legislative 
instruments – Regulations, Directives and Decisions (European Union, n.d.) – a Directive is “a legislative act 
that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve. However, it is up to the individual countries to devise 
their own laws on how to reach these goals.” (European Union, n.d.).  Directives therefore establish a 
framework or set of goals to be achieved, but Member States are left to their own devices when 
implementing or establishing measures designed to achieve those goals.  
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with regard to the processing of their personal data and ensuring the development of open 
telecommunications networks.    
It is apparent that the EU was at this point beginning to engage in the facilitative role 
identified by commentators in Chapter 2 (Christou, 2016).  It was flexing its muscles and 
enjoying the confidence boost of the successful initiation of the Single Market.  Passing 
legislation on a specific aspect of that Market was symptomatic of this increased 
confidence.  The backdrop to these specific measures to increase harmonisation and 
equivalency however, was twofold.  On the one hand was the requirement to carry out 
these measures for the smooth functioning of the new Single Market (European Parliament 
and Council of The European Union, 1996, p. 20, 1995, p. 31; European Commission, 
2000b, p. 17).  On the other, there was a growing realisation that the new technologies 
being advocated had the capacity to transmit potentially harmful content, make the 
dissemination of illegal material easier and for the technology itself to be misused by 
criminal elements.    While the benefits of the exponential growth of the Internet and its 
content far outweighed any potential drawbacks, the effects of illegal and harmful content 
could not be ignored (European Commission, 1997b, p. 1).  To address this, the EU 
developed an action plan for promoting the safe use of the Internet designed to establish a 
common approach to the threats posed by illegal and harmful online content, as well as to 
draw together the disparate instruments used in that approach.   
An obstacle to achieving this facilitative role became apparent at this point.  By the late 
1990s, the EU’s approach to cyber security consisted of a large collection of acquis 
communautaire of varying types.  There was an array of regulations, policies, Council 
Conclusions and other acquis instruments which addressed issues ranging from personal 
privacy (EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee, 1994; European Parliament and Council of 
The European Union, 1995) to unauthorised access to the communications of the European 
Commission.  There was, however, no unifying strategy covering security issues in 
cyberspace.   
Seeing the need to ensure citizen and commercial trust and confidence in an increasingly 
interconnected society and information-driven economy, the European Council, under the 
presidency of Sweden, resolved in 2001 to work with the Commission to develop a 
“comprehensive strategy on the security of electronic networks including practical 
implementing action” (European Council, 2001, p. 23).  ICT was becoming increasingly 
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important to economic growth, competitiveness and the development of a more inclusive 
society (European Commission, 2000b, p. 2; European Council, 2001).  In addition, digital 
technology was becoming increasingly important to the functioning of critical national 
infrastructures (European Commission, 2001a, p. 7).  Securing these would be achieved 
through international co-operation (European Commission, 1998, p. 4).  
The result of this convergence of recognition was the first formal attempt to produce a 
unified EU policy dealing with cyber security; a document entitled Network and 
Information Security: Proposal for a European Policy Approach published by the 
European Commission in 2001 (European Commission, 2001a). 
6.5. Creating a Recognisable “cyber security” policy: 
The 2001 Proposal for a Network and Information 
Security Strategy 
The 2001 Proposal was a crucial milestone in cyber security policy-making for four 
reasons.  First, it laid out a detailed typology of threats from cyberspace.  Second, it 
recommended specific technical measures to improve security.  Third, it provided a 
definition of NIS that would persist in EU policy in this sector until 2013, and finally, it 
formalised the placing of actor co-operation front and centre in the developing cyber 
security discourse. 
6.5.1. Defining a Threat Typology 
To cement its cyber security credentials and demonstrate that it was engaging with 
emerging digital threats, the EU’s Proposal laid out a specific threat typology comprising 
six areas of risk: 
1. Interception of communications; 
2. Unauthorised access into (sic) computers and computer networks; 
3. Disruption of the Internet and telephone networks; 
4. Execution of malicious software that modifies or destroys data; 
5. Malicious misrepresentation; 
6. Environmental and unintentional events (European Commission, 2001a, p. 
5) 
The purpose behind providing these definitions was to give a comprehensive breakdown of 
the types of risks faced by national and private operators as well as bring coherence to the 
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list of risks published in 1996 (European Commission, 1996a, p. 3).  What makes this 
typology important to the development of cyber security policy, and different to the list 
provided in 1996, is that the new typology for the first time acknowledged specific harmful 
actions taken against the digital infrastructure itself rather than just harmful content.  
Previous descriptions of risks and threats had focussed on the impact of harmful and illegal 
data, such as child pornography, or actions which utilised networked technology such as 
fraud and piracy.  Although malicious hacking was considered a threat in 1996 under the 
“information security” heading, by 2001 the digital infrastructure itself had become a 
referent object of security policy, to the extent that disruption of the Internet itself was 
considered a significant risk (European Commission, 2001a, p. 12).  This point in the 
timescape marks the commencement in EU policy making of recognising the Internet and 
ICT networks as critical infrastructures in their own right. 
6.5.2. Specifying Technical Measures for Network and 
Information Security 
To supplement the codified and streamlined threat typology, the NIS Proposal set out a 
series of specific measures designed to increase cyber security.  The Proposal actively 
promoted (inter alia) the use of encryption in communications, not just by private citizens, 
but also communications corporations (European Commission, 2001a, p. 10).  Also 
specified was that anti-virus software should be used to combat unauthorised access to 
digital systems (European Commission, 2001a, p. 12) and that domain name system (DNS) 
protocols should be extended to ensure that networks were not disrupted (European 
Commission, 2001a, p. 13). 
These recommendations are unusual in their specificity.  The EU had not until this point 
issued definitive practical guidance on combatting illegal or harmful content or 
unauthorised access to systems.  Instead it sought to raise awareness of these potential 
risks, so that interested parties could make their own choices regarding solutions.  The 
2001 Proposal was a hands-on approach to NIS which demonstrated an increase in 
confidence on the part of the EU.  It felt itself in a position to state what action should be 
taken by interested parties to combat NIS problems and hence actively engage in a security 
issue it considers important.  
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6.5.3. Defining Network and Information Security 
To demonstrate Union confidence in cyber security, the 2001 Proposal issued a definition 
of network and information security (NIS) for the first time in Union policy.  This 
definition would be the cornerstone of EU policy in this field for the subsequent twelve 
years.  Predicated upon ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, authentication and 
availability of data (European Commission, 2001a, p. 9), NIS was defined as: 
the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of 
confidence, accidental events or malicious actions that compromise the availability, 
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted data and the 
related services offered by or accessible via these networks and systems (European 
Commission, 2001a, p. 9). 
Providing this definition had the effect of bringing a level of clarity, consistency and 
commonality of understanding to EU policy in this field and set the tone for future 
attempts to revise or revivify interest in this area.  Cornish (2009, p. 9) and Klimburg & 
Tiirmaa-Klaar (2011, p. 11) have argued that European cyber security policy at the time 
suffered from a lack of cohesion, a high level of fragmentation and duplication amongst 
competing legislation, strategy initiatives and agencies.  The definition of NIS provided by 
the 2001 Proposal was an attempt to address that fragmentation and lack of cohesion by 
providing formal working definitions of core concepts. 
6.5.4. Promoting Actor Co-operation 
The most prominent measure for ensuring security and minimising risks in the 2001 
Proposal – and a core component of the EU’s cyber security discourse – was actor co-
operation.  In 2001 this co-operation was manifested in sharing best practice (European 
Commission, 2001a, p. 21).  One of the most important elements in developing resilient 
systems to protect critical infrastructures was for the actors involved in service provision 
and maintenance – the private network operators and national authorities – to exchange 
information on threats as they occurred.  It was noted that experienced engineers were 
surprised by the novelty of some incidents.  This highlighted the need for a reliable 
warning system and framework for information-sharing across the EU (European 
Commission, 2001a, p. 21).  It was further noted that Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs) had been established in some Member States by 2001.  Belgium was 
specifically mentioned (European Commission, 2001a, p. 21).  However, it was also noted 
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that co-operation between these CERTS was problematic due to differing operational 
parameters and levels of expertise. 
The Commission therefore proposed to develop measures to strengthen co-operation and 
facilitate information exchange.  It also intended to examine, in co-operation with Member 
States, “how to best organise at European level data collection, analysis and planning of 
forward-looking responses to existing and emerging security threats” (European 
Commission, 2001a, p. 22).  This was of particular importance for tackling online crime.  
In a foreshadowing of the establishment of a high-tech crime centre at Europol the 
following year, the 2001 Proposal envisaged  the establishment of an EU forum on cyber-
crime to “enhance mutual understanding and co-operation between all interested parties” 
(European Commission, 2001a, p. 19).  The sharing of information and best practice would 
be vital tools in the fight against cyber-crime, and the EU with its inherent internationality, 
was ideally placed to facilitate this. 
The NIS Proposal was an important step in EU cyber security policy-making because of 
these policy choices.  It was the first recognisable “cyber security” policy.  While previous 
acquis documents had addressed the core aspects of cyber security and initiated important 
policy paths, the NIS Proposal was the first time these had been brought together.  The sum 
total of all of these actions was that the 2001 NIS Proposal drew together the elements 
which established the path dependencies of EU cyber security policy-making in subsequent 
years.  The ultimate aim of EU policy in the period between 1985 and 2001 was the 
protection of economic viability and capabilities.  This was to be achieved through 
ensuring that the systems and networks which underpinned this economic viability were 
able to continue functioning and providing the services for which they were designed 
(European Commission, 2001a, p. 3).  To achieve this, the NIS Proposal defined exactly 
what NIS was, clarified the threats involved and provided a clear policy framework in 
order to address those threats.  In 2001 this framework was based on harmonising private 
sector protocols, the sharing of information on security breaches, ensuring the continuity of 
critical services and an explicit commitment to treat malicious incidents as criminal acts. 
6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that important cyber security policy paths were established 
between 1985 and 2001.  In 1985 the Single Market was established with a focus on ICT as 
an industry for investment and economic growth.  In 1987 the Single European Act entered 
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into force, followed by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.  These two Treaties established the 
EU’s competences in economic affairs and restricted its capacity in external security and 
defence policy.  Together, these three milestones created a socio-economic environment in 
which future cyber security policy would develop.  It was in this environment that the EU 
first began to respond to cyber threats. 
These threats were described in socio-economic terms: copyright breaches, payment card 
fraud, illegal drug production, libel and even the protection of minors.  Due to a 
combination of competences restricted by successive Treaties and the division of policy 
responsibility initiated by the Maastricht Pillar system, the EU addressed cyber security 
concerns through an economic lens, establishing an interpretation of the problems.  This 
influenced the manner in which these issues were approached and conceptualised.  Instead 
of tackling issues such as distributing harmful content online, credit card fraud or libel as 
solely criminal justice problems requiring criminal justice solutions, the EU approached 
them by seeking to minimise their impact on the economic potential of cyberspace.  As 
stated explicitly by the Commission in COM (1996) 487 on Illegal and Harmful Content 
on the Internet “the presence of illegal and harmful content on the Internet has direct 
repercussions on the workings of the Internal Market” (European Commission, 1996a, p. 
4).  These threats were to be managed in such a way as to cause minimal damage to the 
continued operation of the Internal Market.  This management and limitation of impact 
created a policy path which would influence the nature of the EUCSS in 2013.  That policy 
does not establish methods or techniques for seeking out malicious actors and criminal 
activity.  Rather it seeks to ensure the continued functionality of cyberspace and the 
Internet (European Commission, 2013a, p. 5).  The important point to make at this juncture 
is that Union competences locked a socio-economic discourse in place despite themselves 
being formalised after the initiation of EU interest in ICT and cyber issues.  This 
demonstrates that institutional arrangements such as the EU’s system of competences can 
have significant effects on pre-existing policy paths. 
The chapter provided tabular analyses comparing important acquis milestones with the 
EUCSS.  This provided evidence of the linear connection between the EUCSS and its 
predecessors without lapsing into determinism or historical causality.  There is a linear 
progression between the earliest cyber security acquis and the EUCSS of 2013, showing 
that these documents are part of an underlying discourse. 
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The chapter also showed that the socio-economic interpretation was cemented in 2001 with 
the publication of the NIS Proposal.  This was the first publication which includes 
recognisable cyber security elements.  Despite containing specific threat typologies and a 
codified definition of cyber security, the Proposal established the EU’s approach as one 
which sought to ensure the continued exploitation of this developing commercial domain. 
NIS was seen as a tool for ensuring economic growth and social advantage, as opposed to a 
function of national security or defence. 
The identification of the initiation of path dependencies in the timescape is important for a 
number of reasons.  First, these paths were instrumental in setting the tone for the 
incremental development of a socio-economic cyber security discourse.  Second, while a 
purpose of this thesis is to identify those institutions which have had an influence on the 
EU’s cyber security discourse and policy-making, it is just as important to identify why 
such a discourse developed.  The convergence of the establishment of the Single Market in 
1985 and the signing of the Single European Act, with its explicit security restrictions, 
represents the point at which that socio-economic cyber security position began.  This is an 
important point in an HI analysis: the establishment of path dependencies.  Once these 
paths are in place – i.e. once particular policy choices have been made – there then follows 
a period of consolidation and policy entrenchment.  This consolidation will be the focus of 
the following chapter. 
At this point in the analysis it would be too early to declare that the path to the EUCSS of 
2013 was laid out in any deterministic manner.  The seeds were nevertheless planted in the 
mid-1980s.  The clarification in Treaties of the EU’s security competences as well as the 
initiation of the Single Market established path dependencies which, as will be shown in 
the following chapters, would prove highly resilient (Pierson, 2000, p. 263).  From an HI 
perspective the principles and procedural norms established between 1985 and 2001 
created strong path dependencies, which would be consolidated in later years.  This 
process of consolidation occurred between 2002 and 2006. 
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Chapter 7 | Policy Consolidation 2002-2006 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 6 showed how cyber security policy paths were established between 1985 and 
2001.  Following this establishment EU cyber security policy entered a period of 
consolidation or institutional stasis between 2002 and 2006.  The discourse begun in 1985 
became embedded in subsequent policy choices.  Evidence of this inertia and bedding-in 
can be found in the initiation of specialised agencies whose mandates focused on two core 
facets of EU policy: providing channels for information-sharing and the facilitation of co-
operation between the EU’s Member States and the private sector.   
The predominance of economic and criminal justice matters in cyber security policy was 
established in the NIS proposal of 2001.  To operationalise this policy two agencies were 
established.  A “high-tech crime” centre (HTCC) was founded at Europol with the 
dedicated aim of tackling online criminal activity and the online exploitation of children.  
Its goal was to act as a hub for criminal intelligence gathered from across the Union.  In a 
similar vein, in 2004 the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) 
was established at the Greek city of Heraklion on the island of Crete.  ENISA’s goal was 
and is to act as an advice broker, ensuring information and best practice is disseminated to 
all who would benefit from it.  ENISA and the HTCC were used to operationalise what 
was becoming the most important aspect of Union policy in this field – facilitating co-
operation.   
Despite this ideational inertia, the period 2002-2006 represents a paradox in EU cyber 
security policy development.  While the underlying policy discourse continued unchanged, 
the period saw a shift in dynamic on the part of the EU’s approach to cyber security as a 
whole.  The NIS Proposal of 2001 contained a highly prescriptive approach to cyber 
security.  Specific solutions were proposed, including installing secure servers and up-to-
date anti-virus software.  This reflected a very proactive approach to the field.  By 2006 
this had been tempered, and shifted to a more arms-length pattern of solution-building.  
Reference to specific technological measures disappeared from the acquis in favour of 
softer approaches such as recommendations for co-operation and tools for information-
sharing. 
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The evidence for this shift in dynamic is to be found in two places: the content of acquis 
produced between 2002 and 2006; and the methods employed by the two operational 
agencies initiated in this phase.  An examination of the relevant acquis demonstrates that 
the language used changed to a softer tone.  Instead of being instructed to, for example, 
install anti-virus software or secure DNS servers, entities were invited and encouraged to 
co-operate and take part in solution-building. 
This new approach is epitomised in the remit and actions of the HTCC and ENISA.  The 
HTCC did not carry out arrests for computer-related crime.  It analysed criminal 
intelligence on behalf of Member states.  Similarly, ENISA did not provide security per se.  
It is not an agency which stipulates solutions or implements particular tools for cyber 
security.  ENISA’s purpose was and continues to be to act as a hub for information and 
best practice exchange. The new dynamic and facilitative role was formalised in 2006, 
with the publication of the first recognisable strategy addressing cyber security issues, the 
Strategy for a Secure Information Society.  This shift in dynamic is noteworthy because it 
occurred against the backdrop of a static policy discourse.  As will be shown in this 
chapter, the five core ideational elements of the EU’s cyber security discourse continued to 
influence policy development in this period.   
The chapter is divided into four sections.  The second section will examine the initiation of 
the HTCC and ENISA.  It will explore the role of these two agencies in continuing core 
ideational elements of EU cyber security policy.  The section will also examine the aims, 
mandates and activities of these agencies to illustrate how the EU shifted from a 
prescriptive to a softer approach in this period.   
The third section of the chapter will examine the impact of the publication in 2006 of the 
Strategy for a Secure Information Society (SSIS).  A content analysis of the SSIS will 
demonstrate both the continuity of the underlying policy discourse from the previous phase 
as well as the EU’s new dynamic in cyber security.  Despite continuing a focus on the five 
core ideational elements which underpin the EU’s discourse in this sector, the SSIS 
removed much of the highly prescriptive, definition-introducing content of the 2001 
Proposal.  The SSIS instead provided a softer, facilitative approach.  A fourth section 
concludes the chapter.  
Throughout the chapter the continuity of the five ideational elements will be evidenced in 
order to demonstrate their continuing influence on policy-making in this area.  In addition 
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to being major milestones for the development of cyber security policy, the nature of 
ENISA and the content of the SSIS reflect the five core ideational elements inherent to 
cyber security policy.  Co-operation is of particular significance, given ENISA’s raison 
d’etre as a broker for information-sharing and the subtitle of the SSIS being “Dialogue, 
Partnership and Empowerment”. 
7.2. Operationalising Cyber Security Policy 
7.2.1. Europol and the Fight against Cybercrime 
Europol became fully operational in 1999 (Europol, 2013b) as a centre for co-ordinating 
co-operation between Member States’ police forces.  Its purpose was to combat terrorism, 
drug trafficking and international crime (Europol, 2013c).  Prior to the establishment of 
Europol, international measures to tackle such criminal activity were carried out on 
bilateral bases.  The disadvantage with this approach was that, in the case of serious and 
organised crime, criminal groups “are multinational and are comprised of multiple 
nationalities” (Interview, Senior Official, Europol, 2014).  Establishing a bilateral police 
mission, with the involvement of only two Member States, created a very limited 
perspective on criminal networks and their activities.  Europol was able to address this 
issue by removing the need for a multitude of separate arrangements (Interview, Senior 
Official, Europol, 2014).  Member States could pass criminal intelligence information to 
Europol’s specialist research units where that intelligence would be analysed alongside 
contributions from other Member States. 
As this agency matured, and in recognition of the changing nature of criminal activity, in 
2002 a “high-tech crime centre” (HTCC) was established (Europol, 2013d).  The remit of 
the HTCC was focussed on three specific areas of criminal activity described as “crime 
areas in which the Internet plays a key role” (Europol, 2013d).  These areas were 
computer-related crime, payment card fraud and the protection of children from online 
exploitation.   
The establishment of a specific unit dedicated to criminal activity where the Internet plays 
a role demonstrates not only the importance placed on cyber-crime by the EU at the time, 
but also the socio-economic focus of EU cyber security policy as a whole.  Economic 
interaction, particularly card payments, was being protected so that the trust and uptake of 
digital media could be improved.  Similarly, protecting children online demonstrated the 
EU’s resolve to address the social aspect of the increased use of digital and online 
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technology.  Payment card fraud emphasised the EU’s commitment to treating NIS issues 
as criminal acts affecting the Union’s economic development.  The expansion of Europol’s 
remit into the investigation of online child sexual exploitation demonstrates a widening of 
the issues that the EU considers a part of cyber security.  Acts that cause harm not just to 
physical objects but to people were being included in a wider approach (European 
Commission, 2005, p. 3).  The aim was to build trust in the system, by “making the 
Internet safer from fraudsters, harmful content and technology failures to increase trust 
amongst investors and consumers” (European Commission, 2005, p. 5).   
The methods employed by Europol in this new high-tech crime centre were the same as 
those for its other units.  The HTCC, and Europol as a whole, was not an agency dedicated 
to policing Europe.  This task was left to the Member States.  Europol assisted Member 
States in their responsibilities by facilitating information-sharing.  It provided assistance 
and expertise in the form of data and evidence collection and analysis.  The results of these 
analyses are returned to the Member States, who retain executive judicial authority.  In 
short, it was Member State police forces, not Europol, who carry out arrests and “kick 
down doors” (Interview, Senior Official, Europol, 2014).  This pattern of providing 
analysis and expertise continued into the HTCC.   
This is a core element of the EU’s facilitation of co-operation.  It demonstrates the nature 
of the role that the Union was establishing for itself in cyber security between 2002 and 
2006.  The EU – via Europol – sought to enable national police forces to co-ordinate their 
information and efforts more efficiently by providing a central nexus for criminal 
intelligence and analytical expertise.  This is not an executive role for the EU, but a 
facilitative one, a softer approach to security as opposed to a harder hands-on approach 
inferred in the 2001 NIS Proposal. 
During the 2002-2006 phase, therefore, the EU was seeking avenues to promote joint-
working and information-sharing – i.e. co-operation – amongst its Member States as well 
as those entities with a vested interest in a safe and secure European digital space.  Co-
operation between entities was deemed vital not just to ensure security of systems and 
networks, but also to ensure trust in those systems (European Parliament & Council of The 
European Union, 2004, p. 3).  The HTCC was an important part of this mechanism. 
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To help further these goals, in 2004 the EU established an agency to handle network and 
information security itself, as opposed to concentrating on cyber-crime.  This body was 
named the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA).   
7.2.2. The European Network and Information Security Agency 
ENISA was established in 2004 with the objective of enhancing the capabilities of the EU, 
its Member States and the business community to research, respond to and prevent NIS 
problems (ENISA, 2005).  Its mission is to achieve a high level of network and 
information security (NIS) within the EU by building on national and Community efforts 
in the field (European Parliament & Council of The European Union, 2004, p. 2)
40
.  It was 
also intended to operate as a point of reference for advice and information.  This function 
was provided not just to EU institutions and Member States, but also to other relevant 
stakeholders including those in the private sector.  This was due to the recognition that the 
electronic networks and services were, by 2004, largely privately owned (European 
Parliament & Council of The European Union, 2004, p. 2). 
ENISA’s mandate and work was very specific.  The agency was (and still is) primarily 
concerned with protecting the EU’s open market.  As described by Purser (Interview, 
Purser, ENISA, 2014) “[ENISA] is concerned with businesses [and] the public sector but 
not with the military and not with cyber-crime directly”.  This demonstrates a clear 
distinction between addressing the economic impact of cyber security, and tackling 
criminal justice or defence issues.  ENISA’s mandate specifically excludes defence 
(Interview, Helmbrecht, ENISA, 2014).  This is further evidence of the priority placed on 
economic matters by the Union as a whole: a specialist agency was set up to support cyber 
security solutions intended to mitigate threats to the economic and functional viability of 
the Single Market. 
That being the case, ENISA, as an agency, does not provide security per se (Interview, 
Purser, ENISA, 2014; Interview, Rönnlund, DG Connect, 2015).  Instead it describes itself 
as an “Advice Broker” (ENISA, 2005).  It is a “mechanism for enabling stakeholder groups 
throughout Europe to work with each other” (Interview, Purser, ENISA, 2014).  As such it 
operates as an intermediary or conduit for information to and from its various stakeholder 
groups and the European Commission.  It ensures that experiences and best practice are 
                                            
40
 This Directive was repealed in 2013 and replaced with (European Parliament and Council of The European 
Union, 2013a)  Although the founding Regulation was repealed, its replacement did not substantially alter the 
principles under which ENISA was to function. 
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effectively shared and communicated.  To facilitate this, ENISA has gathered together a 
library of national and international cyber security strategies and published them online 
(ENISA, 2013; Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 2014).  An 
implementation guide was published alongside this, proposing specific actions intended to 
aid the development of a comprehensive cyber security strategy (Falessi et al., 2012).  
ENISA also helps its stakeholders address, respond to and prevent NIS problems through 
publishing advice and assistance (Robinson, 2012, p. 165).  It also produces guidelines 
covering a range of issues including best practice regarding minimum security standards 
(ENISA, 2011a).   
In terms of facilitating co-operation, there are three types of activities undertaken by 
ENISA.  One is joint-working between the agency itself and other non-EU bodies.  This 
includes the NATO Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), based 
in Tallinn.  Utilising the expertise of both agencies, a major project looking at tackling 
botnets was undertaken where the CCDCOE provided legal expertise surrounding tackling 
such illegal networks, and ENISA provided the technical support (Interview, Traat and 
Ristikivi, 2014). 
A greater emphasis, however, is placed on the role of ENISA as a co-ordinating agency.  
An important example of such a role is the staging and management of biannual cyber 
security exercises (Interview, Purser, ENISA, 2014; ENISA, 2005).  These exercises 
simulate cyber incidents targeting critical information infrastructures underpinning EU 
functionality such as the banking sector or communications networks.  The object is to 
examine participants’ responses, collective and individual practices and co-operative 
capabilities.  Named “Cyber Europe”, the first exercise took place in November 2010, and 
brought together representatives from 22 Member States and eight observer nations 
(ENISA, 2011b, p. 3).  Two years later Cyber Europe 2012 built on the findings of its 
predecessor and brought private stakeholders into the simulations.  These included 
financial institutions and internet service providers (ISPs) (ENISA, 2012, p. 5).  ENISA 
also facilitated a transatlantic version of the exercises in 2011 known as Cyber Atlantic.  
This exercise was carried out in co-operation with the EU-US Working Group on 
Cybersecurity and Cyber Crime (ENISA, 2011c).   
The main findings of all of these exercises were that, while some work was needed to build 
capabilities, more training and information-sharing between actors was needed to raise 
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both awareness of existing measures across all stakeholders, and also the level of collective 
security in the face of large-scale incidents.  These exercises demonstrate ENISA’s, and by 
extension the EU’s, commitment to facilitating co-operation and co-ordinating pan-
European responses to cyber security incidents. 
A third aspect of ENISA’s co-ordinating and co-operative function, and a core aspect of 
ENISA’s work overall is harmonisation (Interview, Purser, ENISA, 2014).  Harmonisation 
has been an important policy aim since 2002, when it was recognised in a Directive of that 
year that a regulated approach focusing on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities will help to develop  
relationships between suppliers of networks and services that will result in 
sustainable competition, interoperability of electronic communications services and 
consumer benefits (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2002b, p. 11).   
The issue was that national and private sector initiatives to mitigate cyber security risks 
were often undertaken individually.  Consequently they had differing priorities and 
solution bases.  In order to effectively establish a pan-European, or at least an EU-based, 
response to cyber security issues, the various initiatives in place needed to be compatible 
with one another and meet certain collective minimum standards.  An example of such 
work was that undertaken within the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
community.  ENISA facilitated the development of CERT documentation, which was then 
disseminated to all the Member States, providing a common platform (Interview, Purser, 
ENISA, 2014).   
ENISA serves as an operational exemplar of the continued importance placed by the EU on 
co-operation, and a manifestation of the Union’s role as a facilitative actor.  As a method 
of approaching cyber security challenges arising from an increasing use of digital media in 
all walks of life, co-operation between interested entities was crucial for the EU at this 
time.  Furthermore, because cyber security was becoming an increasingly international 
concern, addressing these issues at the EU level adhered to the principle of subsidiarity.  
That principle, contained in Article 3b of the Treaty of Maastricht, stipulated that the 
Union will involve itself in an issue  
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects 
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of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community (European Union, 
1992, p. 13).   
In short, the Union will become involved if it can be more efficient or effective in 
achieving specific objectives (Follesdal, 2013, p. 1).  Because it was recognised in this 
2002-2006 phase that cyber security challenges were inherently international in nature, it 
made more sense for the EU to facilitate resolving those challenges than for individual 
Member States to engage in them separately.  
Although the establishment of the HTCC at Europol and ENISA were major milestones in 
the EU’s cyber security policy-making process, both of these events reflected a shift in the 
EU’s handling of that policy.  The NIS Proposal of 2001 was highly prescriptive in nature, 
going so far as to specify particular solutions to particular problems.  By 2004, however, 
this approach had shifted dramatically to a more arms’-length approach to cyber security.  
The EU would facilitate the sharing of information and help to put interested parties in 
contact with one another.  Neither the HTCC nor ENISA took any form of direct action to 
solve cyber security issues.  The HTCC functioned under the operational parameters of its 
parent agency, Europol.  Criminal intelligence was fed to its processing units from across 
the EU’s membership and beyond, where it was analysed and fed back.  It was, however, 
for the Member States to decide how to use that information and ultimately it was the 
Member States who carried out arrests (Interview, Senior Official, Europol, 2014).  
Similarly, ENISA did not and does not secure anything (Interview, Purser, ENISA, 2014).  
It ensures that all relevant entities within its purview – the formal institutions of the EU 
and the Member States – have access to the information and resources they need to be able 
to function in a safe digital environment.  This is a very different, softer dynamic to the 
prescriptive policy of the NIS Proposal.  This new dynamic was codified in the publication 
of the first approved cyber security strategy of the EU
41
: COM (2006) 251 – A Strategy for 
a Secure Information Society. 
7.3. A Shift in Approach but not Discourse: The 2006 
Strategy for a Secure Information Society 
This period of consolidating EU cyber security policy closed with the publication in 2006 
of the Strategy for a Secure Information Society – Dialogue, partnership and 
                                            
41
 The NIS Proposal of 2001 was just that, a proposal.  Although cited by the EU as a document in cyber 
security acquis, it, and its contents, were never formally accepted as policy. 
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empowerment (here referred to as the SSIS).  The SSIS is an important document in the 
incremental, linear development of EU cyber security policy for three reasons.  First, it was 
the first formally approved strategy document produced by the EU in this policy area.  
Previous acquis were either position papers on illegal and harmful content (European 
Commission, 1996a) or proposals for strategy documents that were never formally 
approved (European Commission, 2001a).  To have a formal policy approved and accepted 
by the EU’s constituent actors was a significant step in cyber security policy development.  
Second, the SSIS demonstrated continuity of policy aims, in particular the five core 
ideational elements of the EU’s discourse.  These are a focus on economic maximisation, 
engendering trust, protection of fundamental rights, tackling cyber-crime and achieving 
these through co-operation.  Third, the SSIS codified a shift in the EU’s approach to cyber 
security.  This shift was away from prescriptive instructions, such as those in the 2001 NIS 
proposal, to an arms’-length handling of cyber security issues.  
7.3.1. Ideational Continuity in the Strategy for a Secure 
Information Society 
The 2006 SSIS continued a number of important themes established in 1996 and 2001.  
This further supports the position that cyber security policy-making was an incremental 
and linear, but not deterministic process.  Economic security and the viability of the Single 
Market, as well as the protection of privacy, fundamental rights and information integrity, 
are goals which endure throughout the policy-making timescape.  The SSIS should 
therefore be considered the third step in the incremental policy-making process.   
The SSIS was intended to revivify efforts in NIS, (European Commission, 2006a, p. 3) and 
act as a successor to the 2001 Proposal.  It directly quoted its predecessor in a number of 
key areas, including the definition of network and information security (European 
Commission, 2006a, p. 3).  It continued to prioritise economic viability, stating that “the 
relevance of the ICT sector for the European economy and for European society as a whole 
is incontestable” (European Commission, 2006a, p. 5) The SSIS supports this claim by 
stating that, by 2006, ICT was responsible for nearly 40% of economic productivity 
(European Commission, 2006a, p. 5).  In addition, security breaches eroded trust in 
electronic communications and citizens’ willingness to invest in and use online 
technologies.  This would be detrimental to the EU’s economic development.  
Furthermore, the EU’s commitment to fighting cyber-crime continued as NIS threats had 
the potential to affect citizens in their everyday lives (Council of The European Union, 
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2008, p. 1).  This commitment would be achieved through the co-operation of interested 
parties.   
This continuity also extended to the other core ideational elements underpinning the EU’s 
cyber security discourse.  What began as the protection of human dignity in 1996 
(European Commission, 1996a, p. 3) would eventually be codified in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, a core feature of the 2001 NIS Proposal (European 
Commission, 2001a).  By 2006, it was recognised in the SSIS that, in addition to protecting 
such fundamental rights, ensuring the security of digital infrastructures was instrumental to 
achieving this (European Commission, 2006a, p. 5).  This goal was carried forward into the 
EUCSS of 2013 (European Commission, 2013a, p. 3,15).   
There is a similar linear process for ensuring economic security, particularly to counter 
financial fraud.  As early as 1996 the pirating of credit cards was a recognised downside of 
increasing ICT connectivity (European Commission, 1996a, p. 3).  As technology and the 
internet developed, by 2006 malicious software (malware) had been produced that could 
seek out digital records and access personal financial data (European Commission, 2001a, 
p. 10, 2006a, p. 4).  By 2013 a tenth of all Internet users had been the victim of some kind 
of online fraud (European Commission, 2013a, p. 3). 
This continuity of both policy concepts and content can be seen in Table 7-1 below.  The 
table serves to highlight the conceptual and content continuity between these core 
documents of the EU’s discourse and the final EUCSS of 2013. 
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Table 7-1: Continuity in Cyber Policies 1996-2013 
COM (1996) 487 
(European Commission, 1996a) 
COM (2001) 298 
(European Commission, 2001a) 
COM (2006) 251 
(European Commission, 2006a) 
EU Cyber Security Strategy 
(European Commission, 2013a) 
national security (instructions on bomb-
making, illegal drug production, terrorist 
activities);  
protection of minors (abusive forms of 
marketing, violence, pornography);  
…there are growing concerns about 
national security as information systems 
and communication networks have 
become a critical factor for other 
infrastructures (e.g. water and 
electricity supply) and other markets 
(e.g. the global finance market). 
Cyber defence is not addressed in this 
document.  This is due to a scaling back 
of direct proactive engagement on the 
part of the EU and a stricter adherence to 
the letter of the competences.  See Section 
7.3.2 of this chapter for a broader 
discussion of this phenomenon. 
Cybersecurity efforts in the EU also involve the 
cyber defence dimension. To increase the 
resilience of the communication and 
information systems supporting Member States' 
defence and national security interests, cyber 
defence capability development should 
concentrate on detection, response and recovery 
from sophisticated cyber threats 
protection of human dignity (incitement 
to racial hatred or racial discrimination);  
Although protection of human dignity is 
not specifically mentioned in COM 
(2001) 298, adherence to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the 
EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
mentioned.  Human dignity is a core 
element of both these documents 
A breach in NIS can generate an impact 
that transcends the economic dimension. 
Indeed, there is a general concern that 
security problems may lead to user 
discouragement and lower take-up of 
ICT, whereas availability, reliability and 
security are a prerequisite for 
guaranteeing fundamental rights on-line. 
Cybercrime comprises traditional offences (e.g. 
fraud, forgery, and identity theft), content-
related offences (e.g. on-line distribution of 
child pornography or incitement to racial 
hatred). 
 
The EU international engagement in cyber 
issues will be guided by the EU's core values of 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and the respect for fundamental 
rights. 
economic security (fraud, instructions on 
pirating credit cards);  
Unlawful interception can cause 
damage both through invasion of the 
privacy of individuals and through the 
exploitation of data intercepted, such as 
passwords or credit card details, for 
commercial gain or sabotage. This is 
perceived to be one of the biggest 
inhibitors to the take-up of e-commerce 
in Europe. 
[Malware] is becoming a vehicle for 
viruses and fraudulent and criminal 
activities, such as spyware [and] phishing 
- a form of Internet fraud aiming to steal 
valuable information such as credit cards, 
bank account numbers, user IDs and 
passwords. 
Across the EU, more than one in ten Internet 
users has already become victim of online 
fraud. 
information security (malicious hacking);  Some unauthorised intrusion is 
motivated by intellectual challenge 
rather than monetary gain. However, 
what began as a nuisance activity (often 
described as ‘hacking’) has highlighted 
Data are illegally mined, increasingly 
without the user’s knowledge, while the 
number of variants (and the rate of 
evolution) of malware is increasing 
rapidly. 
Cybercriminals are using ever more 
sophisticated methods for intruding into 
information systems, stealing critical data or 
holding companies to ransom. The increase of 
economic espionage and state-sponsored 
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the vulnerabilities of information 
networks and motivated those with 
criminal or malicious intent to exploit 
these weaknesses. 
activities in cyberspace poses a new category of 
threats for EU governments and companies. 
protection of privacy (unauthorised 
communication of personal data, 
electronic harassment);  
Protection of privacy is a key policy 
objective in the European Union. It was 
recognised as a basic right under Article 
8 of the European Convention on 
human rights, Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union 21 also provide the 
right to respect for family and private 
life, home and communications and 
personal data. 
Promote diversity, openness, 
interoperability, usability and competition 
as key drivers for security as well as 
stimulate the deployment of security-
enhancing products, processes and 
services to prevent and fight ID theft and 
other privacy-intrusive attacks. 
Protecting fundamental rights, freedom of 
expression, personal data and privacy: Cyber 
security can only be sound and effective if it is 
based on fundamental rights and freedoms as 
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union and EU core values. 
Reciprocally, individuals' rights cannot be 
secured without safe networks and systems.  
intellectual property (unauthorised 
distribution of copyrighted works, e.g. 
software or music) 
Unauthorised access into computer and 
computer networks is usually done with 
malicious intend to copy, modify or 
destroy data. 
 Cybercrime comprises traditional offences (e.g. 
fraud, forgery, and identity theft), [and] 
content-related offences. 
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The table demonstrates a conceptual link between the core elements of the original 
Commission Communication of 1996 on illegal and harmful content, its successor in the 
2001 NIS Proposal, the SSIS of 2006 and the EUCSS of 2013.  This demonstrates the 
linear connection between these documents and their function as non-deterministic 
stepping stones from the inception of policy in this sector in 1985 to the finished EUCSS of 
2013. 
7.3.2. A New Dynamic for Cyber Security 
While there was clear continuity of policy discourse between 1985 and the 2002 SSIS there 
was one significant change.  Gone were the detailed, specific typologies of threats and the 
apportionment of specific responsibilities for addressing those threats.  By removing these 
specifications for action the EU was codifying its new, looser, arms’-length approach to 
cyber security which had been developing since 2002.  This new dynamic was exemplified 
by the Union setting itself up as a facilitative actor rather than an entity which actively 
secures things.  In short, what differentiated the 2006 Strategy for a Secure Information 
Society from its 1996 and 2001 predecessors was the manner in which the EU sought to 
achieve its goals.  Instead of specifying solutions and expecting interested parties to 
implement them, the EU advocated a softer, less prescriptive method.   
The SSIS included a three-pronged approach to NIS issues (European Commission, 2006a, 
p. 3).  The second and third prongs have their origins in the proposal of 2001; a regulatory 
framework sought to ensure a competitive market within the EU and combatting cyber-
crime was prioritised.  At first glance this approach may seem similar to previous policies.  
However, on closer examination it is the first prong, the “specific NIS measures”, which 
provides the greatest contrast between EU policy in 2001 and 2006.  The 2006 approach 
was characterised by a shift towards greater inclusiveness on the part of all entities with a 
vested interest in cyber security.  This can be seen in the language used to describe these 
measures.  In 2006 stakeholders such as Member States, the private sector and the research 
community would be “invited” to enter into strategic partnerships (European Commission, 
2006a, p. 8).   The private sector was also “invited to disseminate good security practice 
within its community to establish baseline levels for security and business continuity 
(resilience)” (European Commission, 2006a, p. 9).  These invitations are a stark contrast 
with the more definitive language of the 2001 NIS Proposal.  There it was stated that 
operators should secure networks “as they are required to do under Directive 97/66 EC [on 
Data Protection in Telecommunications]” (European Commission, 2001a, p. 10) and that a 
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balance between network protection and the advantages of open access “must be achieved” 
(European Commission, 2001a, p. 12).  By 2006 there had been a softening of tone and 
language to develop an environment of encouragement and partnership.  
To achieve these goals the Commission called upon ENISA, in its role as an advice broker, 
to provide the focal point in various efforts.  These included promoting co-ordination and 
serving as a centre for co-operation, as well as facilitating information-sharing and the 
exchange of best practice (European Commission, 2006a, p. 6).  One method employed by 
ENISA to encourage such co-operation was the organisation of the Cyber Europe and 
Cyber Atlantic international exercises (European Commission, 2009a, p. 9) examined in 
the Section 7.2.2 of this chapter.  
What the actions of ENISA and the EU’s policy framework at this time demonstrate is that 
the wider goal in this period of cyber security policy development had altered.  The goal by 
2006 was not to establish, identify and publicise specific EU definitions of terms and 
challenges, nor was it to prescribe specific courses of action.  Instead, the aim was to foster 
an international culture of network and information security (Robinson, 2012, p. 165; 
European Commission, 2006a, p. 4).  In this culture all stakeholders would be involved, 
and NIS seen as a virtue and commercial opportunity.  It is not by accident that the 2006 
Strategy was subtitled “Dialogue, Partnership and Empowerment”.  The tone of the SSIS is 
one of ensuring not only that all actors fulfil their responsibilities, but also that those actors 
are given support and resources – that they are empowered (European Commission, 2006a, 
p. 6,10).  Through such measures as establishing ENISA and the HTCC at Europol, the EU 
had positioned itself as a facilitator of that dialogue, partnership, and empowerment, rather 
than a prescriptive taskmaster.  Core ideas were consolidated, but the approach had shifted.   
What makes the SSIS stand out as a milestone in the linear policy-making process, 
therefore, is not simply that it was the first formally accepted policy document in this field.  
It stands out because it was different from its predecessors yet maintained the continuity of 
a policy discourse based on five core ideas.  As a policy document it established a new 
paradigm of EU involvement in cyber security, one where direct action is minimised and 
the EU’s function as a facilitative actor is emphasised.  These differences are more than 
simple updates of policy to take into account new and emerging challenges or 
developments in the field since 2001.  They are differences in approach resulting in a shift 
away from a heavy-handed, proactive approach towards a more reserved one recognising 
the roles of the various stakeholders involved (European Commission, 2006a, p. 6).  What 
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is significant is that this shift in dynamic occurred without any change in the policy’s 
ideational foundations.  Cyber security policy was still focussed on ensuring economic 
viability, promoting trust, protecting fundamental rights, tackling cyber-crime and 
promoting co-operation. 
The EU’s co-operative zeal was not restricted to facilitating joint-working between 
Member States and external actors, however.  In 2002, there was a recognition that better 
co-operation was needed between the three Pillars of the EU’s policy-making architecture.  
There was a particular focus on promoting joint-working between the Pillars of Justice and 
Home Affairs – which focused on criminal justice matters – and the Communities Pillar 
which managed the Single Market (Council of The European Union, 2002c, p. 2).  In a 
meeting of the Council of the European Union’s Committee on Telecommunications in 
January 2002, it was acknowledged that better communication and co-ordination between 
the two Pillars was required to reduce the likelihood of duplication of efforts in cyber 
security.  This was a particular issue given the prevalence of threats which were both 
criminal acts and which affected the resilience of the Single Market (Council of The 
European Union, 2002c, p. 3).  The attempt to mitigate such a risk of duplication was one 
of the defining characteristics of the years between 2007 and 2013, the final phase of 
policy development.  Even in 2002 it was recognised that more needed to be done to ensure 
adequate pooling of resources where issues arose that crossed Pillar boundaries, such as 
cyber security.  This particular set of Council Conclusions is also noteworthy for including 
the first mention of the term “cyber security” in Union acquis (Council of The European 
Union, 2002c, p. 2).  From this point the term begins to be used more frequently to refer to 
the totality of security risks to and from cyberspace, although it does not enter common 
policy jargon for some years. 
7.4. Conclusion 
Chapter 6 showed that the years up to 2001 were defined by the initiation of important path 
dependencies in the EU’s cyber security policy-making process.  Chapter 7 has shown that 
years between 2002 and 2006 were characterised by institutional stasis and a bedding-in of 
those policy paths.  These paths were a focus on economic maximisation, the protection of 
rights, tackling cyber-crime to build trust in the digital sphere and achieving these through 
facilitating co-operation.  The chapter also showed that this final element developed 
beyond a simple policy goal to become a defining feature of the EU’s role in tackling cyber 
security issues. 
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The period between 2002 and 2006 was marked not only by policy consolidation but also 
by important developments.  From an institutionalist perspective, the years following the 
publication of the Commission’s NIS Proposal, with its direct prescriptions for specific 
action such as firewalls and anti-virus software, would logically be a period of 
entrenchment of these policy ideas.  Paradoxically however, the 2002-2006 phase was 
characterised by a stepping back of direct Union action in this field and the adoption of a 
more distant, arms’-length approach to the same security challenges.  The acquis published 
between 2002 and 2006 pointed less to a desire to proactively engage in solution-building, 
than to position the Union as a facilitative actor.  Its role in this period became that of an 
advice broker, ensuring information and best practice regarding national and private sector 
solutions were shared, rather than setting out, prescribing and promoting those solutions.  
Although cyber security would remain an important aspect of the functioning of the 
internal market, the manner in which the EU achieves this, and the role it plays in doing so, 
has evolved from its beginnings in 1985.  That role was to promote co-operation between 
interested parties and during this period the EU positioned itself as a facilitator of that co-
operation.  
The chapter also demonstrated that to do this two dedicated agencies were established: the 
High-Tech Crime Centre at Europol and the European Network and Information Security 
Agency.  The role for both of these agencies was to support Member States and 
international liaisons by providing fora for sharing information relating to cyber security 
issues.  Through publishing advice on best practice and carrying out major international 
simulations of cyber incidents, ENISA has established itself as an important hub in 
European cyber security generally. 
This trend of brokering advice and co-ordinating co-operation was exemplified in the 
Strategy for a Secure Information Society, published in 2006.  This Strategy was an 
important step in the incremental process of cyber security policy-making for two reasons.  
Not only did it continue policy paths established between 1985 and 2001, bedding these 
into the policy discourse, but it also codified a new arms’-length approach to cyber 
security.  Gone were detailed definitions of cyber security threats and solutions to those 
threats.  The SSIS advocated empowering and supporting entities to fulfil their own 
responsibilities and codified the role of the EU in facilitating that co-operation. 
The SSIS therefore represented a change in the manner of the EU’s approach to cyber 
security and formalised its facilitative role.  It also represented ideational continuity.  This 
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continuity demonstrated the inertia of paths laid down in the earliest period of policy 
development, 1985-2001, highlighting the linearity of the EU’s cyber security policy.  That 
linearity and inertia would be subject to severe stresses in subsequent years.  The influence 
of those stresses is the subject of the following chapters.  
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Chapter 8 | Punctuated Equilibrium Part 1:  The 
Influence of Exogenous Institutional 
Stresses on EU Cyber Security Policy 
8.1. Introduction 
The period between 2007 and the publication of the EUCSS in 2013 is the most vibrant and 
important in the EU’s cyber security policy-making timescape.  Of particular significance 
is the occurrence between 2007 and 2009 of a series of major events and crises, acting as 
punctuation points in the policy-making process.  These events warrant separate analyses 
due to their complexity and the scale of their influence on this particular policy area.  The 
events galvanised Union interest in cyber security in a manner not seen before.  As a 
consequence, between 2007 and 2013, over 50% of Union acquis relating to cyber security 
(73 of the total of 143 documents) were released during this period alone.  Most 
importantly, they ultimately led to the development of the European Union’s Cyber 
Security Strategy (EUCSS) which was published in 2013 (European Commission, 2013a).  
Evidence gathered from interviews and analyses of Union acquis will be presented here to 
demonstrate that these major catalytic events had a profound influence on EU cyber 
security policy. 
This chapter will examine the influence of two of these events, the triggers for which were 
exogenous to the EU: the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007; and the financial crisis of 2008.  
The direct consequence of these events was an increase in political interest in critical 
information infrastructure protection (CIIP) and resilience in order to maintain the viability 
of the EU’s digital marketplace.  Despite originating outside the Union’s geopolitical 
boundaries these events necessitated responses from the EU.   
The chapter is divided into four sections.  The second section examines the distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks experienced by Estonia in the summer of 2007.  A 
particular problem for the EU with regard to these attacks was its lack of competence in 
security matters. The chapter argues that this complication required the EU to interpret 
important international events such as the Estonian attack as socio-economic issues.  By 
interpreting that event as a threat to the internal market, the EU was able to engage with the 
issue and undertake measures to bolster the security of digital infrastructures.  This is the 
same interpretive process undertaken in previous years.  The DDoS attack experienced by 
Estonia was described as an existential but economic threat (Interview, Smith and Jones, 
eu-LISA, 2014; European Commission, 2009a, p. P.2).  Economic threats are issues where 
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the EU can act.  Direct threats to national security, by contrast, are sectors where Union 
action is severely restricted. 
The third section of the chapter will examine the effect on cyber security policy of the 
commencement of the global financial crisis in 2008.  This event did not need the same 
creative interpretation as the Estonian DDoS attacks.  Because the EU is an economic 
entity, any major events which affected commercial growth and productivity, regardless of 
where they originated, came under its remit and competence.  The point will be made in 
this chapter that the financial crisis of 2008 generated a repeat of processes and policy 
choices initiated in the 1980s.  In both periods Europe was facing financial difficulty and 
turned to digital industries as sectors where growth and employment could be stimulated.  
In both cases political interest in cyber security increased, leading to a greater dynamism 
and willingness to develop policy.   
The chapter will argue, however, that what did not occur was a change in the EU’s 
underlying cyber security discourse.  Instead, that discourse became further entrenched as a 
result of the EU’s need to interpret the Estonian attacks as economic threats.  The result of 
this entrenchment was that the EU’s socio-economic cyber security discourse, as well as 
the five ideational elements which underpinned it, continued on previously established 
paths.  This occurred despite a cyber-attack on a state taking place and the commencement 
of a financial downturn which affected markets around the world.  This entrenchment 
infers an institutional “stickiness” (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 7) inherent to those 
paths, which meant that they were strong enough to withstand major events and crises 
which would otherwise cause policy change. 
8.2. Crisis 1 – The 2007 Cyber Attacks on Estonia 
At the beginning of April 2007, local authorities in Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, chose to 
move a Soviet memorial to the Second World War from the centre of the city to a new 
location on its outskirts (Gaycken, 2011, p. 170).  This act was considered by the Russian 
minority in the country to be an insult.  Public protests erupted in the city which on 26
th
 
and 27
th
 2007 April turned violent.  There were around 1300 arrests, 100 injuries and one 
fatality (Rid, 2013, p. 6).   
Alongside these public protests, on 26
th
 April a series of cyber incidents began to take 
place, targeting the Estonian Parliament and other institutions such as banks, ministries and 
media outlets.  The incidents escalated over a period of four weeks.  On 4
th
 May local 
domain name system (DNS) servers were targeted by low level denial of service attacks 
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(Schmidt, 2013, p. 181; Rid, 2013, p. 6).  Between 9
th
 and 11
th
 May these had escalated to 
distributed denial of service (DDoS)
42
 attacks targeting government websites and Estonian 
financial services and banks.  By 15
th
 May, in a third wave, perpetrators began to use a 
system of botnets to increase the impact of these DDoS attacks (Schmidt, 2013, p. 181).   
According to Rid (2013, p. 6) the material impact of the DDoS attack was relatively minor.  
Websites were either defaced or rendered inoperable and elements of the Estonian banking 
sector were unavailable for a total of four hours over two days.  The political fallout of the 
incident however, was substantial.  Critical elements of the  highly-developed digital 
infrastructure of a small country were temporarily shut down with a sophistication which 
implied foreign state involvement (Bucci, 2012, p. 59).  The Estonian government 
considered this incident an armed attack on its sovereignty, and sought to invoke Article V 
of the NATO Treaty.  This article stipulates that an attack on one Alliance member is an 
attack on all.  There was, however, no consensus amongst NATO allies that the hacks 
constituted armed attacks and so Article V was not brought into play.   
Had Article V been triggered, the potential consequences would have been severe due to 
suspicions around the source of the hacks.  Because of the timing of the attacks and the 
complexity involved in their perpetration, the conclusion was drawn that Russia, or 
Russian-backed hackers, were responsible.  Analyses of the hacks have not been able to 
categorically detect direct Russian government involvement (Fidler, 2012, p. 77), but the 
coincidence was considered too great to ignore.  This incident thrust cyber security, 
particularly government- or state-sponsored activities, into the public domain and up the 
ladder of political discussions.  If nothing else, the incident eroded trust (Rid, 2013, p. 31) 
in both the digital networks’ capacity to withstand such intrusions and national 
governments’ capacities to avert them.   
This incident was an important milestone in cyber security history itself.  Due to 
circumstantial evidence pointing to Russia being the originator of the attacks, “Estonia 
2007” was the first publically acknowledged instance of state-on-state computer network 
operation (CNO) and elevated cyber security, and the concept of “cyber warfare” to the 
highest national policy discussions.  For the EU, the attacks highlighted systemic 
weaknesses in national and European digital infrastructures which could potentially have a 
cascading effect through its economic area.   
                                            
42
 A distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) involves a website or host server being flooded with 
automated, artificial requests for access.  The number of requests is so high that the website or server is not 
able to cope and fails, preventing even legitimate access requests. 
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According to interviews conducted for this thesis, the Estonian attack caused a surge in EU 
interest in cyber security policy.  Out of a total of 29 referable interviews, 11 stated that 
one of the main drivers of cyber security policy as a whole was the Estonian attack of 
2007.  When compared to the frequency of occurrence in interviews of the Georgian 
attacks of 2008 (which also alleged Russian involvement), the significance of Estonia 2007 
becomes apparent.  By way of comparison, the cyber-attack experienced by Georgia in 
2008 was only mentioned five times in the entirety of the EU acquis and research 
interviews. 
The level of interest in “Estonia 2007” is shown in Table 8-1 below, made up of the 11 
direct interview references. 
Table 8-1: Comments from Interview Participants on the 2007 Estonian DDoS attacks 
Source Quotation 
(Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 2014) [the] cyber-attack of Estonia 2007 led to 
establishment activity at a European Level in a more 
constructive manner. 
(Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, European 
Commission, 2014) 
Shocks like 2007 and the cyber-attacks in Estonia 
were huge, kind of shocks that brought everyone in 
the Council at Member State level together, realising 
that cyber security was a global issue that needed a 
global response, or at least a European response. 
(Interview, Traat and Ristikivi, 2014) I do believe that the 2007 events were a trigger for 
that as well, also in the EU. 
(Interview, Rönnlund, DG Connect, 2015) There were several events. There was Estonia, there 
was also [the] Sony hack that had taken place.  There 
were internet platforms that had been experiencing 
incidents with disruption into e-commerce so it was 
clear that this was having disruptive effect. 
(Interview, Roehrig, EDA, 2014) Like NATO, the EU was looking also closely on the 
Estonian crisis and…we saw that cyber can to a 
certain extent be weaponised. 
(Interview, Senior Official, EEAS, 2014) So then in this information society part there was this 
CIIP communication from 2009 already which was 
actually spurred by Estonia attacks because Estonia 
has organised the ministerial meeting that then was 
formulated into the communication in 2009. 
(Interview, Helmbrecht, ENISA, 2014) Of course if you talk about IT security you have this 
2007 incident in Estonia. I think it’s something 
where if you have such incidents it’s something 
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where politicians take action. 
(Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014) One of the points is the cyber-attack upon Estonia.  
That was 2007. That was the first big one that really 
probably hit home to say that “God, we have to do 
something about these things”. 
(Interview, Senior Official, UK Cabinet Office, 
2014) 
There are cyber-attacks which intend to disable like 
the attack on Estonia which really was intended to 
disable a set of key networks. 
(Interview, Pernik, ICDS, 2014) Since [the] 2007 attacks on critical infrastructure 
here [in Estonia], then in Tallinn there was this first 
conference. Of course the EU had already before 
some kind of legislation for CIP but…then they 
focussed more on this. 
(Telephone Interview, Kelam MEP, 2014) Cyber-attacks are something opposite to privacy and 
then talking about cyber defences then I think that 
future wars or conflicts will be just played in 
cyberspace and this could be decisive for all of us. 
That’s why after attacks against Estonia seven years 
ago the Commission has suggested to the Member 
states to develop their national cybersecurity 
strategies but even now the situation is very 
unsatisfactory as we have discovered because even 
more than half of the MS have not yet completed 
their national cybersecurity strategies and some have 
even not yet manage to ratify the Budapest 
convention. 
 
The interview data demonstrates that the most immediate impact on cyber security policy 
was an upsurge in activity at the highest decision-making levels of the EU (Interview, 
Senior Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 2014).  Officials at DG HOME stated 
that the Estonian crisis  
brought everyone in the Council [of the European Union] at Member State level 
together, realising that cyber security was a global issue that needed a global 
response, or at least a European response (Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, 
European Commission, 2014).   
Particular attention was paid at the time to policy concerning critical information 
infrastructure protection (CIIP) (Interview, Senior Official, EEAS, 2014).  The DDoS 
attack on Estonia targeted digital information systems, disruption of which would have a 
serious impact on health, safety, security, and economic or social well-being.  The EU 
therefore needed to ensure its critical digital infrastructures – both software and hardware – 
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were secure and could withstand large-scale, targeted attacks (European Commission, 
2009a).   
The Union’s response was to establish CIIP policy mechanisms predicated upon the 
resilience of networked systems.  This would be achieved through Member State and 
private sector co-operation, a policy standpoint which would ultimately lead to CIIP and 
resilience being core components of the EUCSS itself.  Senior Union officials approached 
cyber security in a more constructive, productive manner than was previously the case 
(Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 2014).   
The degree of importance placed on cyber security at this time is demonstrated by 
Rönnlund (Interview, Rönnlund, DG Connect, 2015).  She argued that what was 
recognised at the time was that not only was the general reliance on ICT increasing 
exponentially, but “the likelihood and impact of incidents was getting bigger”.  This was 
especially troubling after “Estonia 2007”, particularly since, according to Roehrig 
(Interview, Roehrig, EDA, 2014), that incident highlighted that digital technology “can to a 
certain extent be weaponised”.   
The majority of comments from the interviews point to “Estonia 2007” galvanising interest 
in cyber security even more effectively than the attempt to revivify that interest in the SSIS 
published only a year earlier (European Commission, 2006a).  Officials from eu-LISA 
stated that the incident was a wake-up call for Union policy makers, indicating that cyber 
security was a serious, potent issue and that concerted action needed to be taken (Interview, 
Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014).  That action needed to do more than simply address 
criminal activity online or protect citizen privacy.  It needed to address, or at least 
acknowledge, the threat of state-sponsored aggression against national communications 
infrastructures and the potential impact of such incidents on the EU’s financial and 
economic viability.  The result of this increased interest was a series of policy measures 
and instruments published after 2007 which sought to protect critical information 
infrastructures. 
8.2.1. Policy Choice 1: Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection (CIIP) 
Three interview respondents stated that “Estonia 2007” spurred activity at the highest 
levels of EU decision-making, particularly in the area of CIIP (Interview, Senior Official, 
EC3, 2014; Interview, Senior Official, EEAS, 2014; Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 
2014).  The EU recognised that state-on-state cyber aggression was a particularly potent 
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issue given the increasingly wired nature of European society and economy.  Because more 
and more aspects of civilian and commercial life were being transferred to and operated 
through the digital online domain, securing the infrastructures which supported that domain 
was becoming ever more vital (European Commission, 2011a, p. 3).  Equally important 
was the fact that an incident (man-made or otherwise) occurring in one Member State had 
the potential to create a cascading failure or domino effect affecting the whole EU 
communications infrastructure due to the technical interdependence of these networks.  
The view taken by the Union was that not only did something need to be done but it needed 
to be done quickly.  According to senior officials at the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), the concentration on CIIP was a direct result of the Estonian attacks (Interview, 
Senior Official, EEAS, 2014).  The incident highlighted the need for a pan-European 
capacity to ensure that information networks were protected.  This was due to the 
dependence of an ever-increasing range of physical infrastructures on those information 
networks. 
Content analyses of relevant published acquis from this post-2007 period support the 
interview evidence which points to CIIP being the preferred methodology for guarding 
against large-scale attacks on information systems.  Triangulating the interview data with 
the chronology of Union acquis published post-2007 shows an increase in efforts to guard 
critical infrastructures. This pinpoints the moment that CIIP became a crucial element of 
EU cyber security policy.  Of the 73 documents published between 2007 and 2013, 20 
addressed CIIP in some way
43
.  This total included two Commission Communications 
(European Commission, 2011a, 2009a) and three Council Conclusions (Council of The 
European Union, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c).  A fifth Council Conclusion relating to terrorist 
use of cyber-attacks also referred to the importance of protecting critical information 
infrastructures (Council of The European Union, 2011d).  This body of acquis literature 
demonstrates a high level of awareness and willingness to act on the part of the EU. 
One of the core approaches undertaken by the EU to promote CIIP involved developing its 
role as a facilitator of co-operation, one of the five core ideational elements of the EU’s 
cyber security discourse.  This further entrenched co-operation as a modus operandi for 
cyber security.  High-level co-operation and the sharing of information and intelligence 
regarding incidents as they occur were core elements of the EU’s policy to develop and 
achieve CIIP.  The European Forum of Member States was used as a centre facilitating 
high-level discussions between EU Members (Telephone Interview, Christou, University 
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of Warwick, 2014).  By 2013, the EUCSS stated that such co-operation would enable the 
EU to mitigate the potential cascade or domino-effect of major incidents (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 16).   
Although CIIP increased in significance in EU policy in this period, if the infrastructures 
themselves were to be able to continue functioning in the event of a sustained hack of the 
kind seen in Estonia, the networks and data using those networks needed to be more than 
just protected, they needed to be resilient. 
8.2.2. Policy Choice 2: Resilience  
According to Dunn Cavelty (2012a, p. 19), there are two modes of resilience in cyber 
security.  The first of these is predicated upon ensuring that the system or network under 
attack can return to a pre-attack status quo.  Handmer and Dovers (1996, p. 494) describe 
this as “reactive resilience”, where the status quo is strengthened.  The second strand is 
more flexible.  It concentrates on enabling systems to adapt to the parameters of the cyber-
attack to ensure that the function of the target is not impaired.  For example, the function of 
a power station is to generate electricity.  If that power station were targeted in a cyber-
attack, an adaptive resilience response would mean that the priority is to continue 
generating power whatever the attack does, and so adapt to a new status quo.  This is 
described as “proactive resilience” (Handmer and Dovers, 1996, p. 494) or “bounce back” 
(Herzog and Prior, 2013). 
Resilience forms a substantial section of the EU’s cyber security response, and for good 
reason.  As Christou (2016, p. 4) states: 
If the EU cannot facilitate the construction of the necessary conditions for security 
as resilience in cyberspace in the near and long term, then there is a danger that 
trust and confidence in the Internet will be eroded, and that the EU will remain 
vulnerable to cyber-attack and, importantly, unable to react and recover in an 
effective way. 
Trust in digital systems – another of the core ideational elements of EU cyber security 
policy – would almost certainly be adversely affected if the EU could not be seen to protect 
its own digital systems.  This was of great importance for the EU.  A content analysis of 
Union acquis shows that, of the 25 acquis instruments which specifically reference 
resilience, 22 come from the period 2007 to 2013, and only one was released before the 
Estonian attack.  Two instances in that acquis demonstrate the importance placed on this 
concept.  The first was an unusual move for the EU in this sector.  In 2010, the European 
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Commission proposed legislation “to enhance the preparedness, security and resilience of 
critical information infrastructure and exchange best practice” (European Commission, 
2010a, p. 6).  The second was the role resilience played in relation to CIIP in the 2013 
EUCSS itself. 
Given the importance placed on resilience as a policy choice it is logical that this concept 
found its way into the EUCSS.  The protection of EU infrastructures such as the Schengen 
information system and the asylum application database (Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-
LISA, 2014) from large scale cyber-attacks is itself predicated upon the resilience of such 
infrastructures (European Commission, 2009a, p. 2).  This is in order to ensure 
an open, secure and resilient cyberspace based on the core values of the EU such as 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, for our economies, administrations 
and society and for the smooth functioning of the internal market (Council of The 
European Union, 2013b, p. 1). 
The EUCSS was not clear on precisely which mode of resilience it was seeking to achieve.  
At one level, the Strategy seemed to favour strengthening the status quo and making it 
resistant to change.  This is evidenced in the goal of “countering cyber risks and threats” 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 5) and developing tools to combat malware and botnets.  
At other points, the Strategy favoured more adaptive forms of resilience, as the ultimate 
goal of this particular measure was to support the “good functioning of the internal market” 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 5). 
On balance, it can be inferred that the EU favours an adaptive, bounce-back approach.  The 
reason for this inference is that much of the focus on resilience in the EUCSS was on 
ensuring system functionality in the event of an incident, rather than restoration to a pre-
incident state.  The primary objective was to ensure that the Single Market, Internet 
communications and energy supply – all of which are critical physical infrastructures – 
continued to function unaffected.  To achieve this, incidents should be reported and details 
shared to minimise potential damage and maximise the capacity for ICT and market 
systems to continue functioning (European Commission, 2013a, p. 5, 2013b, p. 6).   
Although the choice of seeking to protect critical information infrastructures through 
ensuring their resilience to external shocks explains how the EU responded to the “Estonia 
2007”, it does not clarify why it responded in this manner.  There are two levels to 
explaining this.  On one level there is the acknowledged importance of ensuring physical 
infrastructures continue to function and serve their purpose.  To do this, these 
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infrastructures need to be resilient.  However, on a deeper level there is the question of why 
the EU adopted this approach to respond to a cyber security incident which bore the 
hallmarks of a state-sponsored act of international aggression.  The answer to this deeper 
level is to be found in the EU’s competences, and the effect of those competences on the 
EU’s interpretation of cyber security incidents. 
8.2.3. Interpreting “Estonia 2007” 
As examined in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, the EU’s capacity to respond to state-on-
state aggression or any other matter of military or defence policy was severely restricted.  
This is a view corroborated by officials at CERT-EU (Interview, Senior Official, CERT-
EU, 2014).  In 2007, the EU had no competence to act or respond to such matters in a 
unilateral manner.  The invocation in 2007 of Article V of the NATO Charter by Estonia 
(irrespective of its acceptance by the NATO Council) indicated that that country’s 
government considered the hacks an armed attack on its sovereignty.  Armed attacks are, 
by definition, national security matters to be dealt with by an EU Member State’s defence 
and military institutions.  Such national security considerations and responses are red lines 
for European Union competence.  As examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis, under the terms 
of the 1987 Single European Act, and entrenched in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the EU as 
an entity has no competence in military or defence matters.  Member States retain 
exclusive competence in areas of national security (Zanders, 2009, p. 3). 
This created something of a quandary for the EU.  On the one hand the Estonian 
government claimed that an armed attack had taken place against its sovereignty, an area 
where the EU has restricted competence.  On the other hand the attacks targeted national 
banking and government networks, disrupting access to information as well as causing 
failures in financial systems, albeit to a limited extent.  Ensuring citizen access to 
information as well as the functionality and viability of financial systems was a matter of 
socio-economic policy.  While the EU had no competence in military or defence matters, it 
had strong competence in socio-economic issues, particularly those affecting the Single 
Market.  Should the digital infrastructure fail, the functionality of the Single Market would 
be severely compromised.  The interconnected nature of digital information networks 
meant that an attack targeting the financial services sector of one EU Member State, such 
as Estonia, had the capacity to affect the entire network which underpinned critical Union 
infrastructures.  Transposed up to the European level, therefore, an attack which could 
potentially disable Europe-wide banking and government data networks would have a 
catastrophic effect on the capacity of the EU’s own economic functionality.   
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This quandary of how to respond to a state-backed act of cyber aggression leads to a point 
of particular importance in a study of the development of EU cyber security policy: the 
Union’s CIIP and resilience-focused response to “Estonia 2007” was predicated upon a 
particular interpretation of that incident.  The EU could not respond to a national security 
or military issue.  It could, however, respond to an incident which directly, or potentially, 
affected the EU’s financial and economic infrastructures and viability.  There was the 
distinct possibility that this incident (or similar incidents occurring in the future) could 
affect EU-wide economic systems due to the potential for a cascading failure of critical 
digital infrastructures due to the targeting of financial networks in Estonia, and the 
interconnected nature of those infrastructures across Europe.  The EU therefore elected to 
address “Estonia 2007” from this socio-economic, Single Market-oriented perspective.  
This afforded it great freedom of movement and policy development due to its 
competences in managing financial and economic policy and issues.   
A specific example of this interpretation can be found in the language used by the EU to 
describe the 2007 Estonian incident.  While the word “attack” was used in the interview 
responses
44
 and Union acquis
45
 to describe the incident, the term “war” or “cyber war” was 
never used.  This is a careful and deliberate act, symptomatic of the EU’s construction of a 
socio-economic narrative for such incidents.  Were the EU to employ more military terms 
such as “cyber war” or “cyber warfare” in its policy response to Estonia 2007, it would be 
closing the door on its own capacity to act.  Policy responses employing such terminology 
are explicitly out-with its competence.  By highlighting the threat such an incident posed to 
the workings and ongoing functionality of the internal market, the EU converted “Estonia 
2007” from a national security, defence discourse in which it has little to no competence, to 
a socio-economic, financial discourse in which it has far stronger competence.   
This is a crucial element of the EU’s overall discourse in this field, and highlights its 
fundamental purpose: irrespective of the nature of an incident (criminal or state-sponsored 
in origin), if that incident has an economic impact, then the EU can act and operate.  The 
policy choice of resilience reflects this socio-economic perspective and construction.  
Rather than focus on the consequences for national security, the EU focuses on the 
consequences for the Single Market and European industry.  The infrastructures being 
protected were vital to the social wellbeing of European citizens, as well as the economic 
functionality and viability of the Union.   
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 (Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 2014; Interview, Senior Official, EEAS, 2014; Interview, Smith and 
Jones, eu-LISA, 2014). 
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 (European Commission, 2009a, p. 2, 2010c, p. 16, 2010b, p. 2).  
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This is not simply a matter of getting round a lack of competence.  It is a vitally important 
aspect in the understanding of EU cyber security policy over the course of the 28-year 
timescape.  Over the course of that timescape, the EU constructed a socio-economic 
discourse for cyber security.  This discourse began in 1985 with the concentration on the 
burgeoning ICT sector as an area where economic growth and employment could be 
stimulated.  This policy choice set the precedent – the path dependence – for a focus on 
socio-economic matters in ICT.  Such a standpoint was inadvertently entrenched by the 
provisions of the SEA in 1987, which stipulated that the EU could not become involved in 
national security matters but only in the political and economic aspects of security.  This 
restriction was not specifically intended to be applied to cyber issues.  The impact on cyber 
security of these Treaty restrictions was a functional spillover (Haas, 1958, p. 297) of a 
desire on the part of Member States in the 1980s to ensure that national security remains 
their remit alone.   
Twenty years later, by 2007, these restrictions in competence had created a particular 
narrative of cyber security which influenced the manner in which the EU addressed major 
historical cyber events such as “Estonia 2007”.  As explained in Chapter 4 the competences 
restrict the Union to specific areas of policy, but the remit and capacity of the EU to act 
within those areas is quite extensive.  By approaching the “Estonia 2007” from a socio-
economic perspective, the EU afforded itself a significant capacity to act.  This capacity is 
similar to its response to the financial crisis of the late 1980s, which sparked the original 
interest of the EU in ICT.   
Although this socio-economic narrative was effectively applied to the EU’s response to the 
cyber-attack on Estonia, that narrative would be tested in the Union’s response to the 
second external, catalytic driver of cyber security policy-making: the global financial crisis 
of 2008.  Union responses to this crisis bore striking similarities to the actions undertaken 
in 1985.  In response to a major international financial downturn, the EU chose to focus on 
supporting the information sector to stimulate growth and employment. 
8.3. Crisis 2 – The 2008 Financial Crisis 
The content analysis of acquis employed to identify and triangulate data demonstrating the 
influence of “Estonia 2007” on EU cyber security policy also yielded evidence of a second 
event which fuelled policy-making in a similar manner: the commencement of the global 
financial crisis of 2008.  Although the crisis originated in the US sub-prime mortgage 
market (Coffee Jr, 2009, p. 6; Schwartz, 2009, pp. 20–22; Shiller, 2012), EU acquis from 
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this period demonstrated that it had a major impact on the constituent national economies 
of the EU, and as a result on the Union’s economy as a whole.  Finding the EU in a major 
recession, the European Council sought means to exit the crisis (European Council, 2008, 
p. 3).   
An examination of the EU’s policy response highlights striking similarities to that of the 
mid-1980s, responses examined in Chapter 6.  Any and all means to exit a financial 
downturn were sought and exploited.  As with the initiation of the Single Market in 1985, 
in 2008 the ICT sector was singled out for specific attention.  The case will be made in this 
section of this chapter, therefore, that the EU’s policy in the immediate aftermath of 2008 
was almost a carbon copy of the policies of 1985.  Where there are differences, they are to 
be found in the admixture of cyber security matters – cyber-crime, privacy, data integrity – 
resulting from the development of cyber security policy over the course of the years 
between the financial crises.  Part of this policy response was securing the digital domain 
from the shocks of major financial turmoil, i.e. the EU’s digital domain needed to be 
resilient not just to external attacks but also to economic fluctuations. 
The financial crisis of 2008 has been called the biggest financial and economic crisis in 80 
years.  It began in the sub-prime sector of the US mortgage market (Carmassi et al., 2009, 
pp. 977–978; Melvin and Taylor, 2009, p. 1243).  Due to ever-increasing property prices, 
households were encouraged to borrow more to buy property with little regard to the ability 
to pay off the debt.  The bursting of this credit bubble set in train a cascading series of 
failures caused by systemic weaknesses in financial infrastructures (Crotty, 2009, p. 564).  
The “New Financial Architecture” of post-1980s deregulation led to financial markets with 
very loose government or regulatory oversight.  As a result, insufficient safeguards were in 
place to prevent financial institutions overextending themselves to the extent that they 
would eventually need substantial government bailouts.  Exposure to such risks led to 
crises at major investment banks including UBS and Bear Stearns and most famously led to 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 (Acharya and Richardson, 2009, p. 208).  This 
collapse caused a ripple effect throughout international economic and commercial centres 
which affected European financial institutions due to “dollar funding shortages” (Baba and 
Packer, 2009, p. 1351). 
To respond to the crisis in the EU certain industrial sectors were identified where stimuli 
would be established to increase economic growth and employment.  In a move of striking 
similarity to that of 1985, the digital domain was specifically earmarked for attention 
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(European Council, 2010, p. 2,4).  As a result a “Digital Agenda for Europe” was initiated 
(European Commission, 2010c).  This was a programme intended to increase uptake of 
digital technology in all sectors of society – political, social and economic – and transform 
the EU into a knowledge-based economy.  Its primary aim was “to deliver sustainable 
economic and social benefits from a digital single market based on fast and ultra-fast 
Internet and interoperable applications” (European Commission, 2010c, p. 2).  Such 
measures were designed to get European economies back on track.  The European 
Commission posited a “virtuous circle” for this digital economy, which interlinked core 
areas such as tackling cyber-crime, promoting research and development and increasing 
provision of borderless services (European Commission, 2010c, p. 4). 
When compared to “Estonia 2007”, the financial crisis was not a matter of direct, clear 
policy relevance to cyber security.  However, given the narrative employed by the EU to 
tackle large-scale cyber-attacks – a socio-economic approach focusing on securing 
infrastructures vital to the economic wellbeing of the Union – the link becomes apparent.  
A content analysis of the 73 acquis publications relevant to cyber security published 
between 2007 and 2013 identified that 16 make direct reference to the financial crisis
46
 and 
the need to stimulate economic growth. 
The reason for the link to cyber security is twofold.  First, the European Union could ill-
afford not to respond to this crisis.  In its capacity as an economic entity, any issue which 
affected its capability to fulfil its socio-economic functions was a matter of great 
importance.  The importance placed on this crisis is demonstrated by the response being 
co-ordinated at the highest levels of EU decision-making.  Of the 16 documents identified 
relating to the financial crisis, six were European Council resolutions and three were 
published by the Council of the European Union.  Although the two entities were part of 
the same institution in 2008
47
, the European Council was the configuration at which heads 
of state and government met.  This afforded that entity a greater degree of authority as an 
executive body of EU governance
48
.  According to an official from the former DG 
MARKT, this demonstrated the importance placed by the EU’s highest-level actors on the 
financial crisis.  It also greatly increased the speed at which action could be taken 
(Interview, Senior Official, DG MARKT, European Commission, 2014).  EU decision-
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 See Appendix 5 for the list of acquis which cite the 2008 financial crisis.  While the evidence for the 
influence of the “Estonia 2007” came primarily from interview data, the evidence for the influence of the 
financial crisis is drawn from the acquis itself.   
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 Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
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 But without the legislative powers of the Council of the European Union. 
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making is notoriously slow.  It takes years for proposals for action to be implemented 
(Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 2014).  However, if the situation demands, the European 
Council can require that action be taken and decisions implemented swiftly by the other 
institutions (Interview, Senior Official, DG MARKT, European Commission, 2014)
49
.  
While it does not have any legislative capacity, the European Council has a significant 
amount of normative power at its disposal which can be called upon as the situation arises 
to require that measures be undertaken in an emergency situation.  The European Council 
summit meetings of 2015 and 2016 in response to the Syrian refugee crisis also serve as an 
example of the European Council exercising normative power to address a socio-economic 
concern. 
It is therefore significant that the measures proposed by the European Council from 2008 
included ones that had a direct influence on cyber security policy.  The European Council 
sought any and all means available to exit the financial crisis, as was the case in the 1980s.  
As indicated above, the main thrust of the policy response to achieve this can be found in 
the Digital Agenda.  This was a flagship EU policy, and specifically targeted ICT and the 
digital domain.  In its Communication of 2010 launching the Digital Agenda, the European 
Commission promoted small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) as the foundations for 
this economic growth (European Commission, 2010c, p. 6,27).   
These policies were remarkably similar to those of the Commission’s 1985 
Communication and the Bangemann Report of 1994.  Both of these documents earmarked 
the ICT industry as a sector where specific Union support would generate economic 
growth and boost employment (Bangemann, 1994, p. 10; European Commission, 1985, p. 
20).  The similarity of policy options is significant as it implies a powerful path 
dependency when responding to financial crises.  There appears to be a stock set of policy 
options with regard to ICT to which the EU returns when faced with a financial crisis: 
promote digital commerce in SMEs and encourage private sector investment to stimulate 
national and pan-European economic growth and employment.  The sum total of measures 
proposed reflects the desire on the part of the EU for greater co-operation between all 
sectors of society affected by the economic downturn.  This reinforces the continuity of co-
operation as a core ideational element in EU cyber security and a repetition of policies of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s: closer co-operation in core areas such as ICT to capitalise 
on the increasing use of digital technology.   
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 In the case of the financial crisis the decision was quickly taken to establish a Eurozone banking union.  
Had this been proposed by the Commission out-with a time of crisis, this would have taken years to develop 
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While the economic motivations fuelling Union policy in ICT and networked technology 
had remained largely static over the preceding 20 years, by 2008 part of that policy 
included consideration of issues such as online criminal activity (Council of The European 
Union, 2009; European Commission, 2012b), the protection of minors when online 
(Council of The European Union, 2012, 2011d, European Commission, 2012c, p. 196, 
2011b, 2011c, p. 566) and the protection of digital privacy in general (European Parliament 
& Council of the European Union, 2009).  These criminal justice considerations were 
previously considered separate to economic matters.  This was because they had come 
about as separate policy issues as the EU’s reliance on digital technology evolved and 
developed.  By 2008 these issues were considered as part-and-parcel of a wider economic 
policy to utilise the digital domain to maximise growth.   
As with the EU’s response to “Estonia 2007”, the key methodological approach to 
addressing these concerns was once again to achieve resilience through co-operation.  Just 
as systems and networks had to be resilient to attacks, national and European economies 
also needed to be resilient to more abstract financial shocks such as the collapse of 
Lehmann Bros., criminal activity such as malicious hacks of information systems 
(European Commission, 2007a, p. 2) or breaches of data protection (Council of The 
European Union, 2007, p. 2).  Given the apparent increase in cyber-crime and the lack of 
trust in the digital domain, the need to establish, maintain and develop trust in cyberspace 
was considered a requirement (Council of The European Union, 2011d, p. 3) given the dual 
crises of “Estonia 2007” and the financial crisis of 2008. 
The nature of the EU’s cyber security discourse, and the background to that discourse, 
shows a second way the financial crisis influenced policy.  As examined in the previous 
section of this chapter, the EU’s response to the Estonian attacks of 2007 was dictated not 
by national security or military-defence concerns, but by the EU interpreting that incident 
as a socio-economic threat.  A cyber-attack allegedly perpetrated by another state was 
described in language which enabled the EU to formulate a response within the bounds of 
its political and economic competences.  A financial crisis affecting EU economies’ 
capacity to function needed no such construction, but fitted neatly into that narrative.  By 
default it was part of the EU’s socio-economic competences.  Instead of protecting the 
Single Market from external malicious activity as was the case when responding to 
“Estonia 2007”, the EU was protecting it from financial shocks.  These may or may not 
originate outside the Union but, because of the interconnected nature of financial markets 
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(similar to the interconnected nature of the Internet’s infrastructure) these shocks could and 
did cause cascading failures throughout those markets. 
The EU therefore responded to both the 2007 Estonian DDoS attack and the 2008 financial 
crisis in similar ways.  Instead of focusing on national security or defence approaches to 
cyber security, the EU concentrated on establishing the resilience of economic and social 
infrastructures to major financial shocks.  The primary goal was to ensure that the Single 
Market continued to function in the face of both major financial and geo-political crises.  
To achieve both of these, resilience was the approach of choice due to the restrictions 
placed upon the Union by its competences.   
8.3.1. The Influence of External Crises: Policy Continuation vs 
Policy Change 
The external events of 2007 and 2008 had a substantial influence on the development of 
EU cyber security policy.  The cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 galvanised political 
interest in the field throughout the world and have since featured regularly in cyber security 
literature (Christou, 2016; Dunn Cavelty, 2012b; Gaycken, 2012, 2011; Rid, 2013; 
Valeriano and Maness, 2015)
50
.  Interview data analysed for this thesis demonstrates that 
the incident spurred political interest at the highest levels of EU governance.  This resulted 
in a concentration on critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) and resilience.  
The thinking was that digital networks must continue to be serviceable due to the ever-
increasing number of other infrastructures which depend on them.  The aim was to ensure 
that the Single Market and the wider economic viability of the EU as a whole would 
continue in the event of a major cyber-attack. 
One of those secondary infrastructures was the financial sector itself.  The 2008 financial 
crisis demonstrated that economic systems needed to be resilient not just to man-made 
malicious incidents, but to fluctuations originating in other financial centres.  This 
revivified interest in the economic potential of cyberspace, in a repeat of policies 
implemented in the late 1980s.  This was a trend which continued into the development of 
the EUCSS itself in 2013.   
However, despite the speed at which these incidents occurred, the policy choices were not 
ad hoc responses to crises as they unfolded.  Although the EU, through the European 
Council, moved quickly to respond to both incidents and develop policy solutions, the 
choices of CIIP and resilience were part of a well-established narrative of cyber security.  
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The choices made at previous stages of the EU’s process in this field had created a political 
and economic policy discourse which was being consistently applied.  Between 1985 and 
2001 the EU sought to utilise the burgeoning ICT sector to stimulate growth, establishing 
an economic policy foundation for interest in this sector.  Over the course of that period, 
illegal and harmful Internet content began to become a social problem, leading by the late 
1990s to measures to combat cyber-crime and ensure citizen rights such as privacy and 
human dignity
51
.  The Treaty-defined competences were the basis of this socio-economic 
discourse.  These competences restricted the capacity of the EU to act in national security 
or military matters, in turn necessitating a focus on economics to the extent that “Estonia 
2007” was re-interpreted and repackaged as an economic issue of the same sort as the 
financial crisis of 2008.  This entrenched the EU’s discourse in this field. 
This continuation and entrenchment of the EU’s discourse is of particular consequence to 
historical institutionalism, as it represents something of a paradox.  As examined in 
Chapter 4 Section 4 of this thesis, Krasner’s (1984) and Baumgartner’s (2014) descriptions 
of punctuated equilibrium stipulate that policy choices shift from one period of stasis or 
inertia to another when major crises occur.  The paradox for EU cyber security is that 
major crises which affected the development of that policy – the Estonian attacks of 2007 
and the financial crisis of 2008 – did not change the EU’s wider policy path.  Rather, the 
EU’s choices demonstrated a continuation and entrenchment of long-standing core policy 
paths of economic maximisation within a socio-economic cyber security discourse.  If 
punctuated equilibrium seeks to explain policy change as the result of crises, EU cyber 
security policy represents an important exception to this rule.  Instead of effecting a shift in 
policy paths from one period of stasis to another, the crises of 2007-2008 reinforced the 
strength of path dependent processes and are shown to be drivers of policy continuation 
rather than policy change.   
The reason for this is to be found in the discourse constructed under the influence and 
restrictions of the EU’s competences.  These competences led, over the period of the 
policy-making timescape, to the development of a particular socio-economic cyber security 
narrative which affected the manner in which major crises were interpreted.  The socio-
economic construction of cyber security threats was the best, and to some extent only, way 
to respond to these events.  The financial crisis was just that, a financial crisis.  Socio-
economic responses were therefore the most suitable given the issues under examination.  
“Estonia 2007”, by contrast, was alleged to have been an act of inter-state aggression.  
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There was, however, a socio-economic impact of particular concern for the EU given the 
interconnected nature of information networks.  The EU applied its well-established socio-
economic cyber security discourse to these two incidents and developed a wide-ranging 
response as a result, a response still operating within the confines of Union competences.  
The external crises faced by the Union in this sector therefore did not alter established 
paths of institutional stasis.  Instead, they reinforced them.   
8.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the effect of important exogenous events on EU cyber security 
policy was not to radically alter that policy, but to entrench its core elements.  By 2007 the 
EU had established itself as an economic entity with an international presence.  Faced with 
two major crises in as many years, the EU was required to show initiative and be creative 
in its responses due to its restricted competences and remits.  Although the 2008 financial 
crisis was within its competences, the Estonian attacks a year earlier were ostensibly 
outside its purview.  In order to be able to respond in any meaningful manner, the EU 
interpreted “Estonia 2007” as threats to the functionality and viability of the internal 
market.   
The chapter also showed that the EU’s preferred policy response to both of these events 
was to focus on resilience.  Having interpreted the events as threats to the Single Market, 
the EU’s priority was to ensure the continued functionality of digital and physical 
infrastructures vital to the Market’s continued viability.  Finally, the chapter showed that 
this response represented a paradox from an historical institutionalist perspective.  Rather 
than force radical rethinks and alterations to a long-standing, socio-economic approach to 
cyber security, these events entrenched that approach.   
It is noteworthy however, that the triggers for the events of 2007 and 2008 were both 
exogenous to the EU.  Although they had a direct influence on EU cyber security policy, 
their original source was located outside the EU’s geographical area52.  Policy development 
need not be restricted to responses to exogenous crises, however.  Internal shocks to a well-
established institutional architecture are just as likely to affect policy choice.  Such an 
internal event occurred in 2009 with the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.  This 
Treaty caused a major restructuring of the EU itself, which necessarily affected policy-
making processes across the entire remit of Union competences.  For cyber security, this 
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restructuring ushered in a policy-making architecture amendable to a truly holistic cyber 
security policy.   
The following chapter will therefore present evidence for two points.  First, the changes 
initiated by the Treaty of Lisbon meant that without it, the EUCSS of 2013 would not have 
been possible.  Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether it radically altered the 
EU’s discourse in that field.  The analysis will show that, despite ushering in a completely 
new policy-making architecture, the Treaty of Lisbon continued the paradoxical effects of 
“Estonia 2007” and the financial crisis of 2008, and further entrenched the EU’s socio-
economic cyber security discourse. 
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Chapter 9 | Punctuated Equilibrium Part 2: The 
Effect of the Treaty of Lisbon on Cyber 
Security Policy 
9.1. Introduction 
Chapter 8 examined the influence on EU cyber security policy of events which began 
outside the Union.  This chapter will present evidence to demonstrate the influence of 
major events internal to the EU.  This will be achieved through the examination of an 
event of singular importance in the history and development of the EU itself: the Treaty of 
Lisbon.  The chapter will make the case that without that Treaty, the EU’s Cyber Security 
Strategy (EUCSS) would not have come about.  By abolishing the EU’s Pillar structure and 
establishing provisions for mutual assistance in the face of major crises, the Treaty of 
Lisbon removed policy silos and reduced duplication of policy-making efforts.  This 
enabled a holistic cyber security policy to be developed.  The removal of the Maastricht 
Treaty’s division of remits created an architecture conducive to a cross-Pillar, multi-field 
policy such as the EUCSS of 2013.  The Lisbon Treaty is therefore an event of crucial 
importance to the EU’s cyber security policy-making timescape.  Interview and acquis data 
both point to the substantial influence it had on pushing and speeding up policy 
development in this field.  That process ultimately culminated in the 2013 EUCSS.   
In conjunction with the Estonian cyber-attack of 2007 and the financial crisis of 2008, the 
Treaty of Lisbon galvanised the policy development process in this field.  As such these 
events represent major punctuation points in an otherwise path-dependent progression from 
1985 to 2013.  However, these three events present an historical institutionalist paradox.  
Under the mechanisms of punctuated equilibrium, major events and crises are punctuation 
points which move policy paths in new directions.  The evidence presented in this chapter 
will demonstrate that these events had the opposite effect: rather than cause policy change, 
they further entrenched the Union’s established socio-economic discourse and approach to 
cyber security issues.   
The chapter will argue that the reason cyber security policies continued rather than 
changed was because the Treaty of Lisbon formalised pre-existing competences rather than 
afforded the EU new or expanded capabilities.  This continuity of competences occurred 
despite the Treaty initiating fundamental change in the architecture of the EU as a whole.  
This meant that those policy areas heavily dependent on Union competences – such as 
cyber security – did not change but that policy discourses became further entrenched.  
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There are two observations to take from these findings.  The first is of direct relevance to 
the research question: the institutional arrangement of Union competences led the EU to 
develop and continue its particular approach to cyber security.  The competences lie at the 
heart of the Union’s discourse in this field and its response to cyber security challenges.  
The EU’s capacity to act, or more precisely, the Treaty-defined restrictions on its capacity 
to act, have shaped the EU’s discourse in this sector and steered it towards particular socio-
economic policy choices designed to ensure the resilience of the internal market.  The 
second observation has particular implications for historical institutionalism as this 
entrenchment in the face of major crises represents a divergence from the mechanisms of 
punctuated equilibrium.  This implies that punctuated equilibrium is a more flexible 
explanatory model as it can be used to explain policy continuity as well as policy change. 
The chapter is divided into five sections.  The second section provides a brief overview of 
the primary changes to the structure of the EU brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon itself.  
The third section provides a detailed examination of how the removal of the Pillars of the 
Maastricht system enabled the development of the EUCSS.  The fourth section examines 
the paradox of the Treaty’s lack of influence on the EU’s cyber security discourse due to 
the continuous nature of Union competences.  The fifth section concludes the chapter. 
9.2. The Effects of the Treaty of Lisbon: Restructuring 
the EU’s policy-making architecture 
On 1 December 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon came into force
53
.  In an effort to create a more 
effective and efficient policy-making and policy-implementing structure, the Treaty 
initiated a number of radical changes in the way the EU was constructed.  At its core was 
the repackaging of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Maastricht into the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  The aim 
of this repackaging was to ensure coherence and comprehensibility as well as increase 
effectiveness in policy development and implementation across the array of fields in which 
the EU was involved (Dinan, 2010, p. 154; Verdun, 2013, p. 1131).  In addition, the 
European Parliament was placed on an equal footing with the Council of the European 
Union by being granted co-decision powers on legislation (Craig, 2008, p. 13).  The 
European Council, until this point a corollary to the Council of the European Union, was 
established as a “formal institution” in its own right (Craig, 2008, p. 9).  Article 9 of the 
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 It was signed, however, on 13 December 2007.  It is not the aim of this chapter or this thesis to enter into a 
lengthy examination of the Treaty of Lisbon, its developmental history or its impact on the wider EU in 
general.  Such analyses have been conducted elsewhere (Craig, 2010, 2008; Dinan, 2010; Verdun, 2013; 
Weatherill, 2014).   
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Treaty established the seven formal institutions of the EU as the European Council, the 
European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the 
European Central Bank, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors (European Union, 
2007, p. 16). 
The Treaty also codified the exclusive, shared and supporting competences of the Union, 
as well as specifying the various policy areas in which each competence was employed 
(European Union, 2007, pp. 46–48).  The EU enjoyed exclusive competence in, inter alia, 
managing the internal customs union, establishing the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market, and “monetary policy for the Member States whose 
currency is the Euro” (European Union, 2007, p. 47).  In matters relating to social policy, 
transport and the internal market, the EU shared competence with the Member States.  
While it did not enjoy sole management of the internal market, sharing competence in this 
field placed the EU on a level footing with Member States in terms of initiating policy.  In 
the fields of culture, tourism, education and sport, the EU had “to carry out actions to 
support, co-ordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States” (European Union, 
2007, p. 48).  This was the weakest form of competence. 
In the fields of foreign affairs and security policy the role of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) was expanded so as to represent the 
EU as a whole on the international stage.  The HR was to be assisted in the fulfilment of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CDSP) goals by a new European External Action Service (EEAS).  The EEAS would also 
serve as a de facto diplomatic service of the EU.  This was to be achieved by  
co-operation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise 
officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of 
the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the 
Member States (European Union, 2007, p. 27) 
In addition the European Defence Agency (EDA) was officially confirmed as a formal EU 
body (Howorth, 2013, p. 13).   
Demonstrating the importance placed on the field of cyber security as a whole, “computer 
crime” was specifically mentioned as an issue and area requiring co-operation in Article 
69(b) of the Treaty (European Union, 2007, p. 65).  It is a field of crucial significance to 
the stability and viability of the internal market due to the nature of the security challenges 
involved.  In terms of practical solutions to those challenges, however, the most significant 
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impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on cyber security policy was the abolition of the Maastricht 
Treaty’s pillar structure.   
9.3. Removing the Maastricht Pillars 
As examined in Chapter 6 Section 3.2, under the policy-making structure instituted by the 
1992 Treaty of Maastricht key aspects of cyber security policy were handled under 
different “Pillars”.  These Pillars covered different policy areas and were subject to 
different decision-making procedures and levels of competence.  The impact of this system 
on cyber security policy-making was the development of a highly fragmented library of 
acquis comprising different policy and legislative instruments.  There was no over-arching 
strategy addressing all elements of cyber security.  By 2002 it was recognised by the 
European Council that this caused a certain degree of duplication due to the fact that cyber 
issues crossed not only geo-political boundaries, but also policy areas (Council of The 
European Union, 2002a, p. 4).  Due to the existence of the Pillars, a truly holistic cyber 
security policy was not possible. 
Under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty creating a single legal personality for the EU, the 
Pillar structure was abolished.  This created a single, streamlined and more efficient policy-
making architecture.  For the first time in the EU’s history functionaries and officials from 
agencies and Commission Directorates-General (DGs) operating across what used to be 
distinct and functionally separate areas of the Communities, judicial co-operation and 
foreign and security policy were able to work together in a formal capacity (Interview, 
Helmbrecht, ENISA, 2014; Interview, Senior Official, EEAS, 2014; Telephone Interview, 
Kelam MEP, 2014).  This in turn created a policy-making system conducive to the 
development of a holistic cyber security policy, the result of which was the EUCSS 
(Interview, Senior Official, EEAS, 2014).     
This change more than any other enabled more collaborative work to be done in cyber 
security and eliminated the risk of duplication of efforts or a lack of awareness between the 
Commission DGs.  Activities which had been carried out in isolation were more joined-up 
after 2009 (Interview, Purser, ENISA, 2014).  In the field of cyber-crime, for example, 
officials previously working under the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar of judicial co-
operation (Pillar 2) were able to work under Pillar 1 policy development and decision-
making processes.  This afforded the Commission two important capabilities.  Under Pillar 
1, the Commission had the right of initiative.  This meant that it could propose policy or 
legislative instruments wherever it saw a need or gap.  By extending this right to what used 
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to be Pillar 3 (Justice and Home Affairs) DG HOME, and thereby the Commission itself, 
was afforded this right of initiative in the field of cyber-crime (Interview, Senior Official, 
DG HOME, European Commission, 2014).  The effect was to enable more judicial and 
policing co-operation (Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014), particularly at 
Europol.   
9.3.1. Promoting Co-operation 
By 2009 the high-tech crime centre established at Europol had developed into an 
established pan-European hub in its own right (Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 2014).  It 
had a multiplier effect, able to direct, pool and co-ordinate resources to tackle cyber-crime 
across all the Member States.  This removed the requirement for individual Member State 
capacity-building or bilateral arrangements.  Before 2009, however, the Commission did 
not have the ability to initiate policy or legislative proposals to support the EC3 in its 
activities.  With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it could.  The Commission 
also now had enforcement capacities in this field.  It could ensure that all elements of the 
relevant cyber-crime acquis were implemented by all Member States.  The Commission 
could also launch infringement procedures were this implementation not undertaken 
(Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 2014).  These two features 
highlight a dramatic increase in the capacity of the EU to act in the field of cyber-crime, an 
important ideational element of the Union’s wider cyber security policy throughout the 
entire 28-year timescape. 
This capacity for joint working had two impacts on cyber security policy far beyond 
tackling cyber-crime.  According to officials at the EDA and eu-LISA the EU was able to 
look outward in its policy and address external cyber issues in a way that previously it 
could not (Interview, Roehrig, EDA, 2014; Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014).  
This enabled the EU to address incidents such a major cyber-attack originating outside the 
EU – as was the case in Estonia in 2007 – but remain within its competences.  As Smith 
and Jones from eu-LISA stated (Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014), the removal 
of the Pillar system coupled with the initiation of the EEAS enabled the EU as a whole to 
establish the coherence of policy that was missing before 2009.  This in turn enabled it to 
address the fragmentation of that policy area, particularly in crisis management under 
Article 222 of the revised Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  This 
additional article is known as the Solidarity Clause (European Union, 2009b, p. 148)
54
.   
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Two interviews mentioned this clause as being of specific relevance to cyber security, in 
particular the capacity to deal with major cyber-attacks (Interview, Roehrig, EDA, 2014; 
Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014).  Both the EDA and eu-LISA cite Article 222 
as an important addition to the capacity of the EU to respond to major cyber incidents.  
Described by Roehrig (Interview, Roehrig, EDA, 2014) as a clause sitting between Articles 
IV and V of the NATO Treaty, it states that the Union and its Member States shall act 
“jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the 
victim of a natural or man-made disaster”.  The clause cannot be compared directly to 
Article V of the NATO Treaty which stipulates that an attack on one member is an attack 
on all, simply due to the fact that the EU is not a military organisation.  Instead, the 
Solidarity Clause is a commitment to mutual assistance in the event of a disaster, thus 
cementing co-operation as an ideational driver.  Cyber-attacks are not explicitly mentioned 
as causes which would necessitate the activation of this clause.  However, it is inferred by 
officials from eu-LISA that such an incident could be of significant scale to constitute a 
man-made disaster.  As Smith and Jones state: 
It’s a clause that a Member State can call upon in case of need.  What that case of 
need might be depends upon the Member State that might [call up] actions but at 
least within certain documents cyber-attack is one of the examples given where 
solidarity would be called on (Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014). 
Although Roehrig from the EDA and Smith and Jones from eu-LISA specifically 
mentioned the presence of the Solidarity Clause as being of importance and relevance to 
EU cyber security policy, these were only two interviews out of the total number of 30 
referable interviews conducted.  As a result it is unwise to infer too great an influence of 
that clause on the wider narrative in this field.  Nevertheless, such a commitment to mutual 
assistance represents a significant step-change in EU crisis management in general.  The 
clause stipulates that Member States are to render such assistance as is required by the 
victim state and that “the Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including 
the military resources made available by the Member States” (European Union, 2009b, p. 
148).  When applied to an analysis of the DDoS attack against Estonia in 2007, and the 
paralysing effect that incident had on that country’s digital infrastructures, such a clause 
presents a significant capacity for action.  It also formalises in Treaty provisions an 
important co-ordinating role for the EU itself.  The clause states that the Council of the 
European Union will be the mechanism through which Member State assistance efforts 
would be co-ordinated.  This codified in Treaty provisions the EU’s role as a facilitator of 
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co-operation during crisis situations, inferred by eu-LISA to include cyber-attacks 
(Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014). 
The Treaty of Lisbon therefore provided the EU a formal capacity in crisis management as 
an entity in its own right.  While not granting the EU any executive powers, it enabled it to 
co-ordinate the extensive resources of its Member States, including military capabilities.  
Care must be taken at this point not to overemphasise the significance of this.  As stated 
above, of the interviews carried out only two state the relevance of the Solidarity Clause to 
EU cyber security policy.  Nevertheless, just as it would be imprudent to overstate the 
significance of this point, it would be a mistake to ignore the potential applicability of the 
clause to incidents such as “Estonia 2007”, should they be repeated in the future. 
The result of the removal of the Pillars and establishment of a new capacity for joint-
working led to a second influence of the Treaty of Lisbon on EU cyber security policy-
making.  Officials from Commission DGs HOME and Connect, and the new External 
Action Service, could for the first time come together in an official capacity to develop a 
strategy document encompassing all elements of EU cyber security acquis.  The result of 
this joint working was the Cyber Security Strategy of the EU - An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace (Interview, Senior Official, EEAS, 2014; Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-
LISA, 2014).  According to Tunne Kelam MEP this was made possible by the new 
framework of the Treaty of Lisbon (Telephone Interview, Kelam MEP, 2014).  At the time 
this was unique, for it represented the first time all three former Pillars were present in the 
development of a single policy (Interview, Senior Official, EEAS, 2014).  DG Connect, 
prior to 2009, fell under Pillar 1.  The EEAS was the new agency initiated by the Treaty of 
Lisbon responsible for managing and developing the CFSP, the former Pillar 2.  DG 
HOME had been granted the right of initiative in criminal justice affairs which had 
previously fallen under the aegis of co-operation in judicial affairs, or Pillar 3.  The new, 
streamlined EU resulting from the Treaty of Lisbon enabled this unprecedented level of 
joint working not just between overlapping policy areas but between the Commission’s 
departments themselves.  This resolved the problem of a silo mentality resulting from the 
pre-2009 Pillar system (Interview, Helmbrecht, ENISA, 2014).  This new architecture and 
combination of Pillar influences can be identified in the EUCSS itself. 
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9.3.2. Combining Pillars in the EUCSS 
The EUCSS presented a “vision” of cyber security based around five strategic priorities 
which address the challenges of living and working in the 21
st
 century.  Taken directly 
from that document, these priorities are:  
 “Achieving cyber resilience; 
 Drastically reducing cyber-crime; 
 Developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) ; 
 Developing the industrial and technological resources for cyber security; 
 Establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and 
promote core EU values” (European Commission, 2013a, pp. 4–5) 
 
Of these five strategic goals, three are direct representations of the pre-2009 Pillars: the 
Communities, CFSP, and Judicial Co-operation. 
Prior to 2009, the strategic goal of drastically reducing cyber-crime was developed under 
the aegis of Pillar 3 as it was a part of the field of police and judicial co-operation.  There 
are a number methods expounded in the EUCSS by which the EU sought to achieve this 
goal.  Most were centred on facilitating co-operation and information-sharing.  Agencies 
such as Europol and Eurojust were tasked with working more closely together “in order to 
increase their effectiveness in combating cyber-crime, in accordance with their respective 
mandates and competence” (European Commission, 2013a, p. 11).  The EUCSS also 
recommends the ratification of the Council of Europe’s 2001 Convention on Cyber Crime 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 9), better known as the Budapest Convention
55
.  The 
EUCSS also stipulates that the EU would support Member States in the establishment of 
their own national cyber-crime units. 
These actions and policies are reminiscent of the pre-Lisbon intergovernmental approach to 
policing and judicial co-operation.  The EU itself did not seek to establish or set up specific 
judicial or technical measures to tackle cyber-crime.  Instead it advocated better use of 
current capabilities in Member States, and promoted better co-ordination, through the EU, 
of those capabilities.  These included the more effective application of existing legislation 
and instruments, including the Budapest Convention, and certain of the EU’s own 
instruments on tackling online child exploitation (European Parliament & Council of The 
European Union, 2011).  This position, of facilitating co-operation, is reminiscent of the 
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core function of Eurojust within Pillar 2 prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon.  Before 2009 Eurojust’s function was to  
increase the exchange of information between the interested parties, facilitate and 
strengthen co-operation between national authorities and Eurojust, and strengthen 
and establish relationships with partners and third States (Eurojust, n.d.). 
This afforded it the same supporting role as Europol, i.e. co-ordinating information-sharing 
from the Member States’ national prosecuting offices but without executive powers of its 
own. 
That supporting and facilitative role could, in certain circumstances, translate into specific 
action in providing analytical and operational support to Member States.  This could be 
provided via the EU’s operational agencies such as Eurojust and Europol.  As set out in 
Chapter 7 Section 2.1, Europol has no executive powers.  However, while it cannot make 
arrests, it can call upon a great deal of expertise (Interview, Senior Official, Europol, 
2014).  A senior official from the EC3 cited the example of a recent major incident where 
the local Member State police did not have the forensic capabilities to analyse a crime 
scene.  In this instance Europol provided direct assistance in the form of forensic and 
analytical experts.  The results and findings were given to the Member State police who 
carried out any resulting arrests (Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 2014).  As the official 
described, Europol provides the detailed analysis of the crime scene or other data, but it is 
the Member State police forces who took executive action (Interview, Senior Official, 
Europol, 2014).  While not specifically a cyber-crime issue, the point of this example is 
that the forensic experts were Europol agents, rather than Member State police officers.  
Europol was facilitating the sharing of expertise and experience in a situation where the 
local police services did not have the required resources.  This enabled the EU to fulfil a 
role as an advice and expertise broker and co-ordinator of co-operation. 
That co-ordinating function is also brought to bear in the third of the five key strategic 
goals, developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) (European Commission, 2013a, p. 5,11).  In this policy area, 
the EU is seeking to develop cyber defence capabilities within the framework of the CSDP 
(European Commission, 2013a, p. 11).  At face value, this goal reads like a mandate for 
developing Union cyber warfare capabilities, something at which most Member States 
would baulk.  Closer examination, however, reveals this not to be the case.  The cyber 
defence section of the EUCSS is the weakest, most under-developed aspect of that 
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document.  At half a page long, it is the shortest section and contains none of the direct 
supporting action of, for example, that advocated in tackling cyber-crime.  It contains no 
references to possible legislative instruments to assist Member States or require co-
operation.  ENISA and Europol do not feature as the agencies operationalising this 
facilitative role in this particular area.  Reflecting the limited capacity for action in the pre-
Lisbon CFSP Pillar 2, this section once again advocates co-operation between interested 
parties and is assuming the role of facilitator between those parties, rather than advocating, 
for example, the development of specific, EU cyber warfare tools. 
To achieve this co-operation the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) are tasked with engaging 
with partners such as NATO to ensure that there is no overlap of responsibilities or 
duplication of efforts (European Commission, 2013a, pp. 15–16).  This desire to avoid 
duplication further distances the EU from specific action in cyber security.  This continues 
the arms-length approach begun in 2006.  While the Union can pass legislation enforcing 
co-operation in the areas of resilience and cyber-crime, the EU is effectively leaving 
European cyber defence to NATO.   
There are two reasons for this.  The first is that NATO, as a military alliance, is best placed 
to deal with military-defence issues in cyberspace.  It is developing policy and capability 
within the bounds of its membership Charter, utilising the tools made available by its 
signatory states (Interview, Traat and Ristikivi, 2014).  In addition, it has its own research 
centres such as the Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) based in 
Tallinn, Estonia.  To have the EU also engaging in such activities, particularly when a 
number of Members of NATO are also Member States of the EU, may lead to an 
inefficient duplication of efforts (Interview, de Vries, National Cyber Security Centre of 
the Netherlands, 2014; Interview, Ottis, Tallinn University of Technology, 2014).  As 
Smith and Jones of eu-LISA state, “the intention even from a pure strategic point of view 
shouldn’t be to do the same [thing if] someone else is doing it already” (Interview, Smith 
and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014). 
The second reason is that the EU has very restricted competence in defence matters.  This 
is a clear throw-back to the pre-2009 Pillar of the CFSP.  As examined in Chapter 4 
Section 2.1, the competences of the EU define in what policy area and to what extent the 
EU may become involved.  Foreign and security policy is an area of highly regulated EU 
action and consequently weak Union competence (Craig, 2010, p. 183).  So strong and 
196 
 
focussed is Member State government oversight and control in this field that one 
interviewee remarked that the European Parliament’s Security and Defence Committee is a 
“toothless tiger” due to its lack of direct, discernible impact (Interview, Senior Official, 
European Union, 2014).  Despite its inclusion in the EUCSS, cyber defence retains the 
restrictions placed on Union defence policy established under the pre-Lisbon Pillar system 
demonstrating continuity of competences. 
While action in cyber defence is minimal, EU involvement in the fourth strategic goal, 
developing industrial and technological resources for cyber security, is far more forthright, 
dynamic and assertive.  This reflects and continues the patterns of policy-making in Pillar 1 
– the Communities – established prior to 2009.  While the Union as an actor is weak in 
terms of cyber defence, it comes into its own in developing industrial and technological 
resources, particularly where these impact on the development and sustainability of the 
internal market. 
According to the EUCSS, the central goal of EU policy in this area is to establish an 
internal market for European-manufactured security products and services.  This is to be 
fostered by research and development assisted by a number of initiatives including the 
Horizon 2020 programme (European Commission, 2013a, pp. 12–14).  This was a wide-
ranging initiative intended to strengthen the Union’s “excellence in science”, foster 
industrial leadership to support business and tackle societal change such as “migration, 
integration, demographic change, the ageing society and disability” (European Parliament 
and Council of The European Union, 2013b, p. 105,163).  The thinking behind this is not 
purely commercial.  It reflects the EU’s desire to ensure the on-going economic and 
functional viability of the Single Market by ensuring competitiveness (European 
Parliament and Council of The European Union, 2013b, p. 167).  In order to ensure the 
security of systems and infrastructure, as well as engender trust in that infrastructure, the 
entire supply chain for building and maintaining ICT networks, from manufacturing silicon 
chips to laying physical cables, must be secure.  The EU recognised that European users 
depended largely on non-European solutions for cyber protection (Olesen, 2016, p. 261).  
European products and technical expertise would contribute to a more dynamic and secure 
Digital Single Market.   
The US recently set a precedent for this digital autarky by banning the use of Chinese-
manufactured components in any American ICT infrastructure systems
56
.  This followed 
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allegations that Chinese software and hardware companies were installing “backdoors”57 at 
the behest of the government in Beijing thereby enabling the Chinese military to access 
these systems (Interview, Senior Official, UK Cabinet Office, 2014).  While the allegations 
were strenuously denied, the US took no chances.  The EU sought to develop a similar 
system.  It was, according to the EUCSS, acutely aware that European ICT infrastructures 
rely heavily not only on private operators but on extra-territorial, 3
rd
-country manufacturers 
for its components and software (European Commission, 2013a, p. 12).  This has the 
potential to weaken the information infrastructure on which so many other physical 
systems rely. 
The approach the EU took to resolve this problem reflected patterns of policy developed 
under the pre-Lisbon Communities Pillar: incentivising the private sector, fostering co-
operation and establishing minimum standards, in this case through a voluntary 
certification scheme.  Because this is a policy area focused on the Single Market, the EU, 
and in particular the Commission, could flex its muscles and be more proactive.  It sought 
to establish a platform for solutions to incentivise private sector industry to build security 
into their products (European Commission, 2013a, p. 12).  Considering security as integral 
to product design, and indeed to infrastructure design itself, was argued by Ilves  
(Interview, Ilves, Govt. of Estonia, 2014) and McGraw (McGraw, 2013) as a better 
methodology than considering security as an additional layer or “bolt on”.  European 
standardisation bodies, in particular the European Standardisation Organisation and the 
Cybersecurity Co-ordination Group (European Commission, 2013a, p. 13), were tasked 
with developing certification programmes under the Smart Grids Standard and ensuring 
private sector engagement.  Funds from the Horizon 2020 project were also earmarked for 
research and development programmes for trustworthy ICT systems to be used in the fight 
against cyber-crime (European Commission, 2013a, p. 14).  All these measures were 
intended to reduce the EU’s reliance on non-EU technology which may or may not be 
compromised. 
The strategic aims of the EUCSS demonstrated a combination and continuation of core 
elements of the pre-Lisbon Pillar system.  Tackling cyber-crime, part of police and judicial 
co-operation, was a specific goal of the EU.  This was positioned alongside ensuring a lack 
of over-lap with NATO capabilities and policies in cyber defence, a clear remit of the 
former CFSP Pillar.  Both of these “strategic priorities” were intended to ensure the 
ongoing economic and functional viability of the Single Market and of the EU itself, a 
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policy area of the former Pillar 1, the Communities.  Such a combination of Pillar remits, 
however, would not have come about prior to 2009.  The entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, and its abolition of the Pillars themselves, enabled a level of joint-working and 
collective policy-making not previously possible.  This had important consequences for EU 
cyber security policy-making.  The nature of cyber security is such that policy remits and 
divisions are effectively irrelevant.  The threats and risks to cyberspace affect all aspects of 
policy-making regardless of abstract political divisions such as the Maastricht Pillars.  
Those Pillars were, however, hampering efforts to create an effective policy solution 
because it was not possible to develop a strategy which encompassed all areas of risk.  The 
Treaty of Lisbon removed those obstacles and enabled a holistic policy approach, the 
EUCSS, to be developed. 
9.4. The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on EU Cyber 
Security 
The new architecture of the EU initiated by the Treaty of Lisbon was an important 
milestone in the EU’s cyber security policy-making timescape.  Of particular influence 
were the removal of the Pillar system and the expansion of the Commission’s right of 
initiative.  Without this structural change the EUCSS could not have been developed.  The 
removal of the Pillar structure enabled DGs separated by distinct policy remits to work 
together to reduce the duplication of efforts and develop a cohesive approach to cyber 
security.  The Treaty also created the EEAS, which brought foreign and security policy 
concerns to the cyber security policy-making process.  An examination of the EUCSS itself 
illustrates the presence of policy initiatives which would have been developed under 
separate Pillars: initiatives in tackling cyber-crime (Pillar 3); developing cyber defence co-
ordination (Pillar 2); and protecting the internal market (Pillar 1). 
Avoiding duplication of efforts was a key element of the Treaty of Lisbon. In reforming the 
treaties on which the EU was founded its goal was achieving simplicity (Christiansen and 
Dobbels, 2013, p. 1164).  The changes it ushered in were intended to tackle perceived 
deficiencies in effectiveness, efficiency and democratic accountability.  It sought to 
streamline processes and responsibilities.  In doing so it achieved, in many respects, a more 
coherent and comprehensible European Union.   The Treaty of Lisbon was therefore what 
Pierson (1995, p. 458) labelled a “positive-sum” effort, one designed to sort out 
responsibilities within an architecture in a manner that better meets the needs of all actors 
involved.   
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Although the goals of streamlining policy- and decision-making were not directed at any 
specific policy area, they can most clearly be seen in the field of cyber security.  By 2009, 
cyber security policy had a 24-year heritage in the EU with the result being a fragmented 
and diverse library of differing legislative and policy instruments.  This included white and 
green papers, strategy documents, formal legislation, European Council pronouncements 
and conclusions of the Council of the European Union.  All of these were produced under 
differing decision-making and developmental patterns within the policy debates of those 
actors.  Creating additional fragmentation was the division of the task of operationalising 
that extensive acquis amongst a number of specialised agencies such as ENISA, the EC3 
and CERT-EU.  By abolishing the old Pillar system, offices that were not able to work 
together could now do so under the EU’s new institutional structure (Interview, Senior 
Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 2014).  As a result, a single strategic 
approach to cyber security was developed which encompassed the areas of the common 
market, critical physical and digital infrastructure, internal security and defence.  Cyber 
security policy demonstrated the achievements of the Treaty of Lisbon in its streamlining 
goals.  Decision-making was made more coherent, duplication was reduced and a more 
holistic, unified approach to a single policy area was developed. 
One question remains, however.  While the Treaty of Lisbon altered the architecture of the 
EU itself, and created an entity in which the EUCSS could develop, this does not 
necessarily mean that the Treaty effected any changes in the Union’s underlying cyber 
security discourse.   
9.4.1. The Lack of Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the EU’s 
Cyber Security Discourse 
While the Treaty of Lisbon ushered in major institutional change across the entirety of the 
EU’s structure, in cyber security the underlying discourse remained unaltered.  As 
examined in Chapter 5, that discourse is predicated upon five core ideational elements: 
economic maximisation, engendering trust in digital systems, the protection of fundamental 
rights, tackling cyber-crime and facilitating co-operation.  Because these five elements 
continued to under-pin policy after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it can be 
inferred that the EU’s cyber security discourse itself not only continued unchanged, but 
also proved resilient to the structural changes of the Lisbon Treaty.  This section of the 
chapter will demonstrate this continuity using evidence from acquis and interviews.   
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One of the first documents in the EU’s cyber acquis published post-Lisbon was a 
Commission Communication entitled Towards a Single Market Act for a highly 
competitive social market economy: 50 proposals for improving our work, business and 
exchanges with one another (European Commission, 2010d).  This Communication set out 
a series of proposals to “relaunch” the Single Market.  An important component of this was 
the development of a digital single market, reflecting the importance of cyberspace for the 
EU’s economic development (European Commission, 2010d, p. 9).  The aim was to 
revivify political interest in the Single Market and reassure businesses of its viability in the 
face of the global financial crisis (European Commission, 2010d, p. 3).  It was stated that 
the primary aim of the EU as an entity was economic and that “one big market is at the 
heart of the European project envisaged by the founding fathers” (European Commission, 
2010d, p. 1).  The purpose of this Communication was to remind citizens, businesses and 
politicians that economic factors lay at the heart of the EU.  These included creating jobs 
(European Council, 2011a, p. 1) and targeting youth unemployment (European 
Commission, 2012c, p. 2). 
Cyber security was a key element of this drive, particularly in the form of tackling 
counterfeiting and online piracy (European Commission, 2010d, p. 8).  To promote this, 
the Digital Agenda for Europe was established.  According to the former Bureau of 
European Policy Analysis (BEPA) at the Commission, “the ability to access data would be 
at the core of this economic growth” (Interview, Senior Official, BEPA, European 
Commission, 2014).  This meant that digital networks and infrastructures would continue 
to be critical to the revitalised economy in order to secure competitiveness (European 
Commission, 2010e, p. 4, 2009b, p. 2; Interview, Helmbrecht, ENISA, 2014). 
An important issue facing the EU in its efforts to revivify the Single Market following the 
hacks in 2007 and the 2008 financial crisis was a lack of trust in European economic 
systems.  This translated into a similar lack of trust in digital technology and online 
commerce.  A central focus of the Digital Agenda was to reverse this trend (European 
Commission, 2010c, p. 10) and renew confidence, not just in online transactions and 
communications, but by extension in the EU as a place to do business.  Officials from 
BEPA argued that it was, for example, in Amazon’s commercial interest not only to project 
itself as a secure and safe commercial entity, but also to be seen to be operating in a 
trustworthy wider economic community (Interview, Senior Official, BEPA, European 
Commission, 2014).  This shows the continued importance of engendering trust as an 
ideational driver of cyber security policy. 
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Trust in digital systems was particularly important given the increased globalisation of 
markets available through online commerce.  According to an EU functionary interviewed 
for this thesis, one third of Internet users are not confident when buying products from 
other countries (Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 2014).  
The EU sought to counteract this lack of trust and promote online commercial activity.  
Security of transactions and security of systems were important elements of the EU’s plans 
to engender citizen and corporate trust in digital systems post-Lisbon.  A tool to achieve 
this was developing the resilience of economic systems and critical information 
infrastructures.  These would address the perceived fear of hacks and cyber-attacks which 
was preventing users from fully engaging with the developing Digital Single Market 
(European Commission, 2009a, p. 5). 
One cause of this reluctance to use digital online media for commercial transactions, 
certainly from a private citizen’s perspective, was the fear of personal financial or identity 
data being lost or compromised.  Several interviewees stated that private citizens are more 
aware of their right to privacy and the capacity for their personal communications and 
transactions to be monitored due to the exposure by Edward Snowden of details of mass 
surveillance of communications by government security agencies (Interview, Senior 
Official, European Union, 2014; Interview, Senior Official, UK Cabinet Office, 2014).  
Labelled “Snowden Fallout” by the UK’s Department of Business, Information and Skills 
(Interview, Senior Official, BIS UK, 2014), there was an increased awareness of the need 
for personal data protection.  This protection was needed not just from criminal actors 
seeking such digital information for personal gain, but also protection from overzealous 
security services.  This was a form of mission creep warned against by Deibert (2009, p. 
327).  Data protection and anti-surveillance policies became a politicized issue after the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  This is evidenced by the Green party bloc in the European Parliament 
pushing for greater citizen protection from surveillance (Interview, Senior Official, 
European Union, 2014), a policy supported by the growing “Pirate Party” movement 
(Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 2014).   
The protection of personal privacy is not simply a matter of engendering and promoting 
trust in digital systems, however.  Privacy and data protection had been long-term concerns 
for the EU and acknowledged as fundamental rights to be protected alongside the freedom 
of speech and expression (Bangemann, 1994, p. 11; European Commission, 2007b, p. 1, 
1997a, p. p.17, 1997c, p. 2; Interview, Massart, SDA, 2014; Interview, Senior Official, DG 
HOME, European Commission, 2014).  By 2013, the communicative capacity of the 
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Internet and cyberspace had been demonstrated and acknowledged as a vital component 
against oppressive regimes.  The EUCSS itself cited the Arab Spring as an example of the 
capacity of cyberspace to ensure that rights of expression and free speech are fulfilled and 
maintained (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2).  Digital systems and infrastructures are 
therefore of critical importance not just for commercial and civilian life and interaction, but 
as a tool to exercise fundamental rights and pursue democratic governance.  This 
importance is shown by the fact that during the Arab uprisings in 2011, the Egyptian 
government shut down the country’s Internet access in an effort to curb the protests.  The 
right to access and disseminate information became a major driver for the Arab Spring 
itself, particularly in Egypt (Olukotun and Micek, 2016). 
The importance of protecting fundamental rights, as a driver for EU cyber security policy, 
therefore continued unaffected post-Lisbon.  The only difference was that, after 2009, 
privacy was formally acknowledged as a fundamental right accorded to all EU citizens.  
Privacy was incorporated into the TEU and TFEU through recognition of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (European Union, 2009a, p. 397).  The protection of such rights, in the 
context of cyber security, not only continued but was increased in importance after 2009.  
This did not, however, alter the EU’s focus on this sector.  Rather, it placed the respect for 
personal privacy and data protection alongside other basic human rights (Interview, de 
Vries, National Cyber Security Centre of the Netherlands, 2014). 
Another avenue employed to engender trust in digital communications was the tackling of 
cyber-crime, one of the five core ideational elements of the EU’s discourse.  The Union’s 
focus on illegal and harmful content addressed issues as diverse as the protection of 
children when online (European Commission, 2011c, 2010f, p. 3,4; Interview, Senior 
Official, DG HOME, European Commission, 2014; Interview, Senior Official, Europol, 
2014) and digital piracy and copyright infringement (European Commission, 2010d, p. 8; 
European Council, 2011b, p. 2).  Online piracy had increased in significance in this period, 
particularly due to the value of intellectual property in the information based economy 
(Meyer, 2012, p. 107).  This shows that the ideational priority of tackling cyber-crime was 
also unaffected by the Treaty of Lisbon.   
The only tangible change in tackling cyber-crime at this time came about irrespective of 
the Treaty.  This was the elevation of Europol’s high-tech crime unit into a dedicated 
European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3).  While the activities of this Centre do not differ 
greatly from its predecessor, they were clarified.  The EC3 now serves as the central hub 
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for criminal intelligence and information relating to online criminal activity.  According to 
its website, there are three areas on which it has been tasked to focus:  
 Cyber-crimes committed by organised groups, particularly those generating large 
criminal profits such as online fraud; 
 Cyber-crimes which cause serious harm to the victim such as online child sexual 
exploitation; 
 Cyber-crimes (including cyber-attacks) affecting critical infrastructure and 
information systems in the European Union (Europol, n.d.)  
 
The approach of the EU to tackling cyber-crime post-Lisbon is therefore not dissimilar to 
that of the pre-2009 period.  The EC3 still is not an executive law enforcement agency.  It 
supports Member States in their own operations and investigations.  It provides training 
and capacity-building as well as strategic analyses.  At the time of the EC3’s initiation, 
ultimate responsibility for identifying and prosecuting cyber-criminals continued to reside 
with the Member States’ own law enforcement agencies, as was the case prior to 2009.   
Not only does this demonstrate the continuity of the ideational element of cyber-crime 
post-Lisbon, the function of the EC3 maintains the EU’s arms’-length approach to 
achieving cyber security.  As an actor, the Union sought to facilitate information-sharing 
and co-operation through such hubs as the EC3 and ENISA (Interview, Purser, ENISA, 
2014; Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 2014).  Despite the Treaty of Lisbon extending the 
right of policy and legislative initiative as part of the removal of the Pillar structure, no 
extra authority or executive powers were afforded to Europol or the Commission.   
The lack of extra powers and the continuation of an arms’-length approach are 
demonstrated by the fact that legislation in this sector was sparse post-Lisbon.  After 2009, 
only five legislative instruments were passed.  Three of these related to establishing large-
scale initiatives such as the Horizon 2020 programme or extending ENISA’s mandate 
(Council of The European Union, 2013c; European Parliament and Council of The 
European Union, 2013a).  Formal legislation addressing criminal activity was limited to a 
Directive on child pornography in 2011 (European Parliament & Council of The European 
Union, 2011) and a Regulation promoting co-operation between Member States (European 
Parliament & Council of The European Union, 2012).   
These measures not only imply the continuation of the EU’s focus on cyber-crime post-
Lisbon (despite a paucity of formal legislative instruments), they also demonstrated the 
continuation of the EU’s operational methodology.  The EU was not expanding or creating 
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executive powers of arrest in the field of cyber-crime, or seeking actively to secure 
resources or infrastructures from criminal activity.  Instead, continuing trends established 
prior to 2009, the EU focused on establishing protocols and facilities for information-
sharing and co-operation.  A senior official from the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office stated that not only was this an area in which the EU could operate, but smaller, 
newer Member States want the EU to be involved in this capacity as this provides direction 
and coherence (Interview, Senior Official, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014).  
As Smith and Jones state (Interview, Smith and Jones, eu-LISA, 2014), it makes sense, 
under the principles of subsidiarity, for the EU to be involved in developing coherence in 
this particular policy sector.  This is due to the transnational, cross-border nature of cyber-
crime activity.  Cross-border activity cannot be tackled solely at the Member State level.  
Executive authority, in terms of specific technical solutions or powers of arrest, remains, 
however, with the Member States. 
In order to achieve its policy goals – maximising economic potential, engendering trust, 
protecting rights and tackling cyber-crime – the EU continued another trend established 
before 2009.  It sought to establish itself as an actor facilitating co-operation.  Instead of 
physically providing security it would work to ensure that those actors with ultimate 
responsibility for the security and safety of infrastructures (the Member States and the 
private entities which owned and operated digital networks) shared information and best 
practice effectively and efficiently.  Co-operation remained the primary modus operandi 
for achieving cyber security policy goals.  The continued primacy of co-operation in cyber 
security can be demonstrated in a standard content analysis of Union acquis.  After 2009, 
there are 229 references to co-operation in cyber issues.  Of those 229 references, 34 were 
made in the EUCSS alone.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table 9-1 below. 
Table 9-1: Content Analysis of Occurrence of Ideational Elements 2007-2013 
Element Co-operation Economics Cyber-Crime Rights Trust 
Number of 
Occurrences 
229 120 91 63 45 
 
While the focus on co-operation as a tool is a carry-over from the pre-Lisbon period, its 
presence after the entry into force of that Treaty highlights two important developments.  
The first is the larger role of the private sector in securing cyberspace.  There is a notably 
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increased drive to involve private operators post-Lisbon, particularly in the area of system 
and infrastructure resilience.  Measures to secure critical digital and physical 
infrastructures, such as the European Public-Private partnership for Resilience, specifically 
cited the enhanced role of the private sector in achieving cyber security (European 
Commission, 2011a, p. 6, 2010g, p. 10).  Co-operation between public and private actors 
would form a substantial aspect of the EUCSS itself in 2013.  Tunne Kelam MEP, as well 
as senior officials from the EC3, point to the increased attention paid to ensuring private 
sector involvement in the field of information exchange (Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 
2014; Telephone Interview, Kelam MEP, 2014).  The EC3 now operates as an information 
hub pooling and analysing intelligence from across the Member States.  Outreach activities 
conducted by the Centre have resulted in so great an influx of intelligence and information 
from the private sector that there is now too much data to analyse.  The EC3 has had to ask 
private operators to send less data (Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 2014).   
This increased attention was due to an acknowledgement that, by 2009, elements of the 
digital infrastructure spanning the EU were owned and operated not by publically-owned 
utility companies but by the private sector (European Commission, 2009a, p. 5).  In 
addition, much of the critical physical infrastructure underpinning EU functionality in 
general, such as energy, communications and transport, was similarly owned by private 
corporations.  The content analysis of the total library of Union acquis showed an 
acceptance throughout the policy-making timescape of the need to involve the private 
sector.  However, of the 12 items of acquis to specifically cite private sector involvement, 
five were published between 2007 and 2013.  The importance of the private sector in 
acquis is corroborated in research interviews.  Five of the interviews specifically attest to 
this important role.   
The second important development in facilitating co-operation was the initiation in this 
period of a specific conduit for such co-operation and discussion which had the ear of the 
presidency of the Council of the European Union.  In 2011 an unofficial body was 
established called the Friends of the Presidency on Cyber Issues (Interview, Permanent 
Representation of Germany to the EU, 2015).  While the establishment of Friends of the 
Presidency (FoP) groups is neither a novel nor unusual development (there are FoP groups 
covering a range of policy sectors) what makes this an important development with regard 
to cyber security is the collection of actors involved in the group, and the high-level access 
it has to Council leadership. 
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The aim of FoP groups is to provide discussion venues on policy sectors for the formal 
institutions of the EU, operational agencies and national Member State representatives.  
These fora enable functional overlap between representatives to be avoided and discussions 
to be held without the restriction of competences (Interview, Senior Official, DG HOME, 
European Commission, 2014).  In the FoP on cyber issues, functionaries from the EDA 
meet with counterparts in ENISA or the Commission to discuss each other’s activities to 
avoid the kind of overlap the European Council identified as problematic in 2002 
(European Council, 2002).  A range of working groups made presentations at a meeting of 
the FoP in December 2012, including justice and immigration, telecommunications, 
industry and competition (Council of The European Union & Friends of the Presidency on 
Cyber Issues, 2012).  This demonstrated the scope of discussions held in these groups, and 
their ability to facilitate better understanding of what each participant is doing.  Given the 
range of actors involved in these meetings FoPs facilitate the development of coherence of 
action and policy (Interview, Senior Official, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
2014).  They can act as advisory panels for the Council Presidency.  As such, FoP groups 
are potentially quite influential, despite being informal in the sense of not being officially 
instituted or mandated.  
Quantifying the FoP on Cyber Issues’ precise level of influence is challenging because it is 
an informal forum.  Only one instance of its meeting agenda was identified for analysis in 
this thesis.  Furthermore, EC3 officials acknowledged that the effectiveness of FoP groups 
such as that for cyber security depends on the enthusiasm of the sitting Presidency for the 
topic under discussion (Interview, Senior Official, EC3, 2014).  Due to the system of 
rotating leadership, an FoP group for a policy sector not considered a priority by the 
current Council Presidency will be less influential than that of a sector considered vital.  
The important point here is that the very fact such a body exists is testament to the 
importance placed on cyber security by the Union, and testament to the need for co-
operation as a methodological tool and policy aim in this sector. 
Cyber security policy post-Lisbon was not radically different from its previous iterations. 
There were specific innovations in this phase, such as the elevation of Europol’s high-tech 
crime centre to a formal pan-European Cyber-Crime Centre, the 2011 establishment of a 
Friends of the Presidency Group, and the confirmation of privacy and data protection as 
fundamental rights afforded to each citizen.  These innovations, however, did not detract 
from the EU’s underlying socio-economic discourse.  There was no focus on military or 
defence issues.  Those incidents which could potentially have been treated as national 
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security threats, for example the Snowden revelations, were perceived as threats to citizen 
privacy from over-zealous state surveillance.  In other words, they were still interpreted as 
socio-economic in nature.   
Furthermore, the elements used to frame this discourse also had not changed.  There 
remained a focus on maximising economic opportunities afforded by cyberspace, but also 
ensuring that citizens and corporations trust digital and online systems.  Protecting 
fundamental rights and tackling cyber-crime would go some way to ensuring this trust.  
The EU’s method of choice to achieve these aims was to continue to be a facilitative actor, 
bringing entities together to ensure that information, intelligence, experience and best 
practice continued to be shared.   
It is therefore clear that the Treaty of Lisbon did not radically alter the EU’s cyber security 
policy discourse.  The five core ideational elements underpinning it remained static, while 
the EU’s structure was radically altered.  This raises the questions of why and how this lack 
of impact came about.  The answer to these questions is the static, unchanging nature of 
Union competences. 
9.4.2. The Nature and Influence of Competence Post-Lisbon 
Far from being changed or amended in the face of major exogenous crises, the EU’s socio-
economic cyber security discourse was further entrenched.  This can be seen in the 
interpretation the EU placed on events in 2007 and 2008 in order to be able to develop 
responses within its competences.  An important example was the EU’s interpretation of 
the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007.  The Estonian government classified this incident as a 
risk to national security.  The EU, however, had no competence to engage with a national 
security incident.  It therefore approached the issue from a socio-economic perspective.  
This was a perspective born of a cyber security discourse developed over the years prior to 
2007.  The attacks on Estonia were interpreted as existential threats to the functioning of 
the Single Market and the EU’s economic viability as a whole.  This placed the incident 
within the EU’s socio-economic competences.  From an historical institutionalist 
perspective, this is unexpected.  Policy paths tend to shift and change due to the occurrence 
of major events and crises (Peters, 2005, p. 83).  In EU cyber security, however, the path 
dependency of the EU’s competence-defined narrative was so strong that instead of 
changing, the path was consolidated and employed to enable the EU to respond to an 
exogenous issue out-with its normal remit. 
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Despite being a major event endogenous to the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon also advanced 
policy-making in this sector but did not effect any changes to the underlying policy 
discourse.  The Treaty created an architecture amenable and conducive to the development 
of the EUCSS by removing the Pillar structure instituted by the Treaty of Maastricht.  It is 
fair to say that without this removal the EUCSS would never have been published in its 
2013 form.  However, despite these major architectural changes which became effective in 
2009, the EU’s underlying discourse in cyber security as a policy sector remained 
unaltered.  There continued a focus on socio-economic aspects of security such as ensuring 
the economic and functional viability of the Single Market, protecting citizen rights and 
tackling cyber-crime.  The solution of choice – facilitating co-operation between actors – 
continued from its pre-2009 foundations.  The unchanging nature of these core ideational 
elements meant that the EU’s underlying discourse was also unchanged.   
The EU’s cyber security discourse therefore remained resilient in the face of these major 
events.  There were no extra powers afforded to the EU as an international body in the face 
of apparent state-sponsored cyber-attacks in Estonia, or as a result of the new single, legal 
personality created by the Treaty of Lisbon.  The EU’s policy response to cyber security 
remained one predicated upon maximising economic opportunities, eschewing defence or 
military issues, and interpreting events as threats to the Single Market. 
Not only did that discourse weather the major events of 2007, 2008 and 2009, but it 
coalesced to form the foundations for the EU’s first formal, holistic cyber security strategy, 
the EUCSS published in 2013.  Analyses of the Context chapter of that document 
demonstrate that the five core ideational elements which construct the EU’s socio-
economic discourse underpin the purpose, background and overall content of the EU’s 
holistic response to cyber security (See Chapter 5 Section 2).   
The static nature of this discourse has particular ramifications for the theories applied to 
this research.  As examined in Chapter 4, the concept of “punctuated equilibrium” refers to 
moments of crisis which effect change in an otherwise stable and static policy path 
(Krasner, 1984, p. 240).  Large-scale departures from policy paths occur in response to 
important events or crises (Baumgartner et al., 2014, p. 59).  The major events in the EU’s 
cyber security policy-making process certainly advanced that policy, but did not punctuate 
its equilibrium in the manner anticipated by Krasner and Baumgartner.  Instead, these 
punctuation points served to further entrench the EU’s underlying discourse to the extent 
that it informed the Union’s interpretation of those events.  Although the EU’s operational 
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approach evolved and demonstrated elements of change there was no departure from the 
fundamental discourse the EU constructed around cyber security.  The policy discourse 
continued even in the aftermath of the Treaty of Lisbon, an event which punctuated the 
equilibrium of the Union’s entire policy-making and existential architecture.   
There are two reasons for this seemingly paradoxical effect.  The first is the long-standing 
institutional path dependency of the EU’s discourse in this policy-sector, a discourse 
predicated upon five core ideational elements.  The examination of that discourse in 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the conceptual continuity running throughout the 28 year 
timescape, inferring an ideational path dependency inherent in the EU’s developing 
response to cyber security challenges. 
The second reason that the Treaty of Lisbon did not, and could not, affect the EU’s 
discourse in this sector is one of greater importance to this thesis.  The Treaty did not affect 
or amend the Union’s discourse in this sector because it did not expand, enhance or 
otherwise change the EU’s fundamental competences.  The Lisbon Treaty clarified, 
codified and explained those competences, and the policy sectors in which they apply, but 
did not grant the EU any extra capabilities in those sectors.  This is particularly the case in 
foreign and security policy.  The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a 
jealously-guarded area of exclusive Member State competence pertaining to national 
security, was left largely unchanged after the Treaty of Lisbon (Craig, 2010, p. 182).  Its 
separate nature was codified as an area of “special” competence, sitting out-with the 
normal triad of exclusive, shared or supporting competences.  There was no scope for any 
expansion of authority or capability into military, defence, or national security 
considerations.  This meant that a socio-economic discourse towards cyber security was the 
EU’s only option.  The EU’s competences were an institutional constant throughout the 
entire timescape of 1985 to 2013 and their unchanging nature led to the entrenchment of 
the EU’s discourse in this policy sector.  This entrenchment and path dependency was so 
strong that exogenous crises such as the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and the financial 
crash of 2008 failed to punctuate those paths. 
The effect of Union competences on EU cyber security is to serve as an anchor for the 
discourse in that field and the five underlying ideational elements.  The path dependency 
affecting these elements was strengthened and reinforced between 2007 and 2013 despite 
being exposed to severe internal and external stresses because the primary institutional 
dynamic – competences – were not altered. 
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9.5. Conclusion 
Between 2007 and 2013 the EU’s cyber security policy-making process was exposed to 
severe institutional stresses.  Events which began outside the Union – the 2007 Estonian 
cyber-attacks and the 2008 global financial crisis examined in Chapter 8 – tested the EU’s 
ability to respond to cyber security incidents.  The nature of its response demonstrated two 
important aspects of Union policy.  First, its responses were based on interpretations of the 
incidents as threats to the viability of the Single Market.  Even an event such as alleged 
Russian cyber aggression against Estonia, described as an attack on sovereignty by the 
victim nation, was classified as a threat to the ongoing functionality of the Single Market.  
This was due to the Single Market’s reliance on resilient ICT infrastructures.  The 
economic importance of ICT was further demonstrated by the focus placed on that sector 
as a commercial domain following the start of the 2008 financial crisis.  In a move 
reminiscent of the 1980s, specific attention was paid to the ICT sector to stimulate growth 
and employment. 
The second aspect highlighted by these responses is the EU’s restricted security 
competences.  The reason for the EU adopting this interpretive, socio-economic approach 
was because it was confined to addressing socio-economic aspects of foreign and security 
policy by the 1987 Single European Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.  In 2007 and 2008 
the EU had a limited range of policy options at its disposal.  Put another way, the nature of 
the EU’s competences in security matters required it to interpret major international 
incidents such as “Estonia 2007” and the 2008 crisis as socio-economic threats.  The path 
dependencies initiated in the early stages of policy development in this sector – the 
importance of ICT to the Single Market and a restriction of competences to socio-
economic matters – necessitated a particular response to important exogenous crises.  This 
was the result of the development of an idiosyncratic cyber security discourse, itself the 
result of these policy paths. 
However, the nature of Union policy in this sector after the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009 further demonstrated the strength of these policy paths.  The Union’s 
discourse continued despite the fundamental changes ushered in by that Treaty.  Even with 
the removal of the Pillar system of policy development instituted by the Maastricht Treaty 
and the direct, Treaty-based clarification of competences, the EU’s cyber security policy 
continued to be socio-economic in nature. 
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The chapter also made two observations.  The first is a direct answer to the research 
question: Union competences led the EU to develop a particular, socio-economic discourse 
and approach to cyber security challenges, and also led to the continuation of that 
approach. 
The second important observation is there are ramifications for historical institutionalism 
due to the strength of Union path dependencies.  As examined in Chapter 4, the notion of 
path dependency is predicated upon the idea that policy choices lead to periods of 
consolidation and stability until a shock – a punctuation point – occurs which then causes 
policy change generating a new period of consolidation.  Punctuated equilibrium goes 
some way to explaining policy change.  The paths initiated by the EU in cyber security, 
however, were so entrenched that they withstood exposure to three very different but no 
less significant punctuation points, and continued unaffected, even becoming further 
entrenched.  This demonstrates that path dependency and punctuation points can go some 
way to explaining policy continuity, as well as policy change.  The final chapter of this 
thesis will explore these observations in order to demonstrate the influence of this research 
on both EU policy-making literature and historical institutionalist scholarship. 
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Chapter 10 | Conclusions 
10.1.  Introduction and summary of main findings 
This thesis opened with a comment on the 2016 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 Concerning 
Measures for a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information Systems 
across the Union.  This Directive established a set of rules for addressing cyber security in 
the EU and built on the influential 2013 Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union 
(EUCSS).  Not only did this Strategy identify the importance of cyber security for the 
Union in a number of areas, including in the context of its Digital Agenda, it set out for the 
first time a holistic Union approach to security issues in cyberspace.   
That approach had developed over the previous 28 years and, while other actors added 
national security, military or defence considerations to their responses to cyber security 
challenges, the EU adopted and maintained a socio-economic policy discourse.  This 
discourse and its continuity led to the research question this thesis sought to answer: have 
institutions and institutional arrangements led the EU to develop and continue with a 
socio-economic approach to cyber security?  In order to answer this primary question, 
three supplementary questions also required to be addressed: which institutions had the 
greatest influence on EU cyber security policy; did any non-institutional elements also 
have an influence; and was there any interplay between these institutional and non-
institutional elements? 
There were three main findings which resulted from the research carried out to answer 
these questions.  The first two of these findings constitute an empirical contribution to the 
study of the EU and its policy-making processes.  They reflect the specific goal of the 
thesis and emerged as a result of what it sought to explore: the influence of institutional 
dynamics on a particular policy area.  The first finding answers the first supplementary 
question for this thesis: which institution had the greatest influence on EU cyber security 
policy development and continuity?  The analysis conducted identified that the EU’s 
competences were the institutional drivers of greatest influence in this policy sector.  The 
system of exclusive, shared, supporting and special competences established a policy 
framework in which the EU was restricted to non-military, socio-economic policy choices.  
The result of this restriction was that only socio-economic considerations in cyber security 
could be developed and implemented.  This provides a direct, but over-simplified answer 
to the primary research question, one which takes no account of timing. 
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The second finding is the confirmation of the existence of a specific cyber security 
discourse based around five core ideational elements: economic maximisation, the 
protection of fundamental rights, engendering trust in digital systems, tackling cyber-crime 
and facilitating co-operation.  These five elements inform all policy in this field.  They are 
present at the initiation of Union interest in ICT in 1985 and continue into the publication 
of the EUCSS in 2013.  This discourse therefore represents ideational continuity 
throughout the 28-year timescape.  Crucially, the influence of these ideas on cyber security 
policy began before the Union’s socio-economic competences began to be formalised.  The 
confirmation of a discourse built around a set of ideational elements, and their continuity 
throughout the policy development timescape, answers this thesis’s second supplementary 
question: were there other forces at work – particularly ideational or catalytic elements – 
which inform policy choices?   
There is therefore a deeper, more nuanced answer to the research question than simply “the 
competences led to the EU’s policy”.  This deeper answer stems from the confirmation of 
both institutional and non-institutional influences on EU cyber security policy development 
and continuity.  This deeper answer acknowledges the importance of timing and 
sequencing and addresses the third supplementary question for this thesis: did any interplay 
between institutional and non-institutional policy drivers also have an influence on the 
reasons why the EU developed and continued its socio-economic cyber security discourse?  
The EU’s socio-economic interest in ICT began with the initiation of the Single Market 
programme in 1985.  However, once Union competences began to be formalised between 
the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, other policy options 
or approaches were no longer available.  The established socio-economic approach to ICT 
became the only manner in which the EU could tackle developing cyber security 
challenges, regardless of how those challenges or the sector developed.  As a result of this 
particular mode of interaction, that discourse continued unchanged between 1985 and 2013 
because the institutional framework of competences did not enable it to change. 
This ideational and institutional interaction and the resulting institutional stickiness of the 
EU’s discourse led to a third finding.  This is a theoretical contribution to historical 
institutionalist scholarship.  As described above certain policy choices, namely the 
codification of competences, meant that other policy options and approaches to cyber 
security were no longer available to the EU.  Path dependencies had been established and 
were locked in place.  Thus far, EU cyber security policy conforms to certain theoretical 
models of HI, namely that choices made early in a social process continue to have an effect 
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later in the timescape.  However, during the data analysis for this thesis cyber security 
policy was found to be highly resilient to major exogenous and endogenous shocks.  These 
shocks would normally have generated policy change, a process known as punctuated 
equilibrium.  In a break from standard models of punctuated equilibrium, instead of 
changing policy, the response of the EU to these shocks and crises was to further entrench 
established policy paths.   
This unexpected finding has important implications for HI as a theoretical approach to the 
study of the EU: cyber security as a policy sector did not follow the standard models of 
punctuated equilibrium.  Instead of changing to new policy paths, the EU’s approach 
continued and was strengthened as a result of the occurrence of the major events of 2007-
2009.  Punctuated equilibrium, in this case, goes some way to explaining policy continuity, 
rather than policy change.  It therefore provides a more flexible model for examining and 
explaining social phenomena than may at first be apparent. 
This final chapter has six sections.  Following this introduction, the three main findings of 
this thesis are set out in turn.  Sections 2 and 3 set out the empirical findings of the research 
and expand on the partial answer to the research question – that Union competences 
influenced policy development – to set out how this influence occurred and, most 
importantly, why.  The fourth section of the chapter reflects on the theoretical findings of 
the thesis and examines its resulting contribution to historical institutionalism.   
The fifth section of the chapter examines the implications of these research findings.  In 
particular, the section looks at the practical contribution the thesis can make for policy 
practitioners and scholars working in the historical institutionalist tradition and proposes 
avenues for further research.   
The sixth and final section concludes by setting out the empirical, methodological and 
theoretical contributions this thesis makes to current academic scholarship.  The thesis 
examined EU cyber security policy, an under-researched aspect of the Union’s extensive 
remit, and sought to explain why the EU approaches cyber security in the manner that it 
does.  This was done in order to expand current literature which focusses on how the EU 
approaches cyber security challenges.  The thesis also makes a methodological contribution 
to the study of social and political phenomena: a conceptual content analysis technique was 
developed specifically for this thesis.  This technique can be applied to other areas of 
policy development in the EU and beyond.  To facilitate this methodology, a new model of 
“actorness” was developed that blends elements of the work of Scharpf, Bretherton and 
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Vogler (Scharpf, 1997; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006).  In terms of theoretical 
contributions, the thesis applied historical institutionalism (HI) to cyber security and found 
that a specific mechanism of HI, punctuated equilibrium, can help to explain policy 
continuity, as well as policy change. 
10.2.  Finding 1: Socio-economic competence as the 
institutional driver of greatest influence on EU 
cyber security 
In order to answer the research question it was first necessary to determine which if any 
institutions had any influence on EU cyber security policy.  As set out in Chapter 3 this 
thesis used Hall’s (1992, p. 96) definition of institutions as formal rules, standard operating 
procedures and customary practices which affect actor behaviour and effect policy choice.  
Following this definition, the Treaty-defined competences of the EU were identified as the 
institution of greatest influence in this particular policy sector.  Divided into four types, the 
competences define in which areas of policy the EU can become involved, and to what 
extent.  As examined in Chapter 4 Section 2.1, in areas of exclusive competence
58
 the EU 
alone is able to legislate and adopt binding acts.  In areas of shared competence
59
, the EU 
divides this ability with the Member States while in areas of supporting competence
60
 the 
EU can only advise the Member States.  The CFSP comprises an area of “special” 
competence, where EU action is severely limited. 
Union competences therefore provide a set of rules and standard operating procedures 
(institutions) which led the EU to develop a particular interpretation or construction of 
cyber security risks and threats.  So strong was the influence of Union competences on 
cyber security policy that they created an institutional structure in which the only policy 
solution available was a socio-economic discourse.  The 1987 Single European Act and 
1992 Maastricht Treaty confined the EU to political and social aspects of security and 
restricted its capacity to address foreign and security matters.  This situation contributed to 
the organic evolution of a particular discourse of cyber security policy (examined in 
Finding 2 below).   
Not only did Union competences influence the development of a socio-economic 
discourse, they perpetuated it.  Between 1985 and 2013 the discourse would remain 
unchanged and be applied in the development of successive cyber security strategies and 
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 Such as the customs union, competition policy and fisheries 
59
 Such as the internal market, transport policy and technological research 
60
 Including culture, tourism and education. 
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proposals in 1996, 2001 and 2006.  This eventually culminated in the discourse’s 
application in the development of the EUCSS in the early 2010s.  The restricted 
competence in defence matters persisted throughout the timescape.  As a result the 
discourse could not evolve or expand to include “cyber defence” or any national security-
focussed elements.  The static nature of Union competence meant that the socio-economic 
discourse was the only set of policy options which could be applied in the event of cyber 
security incidents or crises.  Such incidents and crises subsequently needed to be 
interpreted in a fashion that enabled the EU’s discourse to be applied.  As examined in 
Chapter 8, this was the case with the DDoS attacks on Estonia in 2007.  Although the 
victim state described the incident as a national security threat and a defence issue, the EU 
interpreted it as a risk to the economic and functional viability of the Single Market.  
10.3. Finding 2: Clarifying the EU’s Cyber Security 
Discourse 
The second empirical finding is that the EU’s cyber security discourse, developed between 
1985 and 2013, was constructed around five specific ideational elements.  These are: a 
focus on maximising the economic potential of cyberspace; engendering trust in new 
technologies and ways of doing business; protecting fundamental rights such as privacy; 
tackling cyber-crime; and achieving these aims through facilitating co-operation across 
Member States at both national and corporate levels.   
These five ideas are policy norms which lie at the heart of EU cyber security policy 
throughout the entirety of the policy development timescape.  Using a conceptual content 
analysis technique developed specifically for this research it was possible to identify not 
only the ideational elements themselves, but also their pervasive, continuous presence in 
both acquis documentary and interview data sources.   
The reason these five ideational elements are important for this discourse is that they are 
not just present or identifiable in certain examples of the Union’s acquis communautaire, 
but form core components in all relevant acquis.  They are particularly prevalent in the first 
three attempts to develop a cyber security strategy prior to 2013: the 1996 Commission 
Communication on illegal and harmful content; the 2001 Proposal for a Network and 
Information Security Strategy; and the 2006 Strategy for a Secure Information Society.   
A crucial aspect of this composite discourse is that it is one which eschews martial 
language and focuses on socio-economic aspects of security.  The EU is not a military 
organisation and so a lack of military language is not surprising.  However, this statement 
217 
 
oversimplifies the reasons for the EU not using such language in cyber security policy.  
The deeper reason behind the lack of martial language in this policy area is because the 
five core elements underpinning that policy are themselves socio-economic in nature.  
There were few references to national security or military issues beyond mentions of 
terrorism in 1996 and 2001 or the need to develop partnerships with military allies such as 
NATO in 2013.  Throughout the entire 1985-2013 timescape, and the acquis developed 
within it, there was no use of language such as “cyber war”, a term coined by Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt in 1993 (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993).  Instead, cyber security challenges, such as 
those faced in the years between 2007 and 2009
61
, were interpreted as socio-economic 
threats.  This interpretation occurred because of the Union’s socio-economic discourse, one 
in which there was no scope or capacity for martial language. 
10.3.1. Empirical Implications: The influence of competences and 
ideas on EU cyber security policy development 
The research question for this thesis is: have institutions and institutional arrangements led 
the EU to develop and continue with a socio-economic approach to cyber security?  This 
question arose due to the EU developing and maintaining a socio-economic cyber security 
discourse while other state actors have added national security, military and defence 
considerations in response to the same challenges.  An initial observational answer to this 
question is: the EU’s Treaty-based competences have led the EU to the development and 
continuation of a socio-economic discourse.  As set out in Finding 1 above, the 
competences define in which policy areas, and to what degree, the EU can operate.  As a 
set of rules and standard operating procedures, the competences bestow great freedom of 
engagement in socio-economic policy areas, at the expense of military or national security 
areas.  Therefore Union competences confined the EU to socio-economic aspects of cyber 
security with very few details on military or defence matters.   
This answer, however, belies the complexity of the relationship between competences, 
ideas and the EU’s cyber security discourse.  It also takes no account of timing.  In 
gathering data sources and tracing the progression of the EU’s policy in this sector the 
empirical chapters of this thesis demonstrated that the EU’s socio-economic interest in ICT 
– what would evolve into cyber security policy – began with the initiation of the Single 
Market in 1985.  This was two years before the entry into force of the Single European Act 
(SEA) when security competences began to coalesce.  Historically, this concentration on 
economic, social and industrial policy was a throwback to the failure of the European 
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Defence Community (EDC) in 1954.  According to Dinan (2010, p. 21) the EDC would 
have enabled collective defence and security action in a similar vein to its counterparts, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC).  Because the EDC had foundered after being rejected by the French 
Parliament, there was no definitive clarification of European capacities in defence and 
security
62
.  These sectors were omitted from the precursors to the modern EU.  As a result 
of this omission, the EU’s security remit remained unclear until the mid-1980s.  That 
clarification came in the 1987 SEA and 1992 Maastricht Treaty but occurred separately to, 
and crucially after, the initiation of the EU’s discourse in what would become cyber 
security. 
Two processes were occurring in parallel to one another, both as a result of the EU 
developing a policy of economic integration post-1985.  First, the EU was embarking on a 
large-scale economic restructuring because it was, at its heart, an economic entity.  This led 
to the EU developing its interest in ICT as a sector for economic growth and increased 
employment.  Cyber security policy would evolve from this discourse.  Second, the Union 
was clarifying and codifying its restricted security capacities and competences, also the 
result of the EU developing this economic policy narrative.   
By the time the Commission published its Communication on illegal and harmful online 
content in 1996 these two parallel processes of economic development and codification of 
competences had intersected.  The codification in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty of the 
restriction of policy-making capacities to the economic and social aspects of cyberspace 
had important effects on EU cyber security policy.  It meant that subsequent policy could 
only address these aspects.  This restricted the EU’s discourse in that sector.  By 1996 the 
five core ideational elements identified in Finding 2 had become core features of the EU’s 
cyber security policy
63
.  With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty that discourse 
was locked in place.  Union competences established and formalised between 1987 and 
1992, two years after the initiation of the internal market and the commencement of EU 
interest in ICT, put the EU on a policy path from which it would not deviate.  This lack of 
deviation, or strength of policy path dependency, would be demonstrated 20 years later 
when the EU faced the Estonian attacks of 2007, the financial crisis of 2008 and the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.  Despite these three significant institutional 
stresses, including a major restructuring of the Union and removal of policy pillars, the 
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 A possible exception to that was the Western European Union (WEU).  However, as the European arm of 
NATO this was a separate entity to the developing EU.   
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 See Chapter 6. 
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EU’s cyber security discourse did not alter.  This was due to the strength of the institutional 
lock of unchanging, static competences.  Because competences did not change, neither did 
the cyber security discourse. 
There are two consequences of an interaction of static competences and a specific policy 
discourse.  First, that interaction meant that cyber incidents had to be interpreted in a 
socio-economic manner by EU policy-makers in order for the Union to be able to respond.  
This interpretive act was most evident in one particular event, the EU’s response to the 
DDoS attacks on Estonia in 2007.  At the time the EU interpreted that event not as a 
military threat necessitating a defence-policy response, but as an economic threat to the 
ongoing functionality and viability of the internal market.  Doing this enabled the EU to 
co-ordinate a response.  This act demonstrates the existence of a mechanism which enables 
EU policy-makers to engage with topics and issues in which the Union has limited 
competences, or even with matters outside its purview.  By engaging with a policy area 
interpreted as socio-economic, the EU is increasing the legitimacy of that involvement. 
Secondly, in historical institutionalist terms, the unchanging nature of its competences 
meant that the EU could not divert from paths established in the earliest stages of the 
policy process.  Path dependency had been created based around five core ideational 
elements.  This further demonstrates that the institution and institutional arrangement 
which had the greatest influence on the EU’s cyber security policy was the Union’s 
competences.  Their unchanging nature led to the entrenchment of a particular narrative 
approach to cyber security which underpinned all the EU’s policy in this sector.  
The answer to the research question for this thesis is therefore not simply “the competences 
of the Union” (despite this view being held by a number of interview participants).  The 
precise relationship of the EU’s cyber security discourse with those competences is more 
complex than that statement suggests.  The Union’s competences and its cyber security 
discourse were born of the same general socio-economic direction begun in the 1980s.  
That direction led to a clarification of policy remits and capacities for the Union which 
would evolve into a set of rules, standard operating procedures and patterns of behaviour.  
These would be of greater influence on the future development of cyber security policy 
than the cyber security discourse itself.  Competences would lock the EU’s discourse in 
place, tying its expansion, or lack thereof, to their own development.  Where the 
competences went, so too would go the EU’s cyber security discourse. 
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10.4. Finding 3: The resilience of EU cyber security 
policy to institutional stresses 
This institutional lock leads to a third finding, one which makes an important theoretical 
contribution to both EU scholarship and historical institutionalism (HI).  It relates to 
punctuated equilibrium, an important aspect of HI approaches to the study of political 
processes.  Under the mechanisms of path dependency, choices made at the initiation of a 
policy or process continue to affect that policy in later years.  In the case of EU cyber 
security this thesis has shown that that process began with the initiation of the internal 
market in 1985 and the promotion of ICT as a commercial domain throughout the 1990s, 
and was heavily influenced by the development and codification of Union competences.   
Once these choices were made, the policy sector entered a period of consolidation, or 
equilibrium, between 2001 and 2006.  During this time EU policies of tackling cyber-crime 
and fostering co-operation were entrenched and operationalised through the establishment 
of dedicated agencies such as ENISA and the high-tech crime centre at Europol.   
At this point, however, EU cyber security policy ceases to conform to the mechanisms of 
punctuated equilibrium.  Under those mechanisms, once path dependency in a policy area 
has been established, that policy becomes entrenched or “sticky” (Pierson and Skocpol, 
2002, p. 7).  It is subject to institutional inertia and it is difficult to alter or amend policy 
choices without a major impact – a punctuation – occurring which can cause changes in 
policy choice and direction.  Krasner (1984, p. 240) argued that when policy paths are 
punctuated by major events, new paths are created.  This is how policy choices are 
changed. 
In EU cyber security policy, such punctuation points occurred when the cyber-attacks on 
Estonia took place in 2007, the financial crisis began in 2008 and the Treaty of Lisbon 
entered into force in 2009.  Within the context of punctuated equilibrium, these events 
should have led to changes in the EU’s cyber security policy paths.  What actually occurred 
was that these paths continued and were further consolidated.  The reason for this was that 
Union competences and the five ideational elements of cyber security did not change 
between 1985 and 2013.  The only major opportunity to amend competences – the Treaty 
of Lisbon of 2009 – did not alter the policy areas and capacities of the EU.  Instead the 
Treaty clarified and codified its existing capacities, making it clear in which policy sectors, 
and to what extent, the EU could act.  The EU’s fundamental socio-economic discourse in 
this sector was unchanged after 2009 and actually became further entrenched.   
221 
 
This entrenchment following the occurrence of three major events is a significant 
divergence from punctuated equilibrium.  Instead of policy paths changing to new states of 
equilibrium following the occurrence of major critical junctures, in the case of cyber 
security the opposite occurred: previous policy choices continued and were written into 
new, definitive strategies such as the EUCSS. 
10.4.1. Implications for Historical Institutionalism 
The third finding of this thesis raises important implications for HI as an explanatory 
theory for EU policy making.  EU cyber security policy conforms to core elements of HI, 
such as path dependence and institutional “stickiness” (Alexander, 2001, p. 251; Pierson 
and Skocpol, 2002, p. 7).  There is, however, a significant departure from certain aspects of 
HI, notably punctuated equilibrium.  For HI scholars, this means that EU cyber security 
policy is an exception to standard models of punctuated equilibrium.  This raises 
opportunities for studying the strength of institutional dynamics in the face of punctuation 
points which would normally break continuity and cause change. 
The departure of EU cyber security from aspects of punctuated equilibrium is shown in the 
Union’s response to the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007, the financial crisis of 2008 and 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.  These events had important effects on 
cyber security in general and on the structure of the EU itself.  It was not unreasonable to 
expect that they would alter the direction of EU cyber security policy.  What actually 
happened was that the EU’s socio-economic cyber security discourse continued unchanged 
on paths established prior to 2007.  Between 2007 and 2013 such policy and legislation as 
was developed further solidified the application of the discourse’s five core ideational 
elements.  As shown in Chapter 5 Section 2, this entrenchment can be seen in the Context 
section of the EUCSS itself.  That section specifically utilises the five ideational elements 
of the EU’s cyber security discourse as the underlying framework on which the EUCSS 
was developed.  The implication is that the ideational foundations and concomitant 
institutional inertia of EU cyber security policy were so strong that they withstood the 
pressures and stresses experienced between 2007 and 2009.  Cyber security policy can 
therefore be held up as an example of a process with institutional forces of exceptional 
strength.   
While punctuated equilibrium is a tool for explaining policy change, this thesis has 
demonstrated that it can be used to explain policy continuity.  The events which occurred 
between 2007 and 2013 clearly punctuated the equilibrium of the EU’s approach to cyber 
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security.  However, the EU’s reaction was to strengthen its policy discourse.  It did not re-
evaluate its fundamental socio-economic approach, but instead used it to interpret external 
aggression as an economic threat in order to be able to produce a response.  Similarly, the 
codification of the EU’s competences in the Treaty of Lisbon could have been seen as a 
further restriction on its capacity to act in cyber security.  Instead it was used as an 
opportunity to develop a truly holistic cyber security strategy within the framework of 
those restricted competences, something which could not have been done without the 
removal of the Maastricht Pillar system.  That new holistic strategy was predicated upon a 
continuation of the underlying socio-economic discourse.  EU cyber security policy was 
therefore resistant to the punctuation points and critical junctures of the 2007-2013 period.   
This does not mean that either the model or mechanisms of punctuated equilibrium are 
flawed or deficient, or that a radical re-evaluation is required.  The opposite is the case.  By 
providing a tool to explain policy continuity, punctuated equilibrium is shown to be a more 
flexible and applicable tool which can be applied to a wider range of social and political 
phenomena.  This means that the findings of this thesis make a contribution to the 
development and progression of HI as an analytical approach by expanding the explanatory 
potential of HI mechanisms.  It also opens up potential avenues for further research.  
Future examinations of other areas of EU policy can identify whether cyber security is an 
aberration in standard HI processes such as punctuated equilibrium, or whether there are 
other policy sectors where critical junctures are shown to reinforce continuity rather than 
cause change.  If this is the case then EU cyber security policy can be held up as an 
exemplar of an under-explored aspect of HI analysis. 
10.5. Implications of this research for policy practitioners 
and avenues for further research 
This research is important because it looks at why a particular policy solution was chosen.  
Policy and strategy in the EU are structured by and around Union competences.  This thesis 
does not deny this fact.  What the research has done is unpack the relationship between 
competences as an institutional driver and a finished policy product, in this case the EU’s 
2013 Cyber Security Strategy.  In doing so, the research has shown that competences act in 
concert with key ideas, laid down at the initiation of a policy process. This thesis therefore 
provides greater insight by delving deeper into the policy-making process and makes a 
generalizable contribution to potential future analyses of international relations and 
political studies, including those beyond the European Union. 
223 
 
This is important for two reasons.  First, such a study has not been carried out in EU cyber 
security research.  This thesis has therefore provided a deeper, more nuanced 
understanding of EU cyber security policy-making.  Second, the inter-relation of 
competences with important ideational drivers can now be examined in other policy areas.  
There are scores of sectors and areas in which the EU is involved.  These range from 
agriculture to sports and tourism.  It is not possible to say definitively whether or not the 
features identified in cyber security – it being a long term process with core ideational 
elements and an idiosyncratic discourse – are traits unique to that sector.  The methodology 
for this thesis can be employed to extract the ideational elements and policy-making 
timescapes for other areas of EU policy.  Not only would this exercise provide insight into 
those other policy sectors, but it would determine whether EU cyber security policy is 
unique in its development. 
This thesis can therefore facilitate the understanding of not just how a policy or solution 
functions and came to be chosen, but why.  A methodology has been developed involving a 
conceptual content analysis of relevant policy documents published over a longer period of 
time than may at first be evident.  This longitudinal analysis can be employed to identify 
institutional and ideational drivers which have influenced policy in conjunction with Union 
competences.  This is an area of potentially fruitful future research which will deepen the 
understanding of EU policy-making mechanisms.  
The findings of this thesis are also important for policy-making practitioners in the EU 
itself.  As set out in Chapter 3, bureaucrats are not in position for the entire duration of a 
policy timescape.  They are therefore not always able to break the path dependency of 
policy solutions which have been developed prior to their engagement.  This thesis has 
exposed the underlying institutional and ideational dynamics in cyber security policy.  
There are, however, both positive and negative implications of an increased clarity and 
awareness of underlying ideas and discourses in policy.  As shown in this thesis, the 
existence of an underlying discourse allows for continuity of policy solutions, which in 
turn promotes stability of action.  Throughout the 28-year timescape the EU has 
consistently advocated for more co-operation in cyber security, and has set itself up as a 
facilitative actor to promote that co-operation.  This role has not changed, representing a 
stable anchor in a rapidly changing and evolving policy sector.  This is a positive feature of 
the identification of underlying policy discourses. 
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A second positive point stemming from the identification of institutional dynamics is the 
recognition that these dynamics have been of influence in this sector for decades and can 
be forgotten over time due to the turn-over in employment of policy-making functionaries.  
This is not to say that this cycle cannot be broken.  By being aware of underlying policy 
paths as a result of research such as this thesis, and the manner in which those paths 
interact, policy-makers have the opportunity to develop more creative solutions to cyber 
security problems.  This fact is not restricted to cyber security policy.  A greater awareness 
of the potential existence of underlying institutional currents in all areas of Union policy 
can be of benefit to practitioners in those sectors.   
There are, however, less positive aspects of this institutional and ideational endurance.  It 
should be pointed out that that same stability of action resulting from a continuous 
ideational background can reflect a certain inflexibility in developing policy solutions.  
Throughout the thesis, the argument has been made that the EU’s competences have 
remained static and focussed on socio-economic matters.  This has not enabled the EU to 
develop as effective a defence policy in cyber security as would be the case were the 
institutional frameworks of the competences more flexible.  The EU’s greatest strength – 
its institutional framework in which it can focus its efforts on socio-economic solutions of 
benefit to commerce and EU citizens – can also be considered its greatest weakness.  
Union competences have locked potential choices and solutions out of the development 
process.  Once again, by being aware of the positive and negative aspects of institutional 
strength and by being more self-aware of the underlying dynamics of policy development, 
more creative solutions within those dynamics can be developed. 
10.6. Contribution of the thesis and concluding 
comments 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to contribute to an improved 
understanding of the EU’s policy-making processes in the field of cyber security.  The 
study of this sector provides insight into the EU’s long-term policy-making process.  
Specifically, the thesis sought to explain why the EU adopted a purely socio-economic 
approach to cyber security when other actors included defence-oriented options.  This is an 
original endeavour and as such the thesis makes a number of contributions to scholarship.   
EU policy sectors such as agriculture, the environment, competition regulation or foreign 
and security policy have been the subject of extensive research, including analyses from 
specific theoretical traditions.  Cyber security by contrast has received comparatively little 
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academic attention.  Despite the speed of technological change in digital and online 
spheres, it was only recently that certain major events placed the security challenges of 
cyberspace at the top of political agendas and discussions.  This thesis contributes to 
current scholarship by focussing on an under-researched policy area. 
Cyber security was also not considered a stand-alone topic in academic studies of the EU 
and security.  Such literature as currently exists on cyber security policy in the EU has 
approached the topic from a relatively narrow perspective.  Contributions such as those of 
Christou (2016), Olesen (2016) and Sliwinski (2014) present interesting and valuable 
explanations for what the EU does in cyber security policy.  Crucially, however, that 
literature has never offered a convincing reason for why the EU has adopted its particular 
policy approach.  By undertaking an historical institutionalist analysis of this policy area 
this thesis has shown that it is possible to trace the development of cyber security within 
EU policy structures, and in doing so explain both why the EU adopted its socio-economic 
approach and why it continued.   
The thesis also made a number of methodological contributions to scholarship.  An 
analytical technique – a conceptual content analysis based on the work of Hycner and Berg 
(Berg, 2004; Hycner, 1985) – was developed for this research.  This was done in order to 
study a policy area which suffered from a lack of agreed terminology and definitions, as 
well as examine literature and interview sources in equal measure.  By searching for and 
counting the occurrence of synonymous concepts rather than individual words, a more 
nuanced, conceptual content analysis was developed that can be of benefit to researchers in 
a range of social science fields.  This methodological tool can be applied to other areas of 
scholarship which are similarly handicapped by inconsistent terms.   
The thesis also developed a method for testing the “actorness” of entities, the Scharpf-
Bretherton-Vogler model
64
.  This was developed by combining Scharpf’s conceptualisation 
of “composite actors” with Bretherton and Vogler’s three-part model of “actorness”: 
opportunity, presence and capability.  The model developed can be used to clarify the 
“actorness” of an entity not normally considered an actor in international relations, such as 
the formal institutions of the EU. 
The thesis also made a theoretical contribution to scholarship relating to the use of 
punctuated equilibrium to explain policy continuity rather than change.  By looking at the 
response of the EU to critical junctures and punctuation points, rather than the impact of 
                                            
64
 See Chapter 4 Section 3. 
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those punctuations, it has been possible to clarify that EU cyber security policy did not 
alter, but became more entrenched as a result of these incidents.  This is an area of 
potential future research in HI scholarship. 
The thesis’s adoption of an HI approach also contributed to the general understanding of 
the EU beyond cyber security policy.  By encouraging a more longitudinal approach the 
analysis of policy decisions need not be restricted to specific points in time, or considered 
as a response to single, major events.  As the analysis of cyber security has shown, EU 
policy can develop as a response to a series of events and decisions taken over a long 
period of time.  In the case of cyber security this was 28 years.  A more nuanced 
understanding of EU policy in any sector can be achieved if this longitudinal approach is 
adopted.  This thesis therefore makes a substantive contribution to current scholarship and, 
it is hoped, can provide a link to new and equally dynamic areas of examination in cyber 
security and beyond the EU. 
Cyber security itself promises to be a fruitful and rewarding research field.  At the time of 
writing the EU is currently undergoing major changes and demonstrating a resurgence of 
confidence in defence matters.  Analysts are commenting that defence integration is set to 
progress (Kern, 2016) and that the French and German governments are discussing the 
initiation of a dedicated EU army (Kornelius, 2016).  Such developments in defence policy 
raise the prospect of the development of a more defence-oriented cyber security policy.  
The evidence gathered for this thesis would suggest, however, that EU cyber security 
policy will continue on established, long-term, socio-economic policy paths. 
This is not a prediction of future development.  EU cyber security policy has shown itself 
to be highly resilient to change, even in the face of major structural changes to the EU 
itself.  Cyber security policy has remained on socio-economic paths founded upon five core 
elements for nearly 30 years.  Even after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
radically altered the structure of the EU itself, policy in this sector continued unchanged.   
There is therefore nothing to suggest that a new-found defence confidence will lead to a 
more defence-oriented approach to cyber security.  One reason for this is that Union 
competences have not changed.  The EU remains restricted in its capacity to act and will 
continue to be so unless a substantial change to Union competences occurs to expand them 
beyond their socio-economic boundaries.   
That being the case, EU cyber security policy has taken unexpected paths in the past.  The 
EU maintained a socio-economic approach when other actors added defence- or national 
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security-oriented paradigms.  The EU’s policy approach has not changed even when such a 
change is expected to occur in response to major events.  Given the current developments 
in EU defence policy, a harder approach to cyber security will not be a surprising 
development.  Cyber security is a dynamic, constantly shifting subject and the EU’s 
responses to this ever-changing field will provide fruitful and interesting research in the 
future. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – European policy and legislative documents 
relevant for cyber security 
The European policy documents relevant for cybersecurity include: 
 The Commission Communication on "Network and Information Security: Proposal for 
A European Policy Approach"
65
 of 2001. 
 The establishment of the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA)
66
 in 2004. 
 The Commission Communication on a "Strategy for a Secure Information Society - 
Dialogue, partnership and empowerment"
67
 of 2006. 
 The Commission Communication on a "European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)"
 68
 of 2006 which sets forth the horizontal framework 
for the protection of critical infrastructures in the EU. 
 The Safer Internet Programme69 2009-2013 adopted in 2008 to promote safer use of the 
Internet and other communication technologies, particularly for children, and to fight 
against illegal content and harmful conduct online. 
 The Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure protection (CIIP)70 of 2009 
focusing on the protection of Europe from cyber-attacks and cyber disruptions by 
enhancing preparedness, security and resilience and launching an action plan with five 
pillars of actions: preparedness and prevention; detection and response; mitigation and 
recovery; international cooperation; criteria for the ICT sector. 
 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services (Framework Directive)
71
 which sets new 
provisions on security and integrity of networks and services (Art. 13 a and b of 
Framework Directive). 
 The Trust and Security chapter of the Digital Agenda for Europe72, which launched 
several action addressing security and resilience. 
 The Commission proposal to modernise the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA), which is currently under discussion in the Council and the 
European Parliament
73
. 
 The Stockholm Programme/Action Plan74 and the EU Internal Security Strategy in 
action
75
 (ISS) which underline the Commission's commitment to building a digital 
                                            
65
 COM(2001) 298 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0298en01.pdf  
66
 See Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=-
CELEX:32004R0460:EN:HTML and  
67
 COM(2006)251 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0251en01.pdf  
68
 COM(2006)786 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0786en01.pdf 
69
 Decision No 1351/2008/EC 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/docs/prog_decision_2009/decision_en.pdf  
70
 COM(2009)149 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0149:FIN:EN:PDF  
71
 See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/regframeforec_dec2009.pdf 
72
 COM(2010)245 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0245:FIN:EN:PDF  
73
 COM(2010)521 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0521:FIN:EN:PDF  
74
 COM(2010)171 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0171:FIN:EN:PDF 
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environment where every European can fully express his or her economic and social 
potential. 
 The second Commission Communication on CIIP of March 201176 on 'Achievements 
and next steps: towards global cyber-security’ which take stock of the results achieved 
since the adoption of the CIIP action plan in 2009 and describe the next priorities 
planned under each action at both European and international level. 
 The Commission proposals on a Directive on attacks against information systems and 
the Directive 2011/92/EU
77
 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography adopted on 1
st
 December 2011. 
 2013 Cyber Security Strategy. 
 2013 proposed directive concerning measures to ensure a high common level of 
network and information security across the Union. 
  
                                                                                                                                    
75
 COM(2010)673 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN:PDF 
76
 COM(2011)163 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0163:FIN:EN:PDF 
77
 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:335:0001:0014:EN:PDF 
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Appendix 2 – EU Acquis relevant to Cyber Security 
Acquis Document Name Nodes References 
Bangemann Report to European Council May 1994 18 36 
COM (1985) 310_f_en Completing the internal market 8 27 
COM (1992) 24 final Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal 
protection of databases 
3 5 
COM (1992) 422 final Proposal for a council directive on protection of 
processing personal data 
2 2 
COM (1993) 700 Commission White paper Growth, Competitiveness, 
Employment: The challenges 
16 51 
COM (1994) 347 Information Society Action Plan 14 40 
COM (1995) 492 final REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION on the 
main events and developments of the info market 1993-4 
15 44 
COM (1996) 389 final Green Paper living and working in the 
information society 
9 32 
COM (1996) 395 final Info society impact on EU policies 15 23 
COM (1996) 471 final Learning in the information society: plan for 
education initiative 
9 13 
COM (1996) 483 Green Paper on the protection of minors and human 
dignity in audio-visual and info services 
10 26 
COM (1996) 487 final Illegal and harmful content on the Internet 18 43 
COM (1996) 607 final Europe at the forefront of the information society  5 6 
COM (1997) 157 initiative on electronic commerce 10 30 
COM (1997) 503 Ensuring security and trust in electronic 
communications 
15 31 
COM (1997) 582 final Action plan on promoting safe use of the Internet 13 32 
COM (1998) 50 final need for Strengthened international coordination 7 11 
COM (2000) 130 eEUROPE 2 3 
COM (2000) 890 computer related crime 23 77 
COM (2001) 140 eEurope impact and priorities 2 3 
COM (2001) 298 network and info security proposal for a European 
policy approach 
16 23 
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COM (2005) 229 FINAL “i2010 – A European Information Society for 
growth and employment” 
17 38 
COM (2005) 576 en 01 GREEN PAPER on a European program for 
critical infrastructure protection 
1 1 
COM (2006) 251 A strategy for a Secure Information Society – 
Dialogue, partnership and empowerment 
15 26 
COM (2006) 786 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION on 
a European Programme for 
3 4 
COM (2007) 267 towards a policy on cybercrime 11 16 
COM (2008) 712 legislative and work programme vol. 1 final  4 4 
COM (2009) 149  CIIP Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks 
and disruptions enhancing resilience  
16 23 
COM (2009) 277 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE 
COUNCIL Internet governance the next steps  
8 8 
COM (2009) 324 final  ICT Standardisation  2 2 
COM (2010) 171 final Stockholm program  13 20 
COM (2010) 245 digital-agenda for Europe-communication-en  20 34 
COM (2010) 517 proposal for a directive on attacks on info systems  12 20 
COM (2010) 521 proposal for a regulation concerning ENISA  17 32 
COM (2010) 608 final2 proposals for a single market  9 14 
COM (2010) 673 final EU internal security strategy  8 14 
COM (2011) 163 final Communication on Critical Info Infra protection - 
achievements and next steps towards global cyber security  
16 30 
COM (2011) 522 proposal for a regulation on co-operation through IMI  8 22 
COM (2011) 566 final Report from Commission Protecting Children in 
digital world  
4 5 
COM (2011) 60 final EU agenda on rights of the child  1 1 
COM (2011) European principles and guidelines on internet resilience  21 30 
COM (2012) 140 final establishing a European Cybercrime centre  15 23 
COM (2012) 196 Final European Strategy for a Better Internet for 
Children  
16 23 
COM (2013) 48 final Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 24 64 
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PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
Council of EU 2009 European Security Strategy  6 6 
Council of EU 2011 April Hungary: CIIP Conference Presidency 
Statement 
9 12 
Council of EU 2012 Dec Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber 
Issues  
1 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 1997 March on harmful content of internet  6 12 
Council of EU Conclusions 1999 Dec 14th Protection of minors  4 7 
Council of EU Conclusions 1999 May 23rd Brussels Budapest 
convention  
6 6 
Council of EU Conclusions 1999 Sept 16th Digital TV and protection of 
Minors 
1 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2001 May Brussels CIIP 14 18 
Council of EU Conclusions 2001 Nov 18th Spain's view on Europol 
cyber-crime centre 
11 16 
Council of EU Conclusions 2002 Jan Establishing a cyber-crime centre 
at Europol 
5 5 
Council of EU Conclusions 2002 May 13th Brussels preserving digital 
culture 
4 4 
Council of EU Conclusions 2003 Nov 7th Digital content  7 9 
Council of EU Conclusions 2004 May 14 Accessible Digital Content  12 23 
Council of EU Conclusions 2007 8th November general inc. cyber-
crime  
5 8 
Council of EU Conclusions 2007 March 23 CIIP 4 5 
Council of EU Conclusions 2008 July 11 Plan to combat cyber-crime  8 11 
Council of EU Conclusions 2009 Dec Resolution on collaborative 
approach to NIS  
13 18 
Council of EU Conclusions 2009 July 22 Position of Netherlands on 
cyber-crime  
8 12 
Council of EU Conclusions 2010 May 26 Adoption of resolution on 
Digital agenda  
9 17 
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 April 8 CIIP  10 13 
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 December Brussels (open internet)  6 9 
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Council of EU Conclusions 2011 May 19th CIIP and cyber security  8 9 
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 Nov 28 terrorist cyber-attacks  7 11 
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 Nov Brussels children in digital world  7 8 
Council of EU Conclusions 2012 Dec 5th PRESS RELEASE Launch of 
Global alliance against child sexual exploitation  
3 3 
Council of EU Conclusions 2012 Nov 21 Record of Parliament 
discussions on CSDP  
5 5 
Council of EU Conclusions 2012 Nov 6th Better coordination in council 
on cyber policy issues  
11 15 
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 July Brussels conclusions on cyber 
security strategy  
17 29 
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 Luxembourg approving Cybersecurity 
Strategy  
25 55 
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 Nov 26th Draft operational action plan 
on cyber-attacks 
2 2 
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 Nov 5th COREPER report on FoP 
activities 
5 6 
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 November Brussels CSDP  6 7 
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 Sept joint debate with EP cyber 
security digital agenda  
8 13 
Council of EU Policy Outline 2013 Feb 7 Improving cyber security 
across the EU - Policy outline  
5 5 
Council of EU Resolution 2009 Dec 29 on a collaborative European 
approach to Network and Information Security  
12 21 
Decision 1992 March of the Council on security of information systems 7 7 
DECISION 1999 No 276 1999 EC promoting safer use of the interne  10 19 
Decision 2000 375 on child pornography 7 13 
DECISION 2005 COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION 222 JHA of 
24 Feb 2005 on attacks against info systems  
7 10 
DECISION 2008 No 1351 EC Child protection on the internet  8 17 
Decision 2013 Dec 3rd of the Council establishing programme 
implementing H2020  
15 30 
Directive 1990  388 of the Commission   EEC 28 June 1990 on 
competition in the markets for telecoms services 
CELEX_31990L0388_EN_TXT 
3 4 
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Directive 1991 250 EEC of the Council MAY 1991 ON LEGAL 
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMS 
4 4 
Directive 1995 46 EC Parliament and Council on protection of 
individuals regarding processing of personal data 
3 11 
Directive 1996 9 EC 11 March 1996 on legal protection of databases  3 3 
Directive 1997 66 EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 15 Dec 1997 concerning the processing of personal 
data and protection of privacy  
3 9 
Directive 1999 93 EC Parliament and Council on electronic signatures 
REPEALED REPLACED 2014 
2 5 
Directive 2000 31 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
8 June 2000 Directive on electronic commerce 
9 33 
Directive 2002 19 EC Access Directive 1 1 
Directive 2002 21 EC regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks 
6 9 
Directive 2002 58 EC data protection 3 5 
Directive 2008 114 EC of the Council identification and designation of 
European critical infrastructure 
6 8 
Directive 2009 140 EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL On Electronic communications 
8 12 
Directive 2011 92 EU on child pornography 4 4 
European Council Conclusions 1992 Dec Edinburgh 1 1 
European Council Conclusions 1993 December Brussels 2 2 
European Council Conclusions 1993 June Copenhagen 4 5 
European Council Conclusions 1994 Dec Essen 8 8 
European Council Conclusions 1994 June Corfu 9 14 
European Council Conclusions 1998 Dec Vienna 5 7 
European Council Conclusions 1999 Dec Helsinki 6 9 
European Council Conclusions 1999 June Cologne 8 14 
European Council Conclusions 2000 March Lisbon 5 6 
European Council Conclusions 2001 March Stockholm 5 5 
European Council Conclusions 2002 March Barcelona 5 7 
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European Council Conclusions 2003 March Brussels 6 10 
European Council Conclusions 2003 Oct Brussels 1 2 
European Council Conclusions 2004 November Brussels 2 2 
European Council Conclusions 2006 December Brussels 1 1 
European Council Conclusions 2006 June Brussels 3 3 
European Council Conclusions 2006 March Brussels 3 4 
European Council Conclusions 2007 December Brussels 3 4 
European Council Conclusions 2008 December Brussels 2 2 
European Council Conclusions 2008 June Brussels 2 2 
European Council Conclusions 2009 March Brussels 3 3 
European Council Conclusions 2010 June 2 2 
European Council Conclusions 2010 September 2 2 
European Council Conclusions 2011 December 2 2 
European Council Conclusions 2011 October 2 2 
European Council Conclusions 2012 June 4 6 
European Council Conclusions 2012 March 1 1 
European Council Conclusions 2012 October 3 4 
European Council Conclusions 2013 Dec Brussels 3 4 
European Council Conclusions 2013 Oct Brussels 6 8 
JOIN (2013) 1 final Cybersecurity Strategy of the EU 42 128 
PRESS RELEASE Council Conclusions 5 Dec 2012 Launch of Global 
alliance against child sexual exploitation 
3 4 
Regulation (EC) 2004 No 460 2004 establishing ENISA 9 15 
Regulation (EU) 2012 No 1024 of 25 Oct 2012 on administering co-
operation through the IMI 
3 9 
Regulation (EU) 2013 No 1291 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 
2020  
14 28 
Regulation (EU) 2013 No 526 Concerning ENISA and repealing 
Regulation (EC) 460 2004  
13 19 
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SEC (2006) 642 cyber-crime impact 8 11 
SEC (2010) 1123_EN impact assessment re repealing 2005 directive 10 19 
Treaty 1987 Single European Act establishing the European 
Communities  
5 12 
Treaty 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union  4 9 
Treaty 1997 Amsterdam c_34019971110en 8 20 
Treaty 2001 Nice Establishing the European Community  4 6 
Treaty 2009 European Union AND Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
CONSOLIDATED  
9 14 
Treaty 2009 Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community 2007  
4 6 
Treaty 2010 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  1 1 
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Appendix 3 – Acquis categorised by Actor and Publication Date 
 
 
Year Commission Euco CoEU Directives Decisions Regulations Treaties
Historic 
events
1985
COM (1985) 310_f_en Completing the internal market 
(includes info tech and info sharing) CODED
1987
Treaty 1987 Single European Act 
establishing_the_european_comm
unities CODED
1990
Directive 1990  388 of the Commission   EEC 28 june 
1990 on competition in the markets for telecoms 
services CELEX_31990L0388_EN_TXT CODED
Directive 1991 250 eec of the 
Council MAY 1991 ON LEGAL 
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER 
PROGRAMMS CODED Z
1992
COM (1992) 24 final Proposal for a Council Directive on 
the legal protection of databases CODED
European Council Conclusions 
1992 Dec Edinburgh CODED Z
Decision 1992 
March of the 
Council on security 
of information 
systemsCELEX-
31992D0242-EN-
TXT CODED
Treaty 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty_on_european_union 
CODED First mention of EC 
"competence"
Establishment 
of Single 
Market
COM (1992) 422 final Proposal for a council directive on 
protection of processing personal data UNI PITT 
ARCHIVE 130 PAGES
1993
COM (1993) 700 Commission White paper Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment The challenges NVIVO 
CODED
European Council Conclusions 
1993 December Brussels 
CODED Z
European Council Conclusions 
1993 June Copenhagen CODED 
Z
1994
Bangemann Report to European Council May 1994 Z European Council Conclusions 
1994 Dec Essen
COM (1994) 347 info_socieity_action_plan_PPP CODED European Council Conclusions 
1994 June Corfu CODED Z
1995
COM (1995) 492 final REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION 
on the main events and developments of the info 
market 1993-4 CODED
Directive 1995 46 EC Parl and 
Council on protection of 
individuals regarding 
processing of personal data 
CODED
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Year Commission Euco CoEU Directives Decisions Regulations Treaties
Historic 
events
1996
COM (1996) 389 final Green Paper living and working in 
the information society CODED
Directive 1996 9 EC 11 March 
1996 on legal protection of 
databases 
CELEX_31996L0009_EN_TXT 
4 yrs after COM proposal 
CODED
COM (1996) 395 final Info society impact on EU policies 
CODED
COM (1996) 471 final Learning in the information 
society plan for education initiative CODED
COM (1996) 483 Green Paper on the protection of 
minors and human dignity in audiovisual and info 
services CODED
COM (1996) 487 final Illegal and harmful content on the 
Internet PPP CODED
COM (1996) 607 final Europe at the forefront of the 
information society CODED
1997
COM (1997) 157 initiative on electronic commerce 
CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 1997 
March on harmful content of 
internet CODED
Directive 1997 66 EC OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
OF THE COUNCIL 15 Dec 
1997 concerning the 
processing of personal data 
and protection of privacy 
CODED
Treaty 1997 Amsterdam 
c_34019971110en CODED
COM (1997) 503 Ensuring security and trust in electronic 
comms CODED
COM (1997) 582 final Action plan on promoting safe use 
of the Internet PPP CODED
1998
COM (1998) 50 final need for Strengthened intl 
coordination CODED
European Council Conclusions 
1998 Dec Vienna CODED Z
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Year Commission Euco CoEU Directives Decisions Regulations Treaties
Historic 
events
1999
European Council Conclusions 
1999 June Cologne CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 1999 
Dec 14th Protection of minors 
CODED
Directive 1999 93 EC Parl and 
Council on electronic 
signatures REPEALED 
REPLACED 2014 CODED Z
DECISION 1999 No 
276 1999 EC 
promoting safer 
use of the internet 
CELEX_31999D027
6_EN_TXT CODED 
Z
European Council Conclusions 
1999 Helsinki CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 1999 
May 23rd Brussels Budapest 
convention CODED
Council of EU Conclusions 1999 
Sept 16th Digitla TV and 
protection of Minors CODED
2000
COM (2000) 130 eEUROPE CODED European Council Conclusions 
2000 March Lisbon CODED Z
Directive 2000 31 EC of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2000 
Directive on electronic 
commerce CODED Z
Decision 2000 375 
On_child_pornogra
phy_en_1 CODED Z
COM (2000) 890 computer related crime CODED
2001
COM (2001) 140 eEurope impact and priorities European Council Conclusions 
2001 March Stockholm CODED 
Z
Treaty 2001 Nice Establishing the 
European CommunityEIF 
1_2_2003 
CELEX_12002E_TXT_EN_TXT 
CODED
COM (2001) 298 network and info security proposal for a 
European policy approach PPP CODED DEVELOPED IN 
RESPONSE TO COLOGNE EUCO 1999
Council of EU Conclusions 2001 
Nov 18th Spain's view on 
Europol cyber crime centre 
CODED
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Year Commission Euco CoEU Directives Decisions Regulations Treaties
Historic 
events
2002
European Council Conclusions 
2002 March Barcelona CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2002 
Jan CIIP Info net security est 
cyber crime cenre at Europol 
CODED
Directive 2002 19 EC Access 
Directive CODED
Council of EU Intro note from 
PermRep to Council 2002 May 
13th Brussels preserving digital 
culture CODED
Directive 2002 21 EC 
regulatory framework for 
elec comms networks CODED
Directive 2002 58 EC data 
protection CODED
2003
European Council Conclusions 
2003 March Brussels CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2003 
Nov 7th Note from Presidency 
to Council Digital content 
CODED
European Council Conclusions 
2003 Oct Brussels CODED Z
2004
European Council Conclusions 
2004 November Brussels 
CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2004 
May 14 Accessible Digital 
Content CODED
Regulation (EC) 
2004 No 460 2004 
establishing ENISA 
CODED Z
2005
COM (2005) 229 FINAL “i2010 – A European Information 
Society for growth and employment” CODED
DECISION 2005 
COUNCIL 
FRAMEWORK 
DECISION 222 JHA 
of 24 feb 2005 on 
attacks against 
info systems 
CODED
COM (2005) 576 en 01 GREEN PAPER on a european 
program for ciritical infrastructure protection CODED
2006
COM (2006) 251 A strategy for a Secure Information 
Society – Dialogue, partnership and PPPNVIVO CODED
European Council Conclusions 
2006 December Brussels 
CODED Z
COM (2006) 786 COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
COMMISSION on a European Programe for CIP CODED
European Council Conclusions 
2006 June Brussels CODED Z
European Council Conclusions 
2006 March Brussels CODED Z
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Year Commission Euco CoEU Directives Decisions Regulations Treaties
Historic 
events
2007
COM (2007) 267 towards a policy on cybercrime CODED European Council Conclusions 2007 
December Brussels CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2007 
8th November general inc cyber 
crime CODED
Estonian 
cyber attack
SEC (2007) 642 Commission staff working document cyber crime impact CODED Council of EU Conclusions 2007 
March 23 CIIP CODED
2008
COM (2008) 712 legislative and work programme vol Ifinal CODED European Council Conclusions 2008 
December Brussels CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2008 
July 11 Plan to combat cyber 
crime CODED
Directive 2008 114 EC of 
the Council identification 
and designation of 
european critical 
infrastructure CODED
DECISION 2008 
No 1351 EC Child 
protection on the 
internet CODED
Georgian 
cyber attack
European Council Conclusions 2008 
June Brussels CODED Z
2009
COM (2009) 149  CIIP Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks and 
disruptions enhancing resilience CODED
European Council Conclusions 2009 
March Brussels CODED Z
Council of EU 2009 European 
Security Strategy CODED
Directive 2009 140 EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL Electronic 
communications CODED
Treaty 2009 
European Union 
AND Treaty on the 
Functioning of the 
EU CONSOLIDATED 
COM (2009) 277 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Internet governance the next steps 
CODED
Council of EU Conclusions 2009 
Dec Resolution on collaborative 
approach to NIS CODED
Treaty 2009 
Lisbon amending 
the Treaty on 
European Union 
and the Treaty 
COM (2009) 324 final  ict standardisation CODED AN EXAMPLE OF A POLICY 
WHICH SHARES A NUMBER OF KEY PRINCIPLES BUT IS NOT STRICTLY RELATED TO 
CYBER SECURITY, ONLY TANGENTIALLY
Council of EU Conclusions 2009 
July 22 Position of Netherlands 
on cyber crime CODED
Council of EU Resolution 2009 
Dec 29 on a collaborative 
European approach to Network 
and Information Security 
CODED
2010
COM (2010) 171 final stockholm program CODED European Council Conclusions 2010 
June CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2010 
May 26 Adoption of resolution 
on Digital agenda CODED
Stuxnet
COM (2010) 245 digital-agenda for europe-communication-en CODED European Council Conclusions 2010 
September CODED Z
COM (2010) 517 proposal for a directive on attacks on info systems CODED
COM (2010) 521 proposal for a regulation concerning ENISA CODED
COM (2010) 608 final2 proposals for a single market CODED
COM (2010) 673 final EU internal security strategy CODED
SEC (2010) 1123_EN impact assessment re relealing 2005 directive CODED
Treaty 2010 
Charter of 
Fundamental 
Rights of the 
Europena Union 
c_326 
20121026en03910
407 CODED
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Year Commission Euco CoEU Directives Decisions Regulations Treaties
Historic 
events
2011
COM (2011) 163 final Comm on Critical Info Infra protection - achievements and 
next steps towards global cyber security CODED
European Council Conclusions 2011 
December CODED Z
Council of EU 2011 April 
HU_CIIP_Conference_Presidenc
y_Statement_final CODED
Directive 2011 92 EU on 
child pornography CODED
COM (2011) 522 proposal for a regulation on co-operation through IMI CODED European Council Conclusions 2011 
October CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 
April 8 CIIP CODED
COM (2011) 566 final Report from Commission Protecting Children in digital world 
CODED
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 
December Brussels (open 
internet) CODED
COM (2011) 60 final EU agenda on rights of the child CODED Council of EU Conclusions 2011 
May 19th CIIP and cyber 
security CODED
COM (2011) European principles and guidelines on internet resilience CODED Council of EU Conclusions 2011 
27 May Brussels CIIP CODED
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 
Nov 28 terrorist cyber attacks 
CODED
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 
Nov Brussels children in digital 
world CODED
2012
COM (2012) 140 final establishing a European Cybercrime centre CODED European Council Conclusions 2012 
June CODED Z
Council of EU 2012 Dec FoP 
Agenda CODED
COM (2012) 196 Final European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children CODED European Council Conclusions 2012 
March CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2012 
Dec 5th PRESS RELEASE Launch 
of Global alliance against child 
sexual exploitation CODED
European Council Conclusions 2012 
October CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2012 
Nov 21 Record of Parliament 
discussions on CSDP CODED
Council of EU Conclusions 2012 
Nov 6th Better coordination in 
council on cyber policy issues 
CODED
PRESS RELEASE Council 
Conclusions 5 Dec 2012 Launch 
of Global alliance against child 
sexual exploitation CODED
Regulation 
(EU) 2012 No 
1024 of 
25_10_2012 on 
admin co-op 
through IMI 
STATES 
COMMISSION 
PROVIDES 
SECURITY 
CODED
243 
 
 
 
  
Year Commission Euco CoEU Directives Decisions Regulations Treaties
Historic 
events
2013
COM (2013) 48 final Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL CODED
European Council Conclusions 
2013 Dec Brussels CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 
July Brussels conclusions on cy 
sec strat CODED
Decision 2013 Dec 
3rd of the Council 
establishing 
programme 
implementing 
H2020 CODED
Regulation (EU) 
2013 No 1291 OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND 
OF THE COUNCIL of 
11 December 2013 
establishing Horizon 
2020 CODED
JOIN (2013) 1 final Cybersecurity Strategy of the EU CODEDEuropean Council Conclusions 
2013 Oct Brussels CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 
Luxembourg approving 
Cybersecurity Strategy CODED
Regulation (EU) 
2013 No 526 
Concerning EnISA 
and repealing 
Regulation (EC) 460 
2004 CODED Z
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 
Nov 26th Draft operational 
action plan on cyber attacks 
CODED
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 
Nov 5th COREPER report on FoP 
activities CODED
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 
November Brussels CSDP 
CODED
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 
Sept joint debate with EP cyber 
security digital agenda CODED
Council of EU Policy Outline 
2013 Feb 7 Improving cyber 
security acros the EU - Policy 
outline CODED
244 
 
Appendix 4 – EU acquis relating to Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
 
Acquis Document Name References 
COM (2005) 229 FINAL i2010 – A European Information Society for growth and employment 1 
COM (2005) 576 en 01 GREEN PAPER on a European program for critical infrastructure protection 1 
COM (2007) 267 towards a policy on cybercrime 1 
COM (2009) 149  CIIP Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions enhancing resilience 1 
COM (2009) 277 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Internet 
governance the next steps 
1 
COM (2010) 245 digital agenda for Europe 1 
COM (2010) 517 proposal for a directive on attacks on info systems 1 
COM (2011) 163 final Communication on Critical Info Infra protection - achievements and next steps towards global cyber security 1 
COM (2011) European principles and guidelines on internet resilience 1 
COM (2013) 48 final Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 3 
Council of EU 2009 European Security Strategy 1 
Council of EU 2011 April Hungary: CIIP Conference Presidency Statement 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2009 Dec Resolution on collaborative approach to NIS 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 April 8 CIIP 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 May 19th CIIP and cyber security 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 May Brussels CIIP 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 Nov 28 terrorist cyber-attacks 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2012 Nov 6th Better coordination in council on cyber policy issues 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 July Brussels conclusions on the Cyber Security Strategy 2 
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 Luxembourg approving Cybersecurity Strategy 1 
Decision 2013 Dec 3rd of the Council establishing programme implementing H2020 2 
European Council Conclusions 2001 March Stockholm 1 
JOIN (2013) 1 final Cybersecurity Strategy of the EU 1 
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Appendix 5 – EU acquis relating to the 2008 financial crisis 
Acquis Document Name References 
COM (2008) 712 legislative and work programme vol. 1 final 9 
COM (2009) 277 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Internet 
governance the next steps 
1 
COM (2010) 171 final Stockholm program 2 
COM (2010) 608 final2 proposals for a single market 4 
Council of EU Conclusions 2011 December Brussels (open internet) 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2012 Nov 21 Record of Parliament discussions on CSDP 1 
Council of EU Conclusions 2013 November Brussels CSDP 1 
Decision 2013 Dec 3rd of the Council establishing programme implementing H2020 1 
European Council Conclusions 1998 Dec Vienna 1 
European Council Conclusions 2008 December Brussels 2 
European Council Conclusions 2009 March Brussels 1 
European Council Conclusions 2010 June 1 
European Council Conclusions 2010 September 1 
European Council Conclusions 2011 December 1 
European Council Conclusions 2011 October 1 
Regulation (EU) 2013 No 1291 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 2020 3 
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Appendix 6 – European Commission DG HOME Organisation Chart 
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Appendix 7 – Sample Interview Questions 
 
Sample questions 
(Not all questions will be relevant for all participants) 
1. What have been the most important factors in the development of the European 
Union (EU)’s response to cybersecurity challenges?  
 
2. A hypothesis of this research project is that, as a result of a number of 
institutional forces, the EU approaches the problem of cybersecurity from a 
socio-economic, criminal justice, standpoint in contrast to the more military 
approaches of other actors in the field. What is your opinion on this hypothesis?  
 
3. A second hypothesis of this research project is that there is an historic 
correlation between the EU’s cybersecurity policy and its wider foreign and 
security policy (CFSP). What is your opinion on this hypothesis?  
 
4. It was stated in the EU’s 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy that “dealing with security 
challenges in cyberspace is predominantly the task of Member States.” If this is 
the case, what are the reasons behind the EU becoming involved in cybersecurity 
to the extent that it has done, with the initiation of eu-LISA, ENISA and the 
European Cyber-Crime Centre at Europol?  
 
5. If the EU has restricted competence in security matters, and exclusive or shared 
competence in certain socio-economic policy areas, can the EU’s 2013 
Cybersecurity Strategy and Directive be seen as an attempt to combine its 
competences between these areas?  
 
6. A goal cited in the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy is the development of cyber 
defence capabilities. What can EU do or achieve in this area given that defence 
remains a national remit?  
a. Is the EU attempting to build a capacity alongside national defence 
strategies and capabilities?  
 
7. Coherence in cybersecurity responses is also cited as a goal for the EU. How can 
the EU achieve this given that much of the infrastructure on which cyberspace is 
based is owned and operated by global private actors, many of whose 
headquarters are not located within EU geopolitical borders?  
 
8. What has been the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on EU cybersecurity?  
 
9. What is your view on the role of the Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber 
Issues?  
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Appendix 8 – Participant Information and Plain 
Language Statement 
 
Plain Language Statement 
1. Study title and Researcher Details 
Cyber Security and the European Union: An Historical Institutionalist Analysis of a 
21
st
 Century Security Concern 
 
Researcher: Robert S. Dewar 
 
2. Invitation paragraph  
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time 
to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide 
whether or not you wish to take part. 
Thank you for reading this.  
3. What is the purpose of the study? 
To examine the response of the European Union to Cyber Security issues, and apply 
Institutionalist principles to that examination. 
4. Why have I been chosen? 
Your participation in this study has been requested because your expertise and experience in 
the field of European cyber security would be valuable to the development of this research 
project. 
5. Do I have to take part? 
No.  Participation is entirely voluntary. 
6. What will happen to me if I take part? 
Your participation is entirely voluntary.  Should you consent to be identified in the final 
dissertation, you will be named as a source in the bibliography.  Should you choose to 
participate anonymously, no identification will be made. 
Should you choose to participate in this research project you will be asked for an interview 
regarding your involvement and views on the subject of the project.  The interview will last 
approximately 1 to 1.5 hours. 
The interviews will be held face-to-face in person at a time and location convenient to you.  
Should a face-to-face meeting not be feasible or appropriate, the interviews may be 
conducted by telephone, video-conferencing (e.g. Skype) or via email exchange, whichever 
is most suitable for you. 
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A set of preliminary questions will be provided in advance of the interview.  This will 
demonstrate the subject areas which the researcher wishes to discuss, based on your 
expertise.  During the course of the interview other questions may arise as a consequence of 
themes under discussion. 
The interviews will be audiotaped, but only if you consent to this.  Question 3 of the 
accompanying Consent Form enables you to provide or deny consent for interviews to be 
audiotaped. 
During the interview you have the right at any time to withdraw an answer, refuse to answer 
a question or end the interview.  Participation in this research study and the answering of any 
specific question is entirely voluntary. 
7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes.  There is a section on the participation consent form which allows you to state at what 
level you would prefer to participate.  You can choose to be named in the final thesis or, 
should you not wish to be named, you may choose to participate under a pseudonym so that 
you cannot be identified.   Alternatively you may choose to have your input to this project 
attributed to the institution you represent, with no name or pseudonym assigned in the study. 
8. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be analysed and submitted in a PhD thesis for the University of Glasgow.  
Should you choose to participate a written summary of the results of the research study will 
be provided to you. 
9. Who is organising and funding the research? (If relevant) 
This is an independent piece of research for a PhD thesis at the University of Glasgow. 
Fieldwork funding is being provided by the University Association for Contemporary 
European Studies. 
10. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the College of Social Sciences Ethics Committee and is 
being supervised by Dr Brandon Valeriano and Dr Eamonn Butler of the University of 
Glasgow. 
11. Contact for Further Information  
If you would like further clarification or information, Please contact the researcher, Robert 
Dewar.  He can be contacted at 
Email: r.dewar.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of the research project that they can contact 
the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer by contacting Dr Valentina Bold, 
(valentina.bold@glasgow.ac.uk)  
http://www.gla.ac.uk/colleges/socialsciences/info/students/ethics/committee/ 
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Appendix 9 – Sample Participant Consent Form 
 
Consent Form 
Title of Project: Cyber Security and the European Union: An Historical 
Institutionalist Analysis of a 21
st
 Century Security Concern 
Name of Researcher: Robert S. Dewar 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Plain Language Statement for the above study and 
have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason. 
3. I consent to the interview being audio-taped  
 Yes 
 No 
 (Please delete as applicable) 
4. I agree to be identified in any publications arising from the research via the following: 
 
a) By name 
b) Via a pseudonym which will be assigned by the researcher 
c) By institution only 
(Please delete as applicable 
 
5. I understand that copies of the interview transcripts may be returned to me for verification if I 
request this. 
 
6. I agree / do not agree (delete as applicable) to take part in the above study.     
 
     
Name of Participant    Date   Signature 
 
Researcher     Date   Signature 
1 for subject; 1 for researcher 
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Appendix 10 – List of Referable Interview Participants 
Names of Interviewees are provided where permission was given to do so. 
Organisation Name Location Date 
 
European Union 
        
European Network and 
Information Security 
Agency 
Dr Steve 
Purser 
Athens, 
Greece 
14/05/2014 
European Network and 
Information Security 
Agency 
Prof. Dr. Udo 
Helmbrecht 
Heraklion, 
Greece 
16/05/2014 
Europol   
The Hague, 
Netherlands 
22/05/2014 
European Cyber Crime 
Centre 
  
The Hague, 
Netherlands 
23/05/2014 
eu-LISA   
Tallinn, 
Estonia 
28/05/2014 
European Defence Agency 
Wolfgang 
Roehrig 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
11/06/2014 
European External Action 
Service 
  
Brussels, 
Belgium 
11/06/2014 
DG Connect, European 
Commission 
  
Brussels, 
Belgium 
12/06/2014 
DG MARKT, European 
Commission 
  
Brussels, 
Belgium 
13/06/2014 
CERT-EU   
Brussels, 
Belgium 
17/06/2014 
European Parliament   
 Brussels, 
Belgium 
17/06/2014 
European Union   Brussels 17/06/2014 
Bureau of European Policy 
Analysis, European 
Commission 
  
Brussels, 
Belgium 
19/06/2014 
DG HOME, European 
Commission 
  
Brussels, 
Belgium 
19/06/2014 
EPP, European Parliament 
Tunne Kelam, 
MEP 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
(Telephone) 
08/07/2014 
DG Connect, European 
Commission 
Ann-Sofie 
Rönnlund 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
23/02/2015 
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Research Institutions 
    
Chatham House Dave Clemente London 07/05/2014 
International Centre for 
Defence and Security 
Piret Pernik Tallinn 20/05/2014 
Unaffiliated* 
Lilli Traat, Susan 
Ristikivi  
30/05/2014 
Security and Defence 
Agenda 
Pauline Massart Brussels 16/06/2014 
        
Academic Institutions 
        
Tallinn University of 
Technology 
Dr Rain Ottis 
Tallinn 
(Skype) 
26/06/2014 
University of Warwick Dr George Christou 
Warwick 
(Skype) 
18/09/2014 
        
National Government Representations 
        
UK Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills 
  London 
14/01/14, 
16/05/14 
UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 
  London 08/05/2014 
UK Cabinet Office   London 08/05/2014 
Dutch National Cyber 
Security Centre 
  The Hague 23/05/2014 
Representative of the 
Government of Estonia 
Luukas Ilves Brussels 12/06/2014 
German Permanent 
Representative to the EU 
  Brussels 25/02/2015 
 
*Permission to cite institute withheld  
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Appendix 11 – Control Codes (NVivo nodes) derived from EU Cyber Security Strategy 
Code/Node Name No. of Sources No. of References 
EUCSS Drivers - The EU is doing what it is doing because... 0 0 
1. EU Values Offline also apply Online 12 19 
1a. Protection of fundamental rights 79 157 
2. The Internet needs to be robust and innovative 2 2 
2a. To ensure freedom 1 2 
2b. To ensure prosperity 1 1 
3.a Private sector innovation must be encouraged 17 27 
3.a.i. Through Private sector incentivisation 11 15 
3b. Civil Society involvement must be encouraged 26 40 
4a. The EU is seeking to protect cyberspace from incidents NIS 13 17 
4b. The EU is seeking to protect cyberspace from Malicious Activities NIS 9 12 
4c. The EU is seeking to protect cyberspace from Misuse NIS 2 4 
4d. The EU is seeking to protect cyberspace from 4a-c because doing so is conducive to EU internal security NIS 4 5 
4.d.i Internet's integrity and security must be guaranteed to allow safe access for all 7 8 
5a. ECONOMIC Functioning of the Internal Market 70 169 
5b. ECONOMIC Europe-wide market demand for secure products 4 5 
5c. ECONOMIC Promote industry 23 27 
5d. ECONOMIC Economic Growth 82 180 
5e. ECONOMIC Reliance of economic sectors on ICT 16 21 
5f. ECONOMIC Creating jobs 42 84 
6. TRUST Build citizen trust in online transactions to boost commercial transactions and achieve economic potential 49 85 
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7. to protect the integrity of critical infrastructures (CIP) NIS 24 30 
7a. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection NIS 25 29 
8. Tackling cyber-crime CYBER-CRIME 70 116 
8a. Protection of Children 38 65 
9. Tackling international and state or government misuse of cyberspace 4 4 
10. Keeping up with international political trends 4 6 
11a. CORPORATE ACTOR European Commission 68 197 
11b. CORPORATE ACTOR High Representative 2 3 
11c. INSTITUTIONAL DRIVER Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 14 20 
11d. INSTITUTIONAL DRIVER Budapest Convention 20 29 
11e. INSTITUTIONAL DRIVER International Humanitarian Law 1 1 
12. FACILITATION The EU is conducive to the internationality of cyberspace 41 70 
12a. FACILITATION EU can manage multiple actors and actor types 33 68 
12b. FACILITATION EU can facilitate Co-operation 111 380 
12.b.i FACILITATION EU can facilitate co-operation between civil and military 7 9 
12.b.ii FACILITATION EU can facilitate co-operation between EU Member States 36 64 
12c. FACILITATION The EU is in a position to legislate 22 30 
12d. FACILITATION EU facilitates raising awareness 45 77 
13. Cyber defence CYBER DEFENCE 8 14 
14....because of increased social, economic and political dependence on networked technologies 28 47 
15. RESILIENCE 28 68 
16. Member State responsibility 20 34 
16a. Member States are the drivers INTERVIEWS 12 27 
  
255 
 
Appendix 12 – Codes (NVivo nodes) not derived from EUCSS 
Code/Node Name 
No. of 
Sources 
No. of 
References 
Non-EUCSS Drivers 0 0 
NED 1. FRAGMENTATION 0 0 
NED 1a. FRAGMENTATION of efforts between Member States 52 83 
NED 1b. FRAGMENTATION of efforts between EU agencies 0 0 
NED 1c. FRAGMENTATION of efforts between EU and MS 0 0 
NED 1d. FRAGMENTATION of the market 11 12 
NED 1e. FRAGMENTATION of EU approaches 7 8 
NED 1f. FRAGMENTATION of networks 1 1 
NED 2. INSTITUTIONAL DRIVERS 0 0 
NED 2b. Digital Agenda for Europe 16 18 
NED 2c INSTITUTIONAL DRIVER TEU and TFEU 2 4 
NED 2d. INSTITUTIONAL DRIVER European Public Private Partnership for Resilience 2 2 
NED 2f. INSTITUTIONAL DRIVER Lisbon Treaty 5 13 
NED 2g. INSTITUTIONAL DRIVER Stockholm Programme 3 3 
NED 2l. INSTITUTIONAL DRIVER Competences as defined in the Treaties INTERVIEWS 18 33 
NED 3. CATALYIC DRIVERS 0 0 
NED 3a. CATALYTIC Estonia 2007 14 21 
NED 3b. CATALYTIC Conficker 2008 1 1 
NED 3c. CATALYTIC 2008 Financial Crisis 2 3 
NED 3d. CATALYTIC Lithuania 2 2 
NED 3e. CATALYTIC Georgia 2008 5 5 
NED 3f. CATALYTIC Establishment of Internal Market 1993 0 0 
NED 3g. CATALYTIC September 11th 3 3 
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NED 3h. CATALYTIC Snowden 7 13 
NED 3i. CATALYTIC 2011 Dutch child abuse case 1 1 
NED 3j. CATALYTIC Sony Hack 1 1 
NED 3k CATALYTIC London 7 July 2005 Bombings 1 1 
NED 4. Information Society 21 50 
NED 5. National Security 3 3 
NED 6. Individual Impetus INTERVIEWS 22 61 
NED 7. CORPORATE ACTORS 0 0 
NED 7a. CORPORATE ACTOR Council of the European Union 28 43 
NED 7b. CORPORATE ACTOR European Council 36 64 
NED 7c. CORPORATE ACTOR European Forum for Member States 5 6 
NED 7d. CORPORATE ACTOR EEAS INTERVIEWS 12 26 
NED 7e. CORPORATE ACTOR European Parliament 16 20 
NED 7f. CORPORATE ACTOR Friends of the Presidency INTERVIEWS 8 11 
INTERVIEW DRIVERS 0 0 
ID 1. EU is an economic institution 1 1 
ID 2. Follow the money - look at where the EU is spending resource 4 5 
ID 5. INSTITUTIONAL DRIVER Treaty of Lisbon 9 11 
ID 7. Need for Coherence 7 9 
ID 8. Reducing duplication of efforts 12 17 
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Appendix 13 – Article 222 TFEU: “Solidarity Clause” 
SOLIDARITY CLAUSE Article 222 TFEU 
1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a 
Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-
made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including 
the military resources made available by the Member States, to:  
(a) — prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; — protect 
democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;  
— assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in 
the event of a terrorist attack;  
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in 
the event of a natural or man-made disaster.  
2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural 
or manmade disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its 
political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between 
themselves in the Council.  
3. The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause 
shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by 
the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. The Council shall act in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Treaty 
on European Union where this decision has defence implications. The European 
Parliament shall be informed.  
For the purposes of this paragraph and without prejudice to Article 240, the Council 
shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee with the support of the 
structures developed in the context of the common security and defence policy and 
by the Committee referred to in Article 71; the two committees shall, if necessary, 
submit joint opinions.  
4. The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order 
to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action. 
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